How Ideology and Contestation Shaped Islamic Legal Theory

By Adis Duderija, New Age Islam 16 July 2025 The edifice of Islamic legal theory, with its meticulous categorisation of sources and seemingly unwavering textualism, often projects an image of monolithic certainty. We envision rows of scholars poring over scripture and prophetic tradition, extracting divine commands with an almost mathematical precision. Yet, to equate this tradition with a sterile, uncontested derivation of rules is to ignore the vibrant, often fraught, intellectual landscape from which it emerged and upon which it continues to be debated. Even within the seemingly "dry" and highly textualist branches of Islamic jurisprudence, the production of knowledge has always been a dynamic and contested process, shaped by competing ideologies, cultural anxieties, and the very human struggle for authority. Joseph Schacht, in his seminal work, famously declared that "the essentials of this theory were created by Shāf i‘ī". He viewed al-Shafiʿi's (d. 820) articulation of the four sources of Islamic law – the Qur'an, the Sunna, consensus (Ijma), and analogy (Qiyas) – as an unequalled achievement in mastery and competence. Schacht’s characterization of this theory as “classical” implied a sense of foundational perfection. However, the term "classical" itself carries a complex baggage. While it might allude to admiration for perfection, as in Greek and Roman traditions, Schacht himself also employed "classicism" to signify fossilization, decline, and immobility. Furthermore, in modern discourse, "classical" Islamic law is sometimes perceived as inherently resistant to modern needs due to its sacred sources. This very ambiguity in the term "classical" hints at the ongoing contestation surrounding the interpretation and relevance of this legal tradition. As persuasively demonstrated by Masud, Nasr Abu Zayd’s critical study of al-Shafiʿi’s al-Risala offers a powerful lens through which to understand this inherent contestation. Abu Zayd, an expert in Qur'anic hermeneutics, approached al-Risala not merely as a treatise on jurisprudence (Fiqh) or its methodology (Uṣūl Al-Fiqh), but as a foundational text of an ideology. His work, Al-Imam Al-Shafiʿi Wa Taʾsis Al-Idiyilojiyya Al-Wasatiyya (Imam al-Shafiʿi and the foundation of the ideology of synthesis), became deeply controversial, ultimately leading to his exile. This personal history itself underscores the high stakes involved in questioning mainstream interpretations of Islamic legal theory and the contestation inherent in its very study. Abu Zayd argued that al-Shafiʿi’s primary aim was not simply to define the four sources, but to establish the authority of the (revealed) text – the Qur'an – and to link all other sources to it. This emphasis on textual authority, according to Abu Zayd, emerged within a context of political, social, and juridical developments that al-Shafiʿi perceived as threatening the primacy of revelation. The debates between the Ahl al-Hadith (people of tradition) and the ahl al-raʾy (people of opinion) over the authentic approach to legal reasoning, the apprehension towards Persian cultural influences, and the political contestations of the Abbasid era all formed the backdrop against which al-Shafiʿi formulated his theory. His work was not a dispassionate, objective exercise; it was an intervention in a field already rife with competing ideas. Abu Zayd interpreted al-Shafiʿi’s discourse on jurisprudence as an ideology of power, instrumental in establishing the authority of jurists and their schools. Concepts like Ijtihād (independent legal reasoning) and Ijma (consensus) were redefined within this framework to discourage the growth of truly independent opinion (Raʾy) and to anchor legal reasoning firmly within the perceived boundaries of the revealed texts. Abu Zayd questioned whether criticizing the thought of an influential figure like al-Shafiʿi was considered an attack on religious discourse itself, and whether ijtihad was being unduly restricted by the interpretations of earlier scholars. His very act of posing these questions highlights the ongoing contestation between tradition and critical inquiry within Islamic thought. Central to Abu Zayd’s analysis is the distinction between “text” (Naṣṣ) and the “authority of the text”. He argued that the text itself is not inherently authoritative; its authority is constructed through an epistemology of authority formulated by a community that transforms it into a socio-cultural hegemony. This community then defines the text as the ultimate source of authority, often in opposition to human reason. Abu Zayd pointed to the historical example of the Battle of Ṣiffīn, where Muʿawiya’s forces raised the Qur'an on their lances, proclaiming “sovereignty to God alone,” a slogan that Ali famously countered with “The Qurʾān does not speak, it is humans who speak”. This early episode illustrates the fundamental contestation over who has the right to interpret and wield the authority of the sacred text. Abu Zayd saw echoes of this dynamic in contemporary claims for the "sovereignty of God" and the absolute obedience demanded to literal interpretations of scripture. His own questioning of such approaches, drawing attention to the specific historical contexts of Qur'anic verses, further exemplifies the contestation of knowledge production in this domain. Al-Shafiʿi’s own positions on key legal principles were not universally accepted and reflect the contestation of his time. For instance, his efforts to establish the Sunna as a primary and authoritative source of law alongside the Qur'anwere not self-evident. Abu Zayd points out that al-Shafiʿi's need to argue for this position indicates that it was not yet firmly established. Al-Shafiʿi extended the concept of revelation to include the Sunna, interpreting verses like “He does not speak from desire; it is not but a revelation from God (Qurʾān 53:3-4)” to mean that hadith (prophetic traditions) were also divinely inspired. However, this interpretation was not unchallenged, as evidenced by scholars like Al-Tabari, who understood the pronoun "it" in the verse to refer specifically to the Qur'an. This divergence in interpretation reveals a fundamental contestation over the very nature and scope of divine revelation and its sources. Similarly, al-Shafiʿi’s vehement rejection of Istiḥsān (juristic preference), a method of legal reasoning favoured by prominent jurists like Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfa, highlights another area of contention. Al-Shafiʿi feared that Istiḥsān would lead to arbitrary opinions and undermine the authority of the revealed texts. His strong stance against it, even citing Qur'anic verses condemning conflict, underscores the competing methodologies for deriving legal rulings and the inherent contestation over the proper application of human reasoning in Islamic law. Even al-Shafiʿi’s strong defence of the Arabic language as the sole medium for the Qur'an and essential religious acts was not merely a linguistic observation but an ideological position embedded in the cultural and political anxieties of his era. His insistence that prayers and marriage contracts must be conducted in Arabic, contrasting with the Hanafi school's more lenient view, reveals a contestation over cultural identity and the perceived purity of religious practice. Al-Shafiʿi’s denial of any non-Arabic vocabulary in the Qur'an, based on his belief in the comprehensive nature of the Arabic language and the comprehensibility of the Qur'an to all Arabs, further illustrates how even seemingly linguistic debates were intertwined with broader ideological concerns about authority and understanding. Abu Zayd argued that this defence of the Arabic language, particularly the emphasis on the dialect of the Quraysh, transformed into an ideology connected to the issue of Quraysh’s political and cultural supremacy. The early debates over the caliphate and the subsequent civil wars to settle the supremacy of the Quraysh provide the historical context for understanding this dimension of al-Shafiʿi’s thought. The very historiography of Islamic legal theory reveals ongoing contestation. The existence of distinct scholarly traditions in the modern period – one studying al-Shafiʿi within a broader Islamic literary culture and another focusing specifically on his contribution to legal theory – indicates differing perspectives on the significance and scope of his work. Even within the latter tradition, scholars continue to challenge Schacht’s conclusions while still analysing al-Shafiʿi's contribution from the perspective of the four sources. Joseph Lowry's call to study al-Risala with a wider lens, acknowledging prophetic authority as just one element, and Ahmed el Shamsy's observation of a widening gap between Arab and Western scholarship on the subject, further highlight the diverse and sometimes conflicting ways in which this foundational text is understood. Al-Shafiʿi’s articulation of different types of authentic knowledge and the emphasis on the knowledge of specialists can also be interpreted as a strategy within a contested intellectual landscape. By defining specific avenues for valid knowledge acquisition – such as continuous transmission (Mutawatir), interpretation based on consensus (Taʾwīl), unanimous agreement (Ijma), reports from reliable individuals (Khabar Wāḥid), and analogical reasoning (Qiyas) within defined parameters – al-Shafiʿi sought to establish clear boundaries for legitimate legal reasoning and, implicitly, to marginalize dissenting or independent opinions. This emphasis on a community of specialists and the need for their agreement to validate certain forms of knowledge underscores the role of authority and social dynamics in the production of Islamic legal knowledge. In conclusion, the history of Islamic legal theory, even in its most textualist expressions, is not a story of seamless, uncontested derivation. Figures like al-Shafiʿi operated within a dynamic and often contentious environment, and their contributions were shaped by competing intellectual trends, cultural anxieties, and political realities. Nasr Abu Zayd’s critical analysis serves as a powerful reminder that seemingly objective legal frameworks are often underpinned by ideological assumptions and power dynamics. The debates surrounding the interpretation of scripture, the role of tradition and reason, the authority of different sources, and even the very language of religious discourse demonstrate the inherent contestation in the production of Islamic legal knowledge. Recognizing this dynamic is crucial for moving beyond simplistic portrayals of Islamic law and appreciating the rich and complex intellectual heritage that continues to be debated and reinterpreted in the modern world. The whispers of contestation beneath the seemingly solid textual surface are essential to understanding the true vitality and evolution of Islamic legal thought. ------ Checkout Dr. Adis Duderija’s personal website at: https://dradisduderija.com/ A decades old patron of New Age Islam, Dr Adis Duderija is a Senior Lecturer in the Study of Islam and Society, School of Humanities, Languages and Social Science; Senior Fellow Centre for Interfaith and Intercultural Dialogue, Griffith University | Nathan | Queensland | Australia. His forthcoming books are (co-edited) - Shame, Modesty, and Honour in Islam and Interfaith Engagement beyond the Divide (Springer) URL: https://www.newageislam.com/debating-islam/ideology-contestation-islamic-legal-theory/d/136190 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism