Large-Scale Interfaith Studies Are Urgently Needed To Achieve Interfaith Harmony and Prevent the Growing Hatred in the Country

Religious Madrasas Must Plan For Interfaith Harmony Courses Main Points 1. Freeing The Country From Prejudices And All Forms Of Hatred Is The Most Pressing Need Of Our Time. 2. The start of the Interfaith Harmony course would provide a scholarly foundation for interfaith and sectarian tolerance. 3. The Nizami Centre of Aligarh Muslim University convened a group of specialists to create a course in Hindi language and Indian religions for graduates of religious Madrasas. ....... By New Age Islam Staff Writer 24 November 2021 Interfaith dialogue is one of the most pressing global topics of our time, and it is being discussed in a variety of institutions and platforms all over the world. Although its goals differ from place to place, the challenge of finding common ground amongst religions and defining societal functions of religions has some universal appeal, and intellectuals at all levels are voicing their opinions on the subject. Aside from this broad perspective, there is a need for religious Madrasas, teachers, and students to study current faiths in relation to Islamic teachings, which is something that Madrasas are called upon to do from time to time, and certain institutions are already doing so. However, there appears to be no indication of the seriousness and thoroughness that this subject necessitates in the current global setting. I'm not sure if Indian leaders recognise the need for large-scale interfaith studies or what steps they've taken in that direction, but I was pleased to read today in the Inquilab Urdu Newspaper that some Muslim scholars have recognised the need of the hour and have chosen the difficult path of interfaith dialogue to free the country from prejudices and all forms of hatred, which is certainly commendable. The Following Is The English Version Of This Report: The Nizami Centre for the Promotion of Sciences at Aligarh Muslim University convened a group of specialists to create a course in Hindi language and Indian religions for graduates of religious Madrasas. The meeting was presided over by Prof. Ali Muhammad Naqvi, Director of the Dara Shikoh Interfaith Understanding and Dialogue. The group was asked to meet by Maulana Fazlur Rehman Mujaddidi, Superintendent of Jamia Al-Hidaya in Jaipur. Jamia Al-Hidaya plans to prepare a two-year course for graduates of religious Madrasas who wish to specialise in the Hindi language and Indian religions, according to Fazlur Rehman Mujaddidi, who spoke at the conference. The wisdom and experience of the Faculty of Aligarh Muslim University will be utilised to create the syllabus and system. On this occasion, Muhammad Saud Alam Qasmi, Dean Faculty of Theology, stated that teaching Hindi language and Indian religions courses in Madrassas is a pressing need and that the superintendent of Jamia Al-Hidaya deserves praise for his initiative. According to him, the start of the course would provide a scholarly foundation for interfaith and sectarian tolerance. He believes that such a course should be recognized by Indian universities so that graduates can benefit from it. The study of religions is a part of the Muslim legacy, and he believes it is important to continue it. Professor Mohsin Usmani, former Dean of the Faculty of Languages at EFL University in Hyderabad, stated that prophets have always spoken in the national language, and since Hindi is the national language of India, learning Hindi and becoming familiar with Indian religions is a social and religious responsibility of Ulama. According to Naseem Ahmad Khan, director of Bridge Course, the religion and Hindi language curriculum for Madrasa graduates should be based on the university curriculum so that students can progress more smoothly. Maulana Arshad Jamal Nadvi, Secretary, Islamic Research and Writing Institute, spoke at the event, saying that teaching Hindi and Indian religions is a religious and social necessity. He believes that if prominent Madrasas take the lead in this area, other Madrasas will be inspired to jump on board. Dr. Abbas Raza, a professor at Women's College, believes that the study of other religions should be done sympathetically rather than demonstratively and that professional educators should be appointed to do so. Prof. Ali Muhammad Naqvi, who delivered the Presidential speech, stated that before beginning this course in Madrasas, special attention should be paid to the purpose, method, curriculum, and preparation of course books, as this effort is crucial. In this regard, Aligarh Muslim University's Faculty of Theology, Department of Hindi, Nizami Centre, and Bridge Course Centre will provide full support and will also develop textbooks. (For Urdu Report Inquilab Urdu Newspaper) Establishing large-scale interfaith harmony courses with the objective of promoting tolerance, humanity, and societal peace on sound grounds is unquestionably a critical necessity of our day. URL: https://www.newageislam.com/interfaith-dialogue/interfaith-harmony-hatred-india/d/125833 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism

The Ascent of Taliban in Afghanistan Is a Culmination of Deobandism

Father of Deobandism in India Shah Waliullah Studied Islam with Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab in Hijaz Main Points: 1. Founders of Deoband Movement were influenced by the Wahhabism originated in Najd, Saudi Arabia. 2. Taliban of Afghanistan are the products of Deoband school of Islamic though ---- New Age Islam Staff Writer 24 November 2021 Kamran Bokhari’s article “The Long Shadow of Deobandism in South Asia” gives a detailed historical account of the birth and development of Deobandism in the Indian subcontinent. The author traces the birth of Deobandism in the ideology of Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab of Najd with whom the founder of the Deobandi ideology Shah Waliullah Muhaddith Dehlawi studied the Quran, Hadith and Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in Hijaz. The founders of Darul Uloom Deoband, Qasim Nanautavi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi were groomed by the Wahhabi school of Islamic thought promoted by Shah Waliullah. The Deoband School of Islamic thought believed from the beginning in armed revolution to establish an Islamic state and therefore it declared jihad against the British government. After being defeated by the British, the Deoband School adopted the strategy of expanding its ideological base across the undivided India. Deobandism is greatly influenced by the extremist ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah.The Darul Uloom became the ideological centres of similar schools in the subcontinent. During the freedom movement, they supported Gandhi’s Khilafat Movement and outdid the rival Bareilvis. During the same time, Jamaat Islami emerged on the lines of Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. This movement spread its influence among the majority of Muslims as a puritanical Islamic movement that sought to purify Islam of local un-Islamic impurities that had entered Islam. The leaders of Deoband tried to create a Pan-Islamic presence and tried to topple the British government of India with the help of the Muslim governments of the Islamic world including of Afghanistan. However, the plan failed and the leaders of Deoband were put in prison. During this course, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, Deoband’s political wing came into existence. However, after the Partition, the movement was divided and its Pakistani offshoot, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam came into existence. This JUI later established Darul Uloom Haqqania which promoted militant Deobandism. General Zia promoted Deobandism in the country and during his tenure Deobandism expanded its foothold. This movement later gave birth to Taliban. Taliban was a militant outfit that did not believe in the democratic process. In 2007, 13 Taliban factions of Pakistan formed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. It unleased attacks against government installations and on non-Muslim minorities of Pakistan. Extremist religious outfits affiliated to Deobandism had so great an influence on the governments that the Imran Khan government had to compromise with them. The rise and the growing power of Deobandism caused the contamination of the Bareilvi sect that hitherto remained affiliated to the ideology of Sufism and had become violent. Therefore, Deobandism has caused the rise of militant Islamism in the sub-continent and thrust the Taliban on the pedestal of power in Afghanistan as Wahhabism had thrust ISIS and Muslim Brotherhood to power in the Middle East. The author Kamran Bokhari has very minutely studied the birth and emergence of violent Deobandism in the sub-continent. ----- The Long Shadow of Deobandism in South Asia By Kamran Bokhari November 23, 2021 I might have been 11 when I first heard the word “Deobandi.” My family had just returned to Islamabad after eight years in New York, where my father served as a mid-ranking official at Pakistan’s mission to the United Nations. A year had passed since military ruler, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, began subjecting Pakistan to his despotic Islamisation agenda, and I was being exposed to a lot more than my brain could process. My dad despised Zia for two separate reasons. The first was obviously political. My father was a democrat and a staunch supporter of ousted Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had been executed after Zia’s 1977 coup. The second was religious. Our ancestors were from the Barelvi sect, which constituted the vast majority of Pakistanis at the time and has been the historical rival of the Deobandis, whom Zia had begun to capacitate to gain legitimacy for his regime. For the most part a secular individual, my father had always been passionate about our supposed ancestral lineage to medieval Sufi saints. Illustration by Joanna Andreasson for New Lines ------ Deobandis are Hanafi Sunni Muslims like Barelvis, but for him they represented local variants of the extremist brand known as Wahhabism, which originated in the Arabian Peninsula. And with Zia empowering their mullahs, mosques and madrassas, he thought it was his duty to protect his heritage, and I was given a crash course on the sectarian landscape. While most Islamists in the Arab/Muslim world are more activists than religious scholars, in South Asia the largest Islamist groups are led by traditional clerics and their students. And the Deobandi sect has been in the forefront of South Asian Islamism, with the Taliban as its most recent manifestation. The Deobandis’ influence, reach and relevance in a vast and volatile region like South Asia is immense, yet they are little understood in the West. Western scholarship and commentary tend to be more focused on the movement’s counterparts in the Arab world, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabi Salafism. Deobandism was propelled by ulema lamenting at the loss of Muslim sovereignty in India. Different dynastic Muslim regimes had ruled over various regions in the subcontinent since the late 10th and early 11th century. The ulema had been part of the South Asian Muslim political elite, but their public role was always subject to a tug of war with the rulers and evolved over time. They had a strong presence in the royal court from the time of the first Muslim sultanistic dynasty in the subcontinent: the Turkic Ghaznavids (977-1170), who broke off from the Persian Samanids (who themselves had declared their independence from the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad). It was during this era that the role of ulema began to change in that a great many of them from Central Asia invested in proselytization and spiritual self-discipline. This spiritual approach gained ground and distinguished itself from the legalistic approach of the ulema. The former took on a social and grassroots role while the latter continued to focus on directly influencing the sultan and, through his sultanate, the realm at large. Behind both movements were ulema who, to varying degrees, subscribed to Sufism. The difference was between those who swung heavily toward scriptural scholarship and those who were open to unorthodox ideas and practices in keeping with what they perceived as the need to accommodate local customs and exigencies. This divide would remain contained and the ulema would enjoy an elite status, which continued through the era of the Ghaurids (1170-1215) — an Afghan dynasty. Essentially the ulema provided legitimacy for the rulers and in exchange received largesse and influence in matters of religion. It was under the Sultanate of Delhi (1206-1525) that the ulema were appointed to several official state positions, largely within the judiciary. In addition, a state law enforcement organ called Hisbah was created for ensuring that society conformed to Shariah, which is the origin for the modern-day agencies in some Muslim governments assigned the task of “promoting virtue and preventing vice.” It was an arrangement that allowed the ruler to keep the ulema in check and incapable of intruding into matters of statecraft. After the Delhi Sultanate collapsed in 1526, it was replaced by another Turkic dynasty, the Mughals, under whom the ulema were marginalized. In his award-winning 2012 book, “The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam,” Azfar Moin, who heads the University of Texas at Austin’s Religious Studies Department, explains that during the reigns of Akbar (r. 1542-1605), his son Jehangir (r. 1605-27) and his grandson Shah Jehan (r. 1628-58), the ulema would remain in political wilderness. It was Akbar’s great-grandson, Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707), who not only restored the ulema to their pre-Akbar status but also radically altered the empire’s structure by theocratising it. His Islamisation agenda was a watershed moment, for it created the conditions in which the ulema would eventually gain unprecedented ground. What enabled the advance would be the fact that Aurangzeb was the last effective emperor, leading to not just the collapse of the Mughal empire but also the ascendance of British colonial rule. These two sequential developments would essentially shape the conditions in which Deobandism, and later on, radical Islamism, would emerge, as argued by Princeton scholar Muhammad Qasim Zaman explains in in his seminal 2007 book “The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change.” Over the course of the next two centuries, an ulema tendency that stressed the study of original Islamic sources and deemphasized the role of the rational sciences gained strength. Started by Shah Abdur Rahim, a prominent religious scholar in Aurangzeb’s royal court, this multigenerational movement was carried forward by his progeny, which included Shah Waliullah Delhawi, Shah Abdul Aziz and Muhammad Ishaq. This line of scholars represented the late Mughal era puritanical movement. Delhawi, who was its most influential theoretician, was a contemporary of the founder of Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The two even studied at the same time in Medina under some of the same teachers who exposed them to the ideas of the early 14th century iconoclastic Levantine scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. Salafism and Deobandism, the two most fundamentalist Muslim movements of the modern era, simultaneously emerged in the Middle East and South Asia, respectively. According to the conventional wisdom, the extremist views of Wahhabism spread from the Middle East to South Asia. In reality, however, Delhawi and Wahhabism’s founder drank from the same fountain in Medina — under an Indian teacher by the name of Muhammad Hayyat al-Sindhi and his student Abu Tahir Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim al-Kurani. A major legacy of Delhawi is Deobandism, which arose as Wahhabism’s equivalent in South Asia in the late 19th century. Similar circumstances led to the near simultaneous rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and Jamaat-i-Islami in South Asia in the early 20th century. These connections go to show how the two regions often influence each other in more significant ways than usually acknowledged. For this clerical movement shaped by Delhawi, Muslim political decay in India was a function of religious decline, the result of the contamination of thought and practice with local polytheism and alien philosophies. Insisting that the ulema be the vanguard of a Muslim political restoration, these scholars established a tradition of issuing fatwas to provide common people with sharia guidance for everyday issues. Until then, such religious rulings had been largely the purview of the official ulema who held positions in the state. This group was responsible for turning the practice into a nongovernmental undertaking at a time when the state had become almost nonexistent. By the time Ishaq died in the mid-19th century, he had cultivated a group of followers including Mamluk Ali and Imdadullah Mujhajir Makki, who were mentors of the two founders of Deobandism, Muhammad Qasim Nanutavi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. Renowned American scholar of South Asian Islam Barbara Metcalf in her 1982 book “Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900” explains how the emergence of Deobandism was rooted in both ideological and practical concerns. It began when Nanutavi and Gangohi established the Dar-ul-Uloom seminary in the town of Deoband, some 117 miles north of Delhi, in 1866 — eight years after participating in a failed rebellion against the British conquest of India. These two founders of the movement had already tried forming an Islamic statelet in a village called Thana Bhawan, north of Delhi, from where they sought to wage jihad against the British, only to be swiftly defeated. William Jackson explains in great detail, in his 2013 Syracuse University dissertation, the story of how the two formed a local emirate — a micro-version of the one achieved by the Taliban. Their mentor Makki became emir-ul-momineen, the Leader of the Faithful, and the two served as his senior aides — Nanutavi as his military leader, and Gangohi served as his judge. The tiny emirate was crushed by the British within a few months. Imdadullah fled to Mecca, Gangohi was arrested and Nanautavi fled to Deoband, where he sought refuge with relatives. Realizing there was no way to beat the British militarily, Nanautavi sought to adopt the empire’s educational model and established a school attached to a mosque. His decision would be instrumental in shaping the course of history, ultimately helping to lay the groundwork for Indian independence, the creation of Pakistan and the rise of modern jihadist groups including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. In Nanautavi’s point of view, European Christians were now masters of the land long ruled by Indian Muslims. He thus envisioned the seminary as an institution that would produce a Muslim vanguard capable of restoring the role of the ulema in South Asian politics and even raising it to unprecedented levels. His priority was religious revival and, after Gangohi was released from prison, the madrassa at Deoband became the nucleus for a large network of similar schools around the country. After Nanautavi died in 1880, Mahmud Hassan, the first student to enroll in Dar-ul-Uloom, led the Deobandi movement. Hassan transformed the movement from focusing on a local concern to one with national and international ambitions. Students from Russia, China, Central Asia, Persia, Turkey, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula came to study at the seminary under his leadership. By the end of the First World War, more than a thousand graduates had fanned out across India. Their main task was to expunge ideas and practices that had crept into Indian Muslim communities through centuries of interactions with the Hindu majority. This quickly antagonized the pre-dominant Muslim tendency that was rooted in Sufi mysticism and South Asian Islamic traditions. This movement started to organize in response to the Deobandis, in another Indian town called Bareilly, and was led by Ahmed Raza Khan (1856-1921). The Barelvis, as the rival movement came to be known, viewed the Deobandis as a greater threat to their religion and country than British colonial rule. This rivalry continues to define religious and political dynamics till this day, across South Asia. Although the Deobandis viewed India as Dar-ul-Harb (Dominion of War), they initially did not try to mount another armed insurrection. Instead, they opted for a mainstream approach to politics that called for Hindu-Muslim unity. The Barelvis, meanwhile, took up controversial positions that unintentionally helped the Deobandis gain support. In particular, a fatwa by the Barelvi leader, Ahmed Raza Khan, in which he ruled that the Ottoman Empire was not the true caliphate, angered many Indian Muslims and drove them closer to the pan-Islamic, anti-British vision of the Deobandis. In fact, given the success of the Deobandi movement on a sectarian level, it never really viewed the Barelvis as a serious challenge. While Deobandis and Barelvis were in the making, so was a modernist Muslim movement led by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-98). A religious scholar turned modern intellectual, Sir Syed hailed from a privileged family during the late Mughal era and worked as a civil servant during British rule. From his point of view, Muslim decline was a direct result of a fossilized view of religion and a lack of modern scientific knowledge. Sir Syed would go on to be the leader of Islamic modernism in South Asia through the founding of the Aligarh University. The university produced the Muslim elite, which would, almost half a century after Sir Syed’s death, found Pakistan. Sir Syed’s prognosis of the malaise affecting the Muslims of India was unique and clearly different from that of the long line of religious scholars who saw the problem as a function of the faithful having drifted away from Islam’s original teachings. The loss of sovereignty to the British combined with the rise of men like him who advocated a cooperative approach toward the British and an embracing of European modernity would lead the founders of Deoband to adopt their own pragmatic approach but one that laid heavy emphasis on religious education. The Deobandis viewed Sir Syed’s Islamic modernism as their principal competitor. In other words, the Aligarh movement also developed around a university — but one that emphasized Western secular education — represented a major challenge, and not just politically but also religiously in that it offered an alternative paradigm. Barely half a century after its founding, the Deobandi movement had established seminaries across India, from present-day Bangladesh in the east to Afghanistan in the west. Such was its influence that in 1914, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of the secular Pashtun Khudai Khidmatgars movement, visited the Dar-ul-Uloom. Ghaffar Khan, who would later earn the moniker “The Frontier Gandhi,” met the Deobandi leader Mahmud Hassan to discuss the idea of establishing a base in the Pashtun areas of northwest India, from which they could launch an independence rebellion against the British. Harking back to the armed struggle of their forerunners, the Deobandis, once again, tried their hand at jihad — this time on a transnational scale. With the help of Afghanistan, Ottoman Turkey, Germany and Russia, Hassan sought to foment this insurrection, believing that Britain would be too focused on fighting the First World War on the battlefields of Europe to be able to deal with an uprising in India. The plan was ambitious but foolhardy. Hassan wanted to headquarter the insurgent force in Hejaz, in modern-day Saudi Arabia, with regional commands in Istanbul, Tehran and Kabul. He traveled to Hejaz, where he met with the Ottoman war minister, Anwar Pasha, and the Hejaz governor, Ghalib Pasha. The Ottomans strongly supported an Indian rebellion as a response to the British-backed Arab revolt against them. The plan failed in great part because the Afghan monarch, Emir Habibullah Khan, would not allow an all-out war against the British be waged from his country’s soil. Hassan, the Deoband leader, was ensconced in Mecca when he was arrested by the Hashemite ruler of the Hejaz, Sharif Hussein bin Ali, and handed over to the British. He was imprisoned on the island of Malta. During the four years that Hassan was jailed, several key developments took place back home in India. The most important was the launch of the 1919 Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement by a number of Muslim notables influenced by Deobandism. As prominent historian of South Asian Islam, Gail Minault, argues in her 1982 book “Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India,” the Khilafat Movement, which lobbied Turkey’s new republican regime to preserve the caliphate, was actually a means of mobilizing India’s Muslims in a nationalist struggle against the British. This would explain why the movement received the support of Mahatma Gandhi in exchange for backing his Non-Cooperation Movement against the British. At around the same time, several Deobandi ulema created Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind (JUH), which would become the formal political wing of the movement – engaging in a secular nationalist struggle. When Hassan was released from prison and returned to India, Gandhi traveled to Bombay to receive him. Hassan went on to issue a fatwa in support of the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements, which was endorsed by hundreds of ulema. Under his leadership, the Deobandis also supported Gandhi’s candidacy for the presidency of the Indian National Congress. The move was in keeping with their point of view that the Hindu majority was not a threat to Islam and the real enemies were the British. As the Deobandi movement pushed for Hindu-Muslim unity, it underwent another leadership change. Ill from tuberculosis, Hassan died in November 1920, six months after his release from prison. He was succeeded by his longtime deputy Hussain Ahmed Madani, who engaged in a major campaign calling for joint Hindu-Muslim action against the British. With Madani at the helm, the Deobandis argued that movements organized along communal lines played into the hands of the colonial rulers and advanced the idea of “composite nationalism.” A united front was needed to end the British Empire’s dominance. This view ran counter to the atmosphere of the times and, following the collapse of the Deobandis’ transnational efforts, the movement’s nationalist program also floundered. The All-India Muslim League (AIML), headed by the future founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was growing in strength and steering Indian Muslims toward separatism. At the same time, the Deobandis’ JUH and Gandhi’s Indian National Congress intensified their demand for Indian self-government. The situation came to a head with massive nationwide unrest in 1928. To defuse the situation, the British asked Indian leaders to put forth a constitutional framework of their own. In response, the Indian National Congress produced the Nehru Report, a major turning point for the Deobandis. The report by their erstwhile allies ignored the JUH demand for a political structure that would insulate Muslim social and religious life from central government interference. This led dissenting members of the JUH and among the wider Deobandi community to join AIML’s call for Muslim separatism. While prominent Deobandi scholar Ashraf Ali Thanvi would initiate the break, it was his student, Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, who led the split. Usmani would spearhead a reshaping of the Deobandi religious sect and play a critical role in charting the geopolitical divide that still defines South Asia today. In 1939, Thanvi issued a fatwa decreeing that Muslims were obligated to support Jinnah’s separatist AIML. He then resigned from the Deoband seminary and spent the four remaining years of his life supporting the creation of Pakistan. Thanvi and Usmani realized that if the Deobandis did not act, the Barelvis — already allied with the AIML — could outmanoeuvre them. Better organized and one step ahead of their arch-rivals, the Deobandis were able to position themselves as the major religious allies of the AIML. It is important to note, however, that many Deobandis remained loyal to Madani’s more inclusive approach. They viewed his stance as in keeping with the Prophet Muhammad’s Compact of Medina, which had ensured the cooperation of various non-Muslim tribes. In contrast, Usmani and the renegade Deobandis had long been deeply uncomfortable with the idea of Hindu-Muslim unity, which conflicted with their religious puritanism. When Usmani established Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) in 1945 as a competitor to Madani’s JUH, the deep schism within the Deoband movement had reached a point of no return. Usmani’s insurrection came at the perfect time for Jinnah, a secular Muslim politician with an Ismaili Shia background. Jinnah had long sought to weaken JUH’s opposition to his Muslim separatist project; the support of Usmani lent religious credibility to his cause: creating the state of Pakistan. After partition in 1947, the spiritual home of the Deobandi movement remained in India, but Pakistan was now its political centre. When they founded JUI, Usmani and his followers already knew that it was way too late in the game for their group to be the vanguard leading the struggle for Pakistan. The AIML had long assumed that mantle, but it was not too late for the JUI to lead the way to Islamizing the new secular Muslim state. In fact, Jinnah’s move to leverage the Islamic faith to mobilize mass demand for a secular Muslim homeland had left the character of this new state deeply ambiguous. Such uncertainty provided the ideal circumstances for JUI to position itself at the center of efforts to craft a constitution for Pakistan. In the new country’s first Parliament, the Constituent Assembly, JUI spearheaded the push for an “Islamic political system.” The death of secularist Jinnah in September 1948 created a leadership vacuum, which helped JUI’s cause. As a member of the assembly, the JUI leader Usmani played a lead role in drafting the Objectives Resolution that placed Islam at the center of the constitutional process. The resolution stated that “sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan.” It went on to say that “the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice” must be followed “as enunciated by Islam.” Adopted in 1949, the Objectives Resolution marked a huge victory for JUI and other Islamists. By mid-1952, JUI appeared to be on its way to achieving its objectives. Within months, however, the situation soured. Along with other Islamist groups, it launched a violent nationwide protest movement against the minority Ahmadiyya sect, believing that the move would enhance its political position. In response, the government imposed martial law. A subsequent government inquiry held JUI and the other religious forces responsible for the violence and even questioned the entire premise of the party’s demand for Pakistan to be turned into an Islamic state. Nevertheless, in March 1956, the country’s first constitution came into effect, formally enshrining Pakistan as an Islamic republic. Two and a half years later, however, the military seized power under Gen. Ayub Khan, who was determined to reverse the influence of the Deobandis and the growing broader religious sector. Khan would go on to decree a new constitution that laid the foundations of a secular modern state — one in which the Deobandis did not even achieve their minimalist goal of an advisory role. The Deobandi movement went through another period of decline and transition during President Khan’s reign. It was in the late 1960s under Mufti Mahmud, a religious scholar-turned-politician from the Pashtun region of Dera Ismail Khan, near the Afghan border that JUI experienced a revival. After Khan allowed political parties to operate again in 1962, Mahmud became JUI’s deputy leader. In truth, though, he was now the real mover and shaker of the Deobandi party steering it towards alliances of convenience with secular parties. Pakistani historian Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, in his 2000 book “The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan 1971-1977,” goes into detail on how Mahmud transformed JUI from a religious movement seeking to influence politics into a full-fledged political party participating in electoral politics. By the time Khan was forced out of office by popular unrest in 1969, socio-economic issues had replaced religion as the driving force shaping Pakistani politics. Another general, Yahya Khan, took over as president and again imposed martial law, abrogating the entire political system his predecessor had put together over an 11-year period. Yahya held general elections in 1970, marking the country’s first free and fair vote. Both secular and left-leaning, the country’s two major parties, the Awami League and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), came in first and second place in the vote for Parliament with 167 and 86 seats respectively, while JUI won only seven seats. By now the west-east crisis that had been brewing since the earliest days of Pakistan’s independence was reaching a critical point. The Awami League won all of its seats in East Pakistan while the PPP won all of its seats in the west of the country. The military establishment, meanwhile, refused to transfer power to the Awami League. This caused full-scale public agitation in the east, which quickly turned into a brutal civil war that led to the creation of Bangladesh from what had been East Pakistan. The war, which killed hundreds of thousands, resulted in two major implications that would help the Deobandis regain much of the political space they had lost since the early 1950s. First, it seriously weakened the military’s role in politics and allowed for the return of civilian rule. Second, it helped JUI and other religious parties to argue that only Islam could bind together different ethnic groups into a singular national fabric. Within days of the defeat in the December 1971 war, Gen Yahya’s military government came to an end and PPP chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president. In March 1972, JUI chief Mahmud became chief minister of North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP), leading a provincial coalition government with the left-wing Pashtun ethno-nationalist National Awami Party (NAP). The JUI also was a junior partner with NAP in Baluchistan’s provincial government. JUI’s stint in provincial power, however, was cut short when President Bhutto in 1973 dismissed the NAP-JUI cabinet in Baluchistan, accusing it of failing to control an ethno-nationalist insurgency in the province. In protest, the Mahmud-led government in NWFP resigned as well. The Deobandi party then turned its focus to ensuring that the constitution Bhutto’s PPP was crafting would be as much in keeping with its Islamist ideology as was possible. Well aware that the masses overwhelmingly voted on the basis of bread-and-butter issues as opposed to religion, JUI sought to prevent the ruling and other socialist parties from producing a charter that would seriously limit its share of power. JUI and the country’s broader religious right were able to capitalize on the fact that Bhutto was seeking national consensus for a constitution, which would strengthen a civilian political order led by his ruling PPP. He was thus ready for a quid pro quo with the JUI and other Islamists — conceding on a number of their demands to Islamize the charter in order to establish a parliamentary form of government. Consequently, Pakistan’s current constitution, which went into effect in August 1973, declared Islam the state religion, made the Objectives Resolution the charter’s preamble, established a Council of Islamic Ideology to ensure all laws were in keeping with the Quran and the Sunnah, and established the criteria of who is a Muslim, among a host of other provisions. The following year the Deobandis and the broader religious right won another major victory in the form of the second amendment, which declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. By 1974, the government of PPP founder Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began to appropriate religion into its own politics. Over the next three years, nine parties with JUI in a lead role formed a coalition of Islamist, centrist and leftist factions in the form of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to jointly contest the 1977 elections. The PNA campaign was trying to leverage the demand of the religious right to implement Nizam-i-Mustafa (System of Muhammad). In an election marred by irregularities, the PPP won 155 seats while the opposition alliance took only 36. After three months of unrest in the wake of the results, Bhutto invited his opponents to negotiate; JUI chief Mahmud led the opposition in the talks. In an effort not to compromise politically, Bhutto sought to appease the Islamists culturally and moved to ban the sale and consumption of liquor, shut all bars, prohibit betting and replace Sunday with the Muslim holy day of Friday as the weekly sabbath. The negotiations were cut short when army chief Gen. Zia mounted a coup, ousting Bhutto and appropriated the Deobandi agenda of Islamisation — all designed to roll back the civilianization of the state and restore the military’s role in politics. Zia’s moves to Islamize society top-down naturally resonated significantly with the religious right. From their point of view, Zia was the very opposite of the country’s first military dictator, Ayub Khan, who had been an existential threat to the entire ulema sector. The Deobandis, however, were caught between their opposition to a military dictatorship and the need to somehow benefit from Zia’s religious agenda. Although he was known for being a religious conservative, Zia was first and foremost a military officer. While the entire raison d’être of the Deobandi JUI was to establish an “Islamic” state, the Zia regime weaponized both the religion of Islam and the ideology of Islamism to gain support for what was essentially a military-dominated political order. The JUI saw itself as heir to a thousand-year tradition of ulema trying to ensure that Muslim sovereigns in South Asia were ruling in accordance with their faith. Albeit late in the game, it was also a key player in creating Pakistan, and more importantly, worked to ensure that the country’s constitution was Islamic. But now Zia, who had assumed the presidency, had engaged in a hostile takeover of not just the state but the entire Deobandi business model. This explains why Mahmud opposed Zia’s putsch and kept demanding that he stick to his initial pledge of holding elections, which the general kept postponing. Zia’s primary objective was to reverse Bhutto’s efforts to establish civilian supremacy over the military. By the time Zia banned political parties in October 1979, JUI was struggling to deal with a new autocratic political order that was stealing its thunder. It was also in a state of unprecedented decline. An internal rift had emerged within the party between those opposing Zia’s military regime and those seduced by his Islamization moves. A year later, Mahmud died of a heart attack. Mahmud’s son, a cleric-politician named Fazlur Rehman, was accepted as the new JUI chief by many of the leaders and members of the Deobandi party. But others opposed the hereditary transition. This led to a formal split in the party between Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam — Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Sami-ul-Haq (JUI-S), named after Sami-ul-Haq, a cleric whose madrassah Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania would soon play a lead role in the rise of militant Deobandism. JUI-F continued to oppose Zia’s martial law regime while the splinter Deobandi faction, JUI-S, became a major supporter of the military government. The same year that Zia was Islamizing his military regime, three major events shook the Muslim world: the Islamist-led revolution in Iran, the siege of Mecca by a group of messianic Salafists and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These three developments would prove to be a watershed for the Deobandi movement. Deobandis formed a major component of the Afghan Islamist insurgent alliance fighting the Soviet-backed communist government. Many of the leaders of the Afghan insurgent factions like Mawlawi Yunus Khalis, Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and Jalaluddin Haqqani were Deobandis. From the early 1980s onward, the two JUI factions were involved in dual projects: supporting the creation of an Islamic state in Afghanistan through armed insurrection and the Islamization of Pakistan (though divided over how on the latter). At the same time, Saudi Arabia supported the Afghan insurgency and began to step up its promotion of Wahhabism in Pakistan, partly as a response to the Mecca siege. The Deobandis benefited financially and ideologically from Riyadh’s support, leading to the emergence of new groups. Already wary of how Iran’s clerical regime was exporting its brand of revolutionary Islamism, many Deobandis were influenced by the anti-Shia sectarianism embedded within their own discourse and now energized by proliferating Wahhabism. The Zia regime also had an interest in containing Iranian-inspired revolutionary ideas and supported anti-Shia Deobandi militant factions. In 1985, a group by the name of Sipah-e-Sahabah Pakistan was founded as a militant offshoot of JUI. It would later give way to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, named after Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a firebrand anti-Shia Deobandi cleric. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi remains notorious for horrific attacks targeting Pakistan’s Shia minority. After a century of being a religious-political movement, in the 1980s Deobandism was increasingly militant. The anti-communist insurgency in Afghanistan and sectarian militancy in Pakistan were the two primary drivers increasingly steering many Deobandis toward armed insurrection. While the end of the Zia regime (with the dictator’s death in a plane crash in the summer of 1988) brought back civilian rule to the country, Deobandism was hurtling toward a violent trajectory. By the early 1990s the Pakistani military had retreated to influencing politics from behind the scenes and no longer pursued a domestic Islamization program. The die, however, had been cast. The extremist forces that Zia had unleashed were now on autopilot, and his civilian and military successors were unable to rein in their growth. Deobandi seminaries continued to proliferate in the country, especially in the Pashtun-dominated areas of the northwest. In 1993, another militant Deobandi faction demanding the imposition of sharia law emerged in country’s northwest by the name of Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (Movement to Implement the Shariah of Muhammad) — or TNSM — led by Sufi Muhammad, a mullah who had studied at the Panjpir seminary, which was unique in that its Deobandism was heavily Salafized. The decade long war in Afghanistan against the Soviets had significantly affected the Pakistani military and the country’s premier spy service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, which was managing the Afghan, Pakistani and other Arab/Muslim foreign fighters. Many ISI officers had gone native with the militant Deobandi and Salafist ideologies of the proxies that they were managing. By the dawn of the 1990s two unexpected geopolitical developments would accelerate the course of Deobandism toward militancy. First was the December 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union, which a few months later triggered the collapse of the Afghan communist regime. That in turn led to the 1992-96 intra-Islamist war in Afghanistan, which gave rise to the Taliban movement and its first emirate regime. Second was a popular Muslim separatist uprising that began in Indian-administered Kashmir in 1989. The Pakistani military’s efforts to leverage both developments exponentially contributed to the surge of radicalized and militarized Deobandism. In Afghanistan, Pakistan supported the Taliban, a movement founded by militant Deobandi clerics and students. The military also deployed Islamist insurgent groups in Indian-administered Kashmir, many of which were ideologically Deobandi. They included Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Ansar and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Toward the late 1990s, when the Taliban were in power in Kabul and hosting al Qaeda, these groups constituted a singular transnational ideological battle space stretched from Afghanistan through India. This was most evident after militants hijacked an Indian Airlines flight from Nepal and landed in Taliban-controlled Kandahar. There, the hijackers, enabled by the Pakistani-backed Taliban regime, negotiated with the Indian government for the release of Jaish-e-Mohammed founder Masood Azhar and two of his associates who had been imprisoned for terrorist activities in Kashmir. After 9/11, the Pakistani security establishment lost control of its militant Deobandi nexus, which gravitated heavily toward al Qaeda that had itself relocated to Pakistan. The U.S. toppling of the Taliban regime forced Islamabad into a situation in which it was trying to balance support for both Washington and the Afghan Taliban. Meanwhile, just days before the U.S. began its military operations against the Taliban in October 2001, Jaish-e-Muhammad operatives attacked the state legislature in Indian-administered Kashmir. This was followed by an even more brazen attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on Dec. 13. The Pakistanis were now under pressure from both the Americans and the Indians. As a result, Islamabad clamped down on the Kashmiri militant outfits. The decision of Pakistan’s then military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf to first side with the U.S. against the Taliban and then undertake an unprecedented normalization process with India led to Islamabad losing control over the Deobandi militant landscape. In fact, many of these groups would turn against the Pakistani state itself. There were several assassination attempts on Musharraf, including two back-to-back attacks carried out by rogue military officers within two weeks in December 2003. The radicalized Deobandis whom Pakistan cultivated as instruments of foreign policy in the ’80s and ’90s inverted the vector of jihad to target the very state that nurtured them. Meanwhile, the country’s main Deobandi political group, JUI-F, remained a force. In the 2002 elections, it led an alliance of six Islamist parties called the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (United Action Council or MMA) that won 60 seats in Parliament — in great part due to the electoral engineering of the country’s fourth military regime. It also secured the most seats in the provincial legislatures in the old Deobandi stronghold of NWFP, forming a majority government there and a coalition government with the pro-Musharraf ruling party in Baluchistan. The Deobandi-led MMA governments in both western provinces enabled the rise of Talibanization in the Pashtun-regions along the border with Afghanistan. By the time the MMA government in the northwest completed its five-year term in late 2007, some 13 separate Pakistani Taliban factions had come together to form an insurgent alliance known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Deobandi-led government turned a blind eye to rising Talibanization, partly because it did not want to be seen as siding with the U.S. against fellow Islamists and partly because it feared being targeted by the jihadists. The latter fear was not unfounded given TTP’s several attempts to assassinate several JUI leaders including chief Fazlur Rehman and its Baluchistan supremo Muhammad Khan Sherani. Militant Deobandism in the form of insurgents controlling territory and engaging in terrorist attacks all over the country would dominate the better part of the next decade. Taliban rebels seized control of large swaths of territory close to the Afghan border. The biggest example of this was the Taliban faction led by Mullah Fazlullah (the son-in-law of the TNSM founder), which took over NWFP’s large Swat district (as well as many parts of adjacent districts). The Taliban had significant support even in the country’s capital as illustrated by the 2007 siege of the Red Mosque (Islamabad’s oldest and major house of worship). A group of militants led by the mosque’s Deobandi imam and his brother for nearly 18 months had been challenging the writ of the state in the country’s capital by engaging in violent protests, attacks on government property, kidnapping, arson and armed clashes with law enforcement agencies. An 8-day standoff came to an end when army special forces stormed the mosque-seminary complex leading to a 96-hour gun battle with well-armed and trained militants during which at least 150 people (including many women and children) were killed. The TTP greatly leveraged popular anger over the military operation against the mosque. It unleashed a barrage of suicide bombings targeting high-security military installations including an air weapons complex, a naval station, three regional headquarters of the ISI, Special Forces headquarters, the army’s general headquarters, the military’s main industrial complex and many other civilian targets, which resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. It took nearly a decade of massive counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations to claw back provincial and tribal territories that had fallen under TTP control. By the late 2010s, Pakistan’s security forces had forced Taliban rebels to relocate across the border in Afghanistan where the U.S., after 15 years of unsuccessfully trying to weaken the Afghan Taliban movement, was in talks with it. Washington had hoped that its 2020 peace agreement with the Afghan Taliban would lead to a political process that could limit the jihadist movement’s influence after the U.S. departure. The dramatic collapse of the Afghan government in a little over a week in early August of this year, however, has left the Afghan Taliban as the only group capable of imposing its will on the country. The return of the Afghan Taliban to power in Afghanistan has a strong potential to energize like-minded forces in Pakistan, especially with the Islamic State having a significant cross-border presence and trying to assume the jihadist mantle from the Taliban. Further in the easterly direction, rising right-wing Hindu extremism in India empowered by the current government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi risks radicalizing Deobandism in its country of birth, in response to the targeting of the country’s 200 million Muslim minority. The Deobandis began in India as a movement seeking to reestablish a Muslim religio-political order in South Asia — one led by ulema. After 80 years of cultivating a religious intellectual vanguard and aligning with the majority Hindu community in secular nationalist politics to achieve independence from British colonial rule, a major chunk of Deoband embraced Muslim separatism. Once that goal was realized in the form of the independent nation-state of Pakistan, the locus of Deobandism shifted to Islamizing the new Muslim polity. For the next three decades, the Deobandis tried to turn a state that was intended to be secular into an Islamic republic through constitutional and electoral processes. The ascent of an Islamist-leaning military regime coupled with regional geopolitics at the tail end of the Cold War fragmented and militarized the Deobandi phenomenon whose locus yet again shifted westward. After the 1980s, the movement increasingly reverted to its British-era jihadist roots through terrorism and insurgency. That process has culminated in the Taliban’s empowerment in Afghanistan and now threatens to destabilize the entire South Asian region. Today, Afghanistan represents the center of gravity of South Asia’s most prominent form of Islamism. The movement that has long sought to establish an “Islamic” state led by ulema subscribing to a medieval understanding of religion has established the polity that its ideological forefathers had set out to achieve over a century and a half ago. As the Taliban consolidate their hold over Kabul with dangerous implications for the entire South Asian region, my mind wanders back 40 years to when my father — driven by his own sectarian persuasions — first made me aware of Deobandism. I am amazed at just how rapidly this phenomenon has grown before my eyes. Suffering from dementia for almost a decade and a half, my father has been oblivious of this proliferation. I actually don’t remember the last time either he or I broached this topic with the other. Perhaps it is for the best that he is unaware of the extent to which those whom he opposed all his life have gained ground. I know it would pain him to learn that Deobandism has even contaminated his own Barelvi sect, as is evident from the rise of the Tehrik-i-Labbaik Pakistan, which is now the latest and perhaps most potent Islamist extremist specter to haunt the country of his and my birth. Source: The News Line Magazine URL: New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism

Women in Afghanistan under the Taliban Government Face Existential Threat

Women Judges, Sportswomen, Journalists And Businesswomen Have Been Facing Threats from Taliban Main Points: 1. More than 3,000 women were killed by Taliban from 2010 to 2020. 2. Taliban government minister says a woman should not be a minister. 3. Taliban minister says women are only fit to give birth and stay home. 4. Out of 700 women journalists only 39 are presently working in TVs. ----- New Age Islam Staff Writer 23 November 2021 In Afghanistan, the rule of Taliban has not brought any change especially for women though in the beginning and before they came to power, the Taliban had repeatedly promised that they would honour women’s rights in the country. Though officially they say that they will honour women’s rights, in practice they have not shown any change in their policy towards women. There is little difference in what they did before they came to power and what they are doing after coming to power. Women were killed, tortured and sexually attacked by the Taliban in the decade from 2010 to 2020 for defying their code of conduct on dress, education and jobs. According to UNAMA Annual Reports, a total of 3,435 women died by the insurgents in Afghan from 2010 to 2020. The brutality and repression against women of Afghanistan continued unabated though the Taliban tried to portray a tolerant image of themselves post ascension. Persons of former Afghani national army and police, professionals, businesswomen, judges and journalists are being hounded and threatened by the Taliban for raising their voices in favour of women. Out of 700 women journalists working in national TV channels, only 39 are working because of the threats and harassment. Female judges are being watched and followed by the Taliban government for giving judgments in favour of women. The working women are not directly told to remain at home but are indirectly being threatened and being advised by the Taliban to stay at home for their own safety. Women players are being hunted down and identified especially those who participated in international competitions. The Taliban have no woman minister in their new cabinet. They say that a woman cannot be a minister and they are only fit to give birth. This is the way of thinking of an organization that claims that Islam gives women a place of honour. With the ascension of power, the Taliban have shown that they have not changed so far as their policy towards women is concerned. In this article on the plight of Afghan women in Taliban ruled Afghanistan, Sanchita Bhattacharya gives a detailed account of the insecurity and harassment Afghan women face today. ----- Afghan Women: The Endangered Sex By Sanchita Bhattacharya 22 Nov 2021, On November 13, 2021, two female officers affiliated with the former Afghan National Army were found dead in Gardez, the capital of Paktia Province. Sources indicated that the killing took place on November 12. On November 6, 2021, the Taliban stated that rights activist and university lecturer, Frozan Safi, was killed in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh Province. Reports indicate that the woman received a call – an invitation to join an evacuation flight – and was picked up by a car, only to be found dead later. There are conflicting reports regarding the actual number of her dead associates, with some suggesting that Safi and three other women were killed, while others suggest Safi and another female were found dead. Afghanistan Women Image: Pixabay ----- On September 4, 2021, a pregnant Policewoman, Banu Negar, was mutilated and killed, suspectedly by the Taliban, in front of her husband and children in Firozkoh, the capital of Ghor Province. On August 3, 2021, Taliban terrorists killed a 21 years old woman, Nazanin, in the Samar Qandian village of Balkh District in Balkh Province, for dressing ‘inappropriately.’ On July 12, 2021, a woman, identified as Najia, was killed by Taliban cadres in Faryab Province as she refused to cook for them. These incidents are not in isolation. Though no official data is available for the period after June 30, 2021, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), based on open media sources, at least 15 women have been killed and two injured by insurgents since July 1, 2021 (data till November 21, 2021). These numbers, however, are likely to be gross underestimates of the true level of violence targeted against women. Indeed, the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in its 2020 Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview, noted, Women across Afghanistan continue to be subject to high rates of violence related to their gender, although this remains difficult to quantify due to suspected underreporting and overall lack of data. Meanwhile, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA’s) Afghanistan 2021 Midyear Update on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, released on July 26, 2021, at least 219 women had been killed and 508 were injured between January 1 and June 30, 2021. In the corresponding period of 2020, at least 139 women were killed and 261 injured, registering an increase of 82 per cent in overall casualties (deaths+ injuries). Women killed by Insurgents in Afghanistan: 2010-2021 Year Female Death 2010 98 2011 166 2012 301 2013 235 2014 298 2015 333 2016 341 2017 359 2018 350 2019 345 2020 390 2021 (till June 30) 219 Total 3435 Source for data between 2010 and 2020: UNAMA Annual Reports Source for 2021 data: UNAMA Mid-year Report 2021 Significantly, year 2020 recorded the maximum of 390 female fatlities in a year in insurgency-linked violence since UNAMA began systematic documentation of such data in 2010. UNAMA's 2020 Annual report noted, Women continued to be gravely harmed by the armed conflict in a multitude of ways in 2020, including through death, injury, and sexual violence. Women also bore the brunt of the broader effects of the armed conflict which negatively impacted their enjoyment of a wide range of human rights, including freedom of movement and access to education, healthcare, and justice, and the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sex or gender. UNAMA's Afghanistan 2021 Midyear Update on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict noted that the reasons behind violence against women included: Professional affiliation (Afghan National Police officers, penitentiary staff, judges, media professionals); accused of supporting the Government or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), spying for ANSF; Accused by the Taliban of "immoral conduct", adultery. Also, illiteracy and low levels of public awareness; outmoded patterns of marriage; corruption and abuse of state positions; women's limited access to justice; the lack of security and perceptions that violence against women is 'normal,' resulted in violence against women in Afghanistan. Interestingly, since they took over power on August 15, 2021, the Taliban have sought to portray themselves as more tolerant than their global reputation suggests. In their first press conference held on August 17, 2021, the Taliban categorically declared, “we will honour women's rights but within the norms of Islamic law.” On the contrary, and as expected, incidents of brutality and repression continue to be reported. Such incidents of brutality and abuse, apart from the killings already mentioned, included the September 8 incident, when many women came out into the streets of Kabul demanding equal rights and participation of female members in government, they were lashed with whips and beaten with batons that emit electric shocks, by Taliban fighters. Earlier, on September 7, the Taliban locked tens of women in the basement of Azizi Bank to prevent them from joining protesters in Kabul streets. Further, Taliban forces have been mounting surveillance of women working in various fields and targeting them in various ways. As reported on October 21, 2021, Taliban officials have recovered personal information of more than 200 female judges, who still remain in Afghanistan, from court records. Susan Glazebrook, President of the judges' association and a justice of the Supreme Court of New Zealand observed, The women judges of Afghanistan are under threat for applying the law… They are under threat because they have made rulings in favour of women according to law in family violence, custody and divorce cases… Women journalists and media personnel are also in grave danger from the Taliban. 48 hours after the Taliban took control of Kabul, women reporters with privately-owned TV channels such as Tolo News, Ariana News, Kabul News, etc., had dared to resume talking on the air and going out to cover events. But media executives quickly found that they were being threatened and intimidated. In one such incident, on August 25, 2021, Nahid Bashardost, a reporter for the independent news agency Pajhwok, was beaten by the Taliban while reporting near Kabul Airport. Also, as reported on August 19, Taliban forces barred two female journalists Khadija Amin and Shabnam Dawran, both with the public broadcaster Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), from working at the station's offices. Many female journalists are fleeing Afghanistan due to fear of repression. A September 20 report indicated that just 39 women journalists were still formally working in privately-owned radio and TV stations in. That’s a precipitous drop from the 700 women. On August 25, 2021, Taliban spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, announced that women should not go to work for their own safety. He argued that the measure was necessary because the Taliban's soldiers "keep changing and are not trained." Reports on October 20, 2021, indicated that the coach of the Afghan junior women's national volleyball team, on conditions of anonymity, stated that, since their takeover, the Taliban had tried to identify and hunt down women athletes. The militants have been even more keenly on the look-out for members of the Afghan women's volleyball team, who competed in foreign and domestic competitions, and appeared in media programs in the past. On September 17, 2021, the Taliban replaced the Ministry of Women's Affairs with the Ministry for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which was disbanded in 2001. For Afghan women, this change in Ministry is an official reminder that the Taliban have not changed, and intend to bring back the oppressive and discriminatory order of their first regime. Indeed, the Taliban are unabashedly expressing regressive and anti-women views. On September 9, 2021, in an interview to Tolo News, Taliban spokesperson, Sayed Zekrullah Hashim thus declared, A woman can't be a minister, it is like you put something on her neck that she can't carry. It is not necessary for a woman to be in the cabinet, they should give birth & women protesters can't represent all women in AFG [Afghanistan]. The Taliban formed an all-male interim government on September 7, 2021, as Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, now acting Culture and Information Minister, announced the formation of a 33-member Interim Cabinet. Later, on September 21, 2021, another 17 new members were added to the Cabinet. No woman was included. Taliban’s preceding rule from 1996 to 2001 caused severe havoc in the lives of Afghan women and girls. The regime was notorious for violence against common Afghan women, with frequent incidents of lashing, whipping, public executions, stoning, acid attacks and sexual violence. The situation improved dramatically, once the Taliban was ousted from power in 2001, but began to deteriorate as the Taliban started to regain lost ground. With the Taliban back in power since August 15, 2021, the scenario looks like a rewind to the past, with the likelihood that violence and brutality against women will increasingly be considered ‘normal’. At present, frightful incidents are being occasionally reported as isolated cases. The everyday strain in the lives of Afghan women are largely unseen, and can only multiply. Source: India Blooms ----- Sanchita Bhattacharya is a Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management URL: https://www.newageislam.com/islam-women-feminism/women-afghanistan-taliban-existential-threat/d/125828 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism

Debunking Jihad of ISIS and Its False Theory That ‘Non-Jihadists Can’t Issue Fatwas on Jihad and Mujahid’ - Part 2

Refuting ISIS Principle ‘The One Who Avoids Jihad Has No Legitimacy to Issue Fatwas on a Mujahid’ Main Points 1. Following the Muslim majority’s response, the jihadist organizations devised the bogus principle. 2. The bogus rule “the non-Jihadists have no legitimacy to give Fatwas on a Mujahid” is not from the Islamic legal maxims [Fiqhi Qawaid] but an invented theory of ISIS and other Jihadists. 3. The criteria of the mufti, that he be a fighter, a mujahid, or a resident of the frontier territories, were never specified by Muslim legal theorists and jurists. 4. The Jihadists are not doing Jihad but an act of transgression. 5. The Quran and Sunnah have made it clear to their followers that they must refrain from transgression in a variety of areas, including Jihad and war. ....... By New Age Islam Staff Writer 23 November 2021 Representational Photo/ISIS) ------ Muslim Ulama and Fatwa experts from over the world have not only boycotted ISIS's so-called "Khilafah," but have also referred to them as Kharijites, after assessing their unlawful behaviour and narratives. Following the Muslim majority’s response, not just ISIS, but also other so-called jihadist organizations devised a bogus rule in the guise of jurisprudential rules, attempting to persuade the world that a mufti who does not participate in jihad has no legitimacy to give Fatwas on Jihad and Mujahid. To demonstrate this, they devised the following Arabic rule: "لا يفتي قاعد لمجاهد" “The one who remains [at home] has no legitimacy to give Fatwas on a Mujahid” This rule means that a mufti who does not engage in jihad is ineligible to issue Fatwas or make comments on the subject of jihad or Mujahid. If a mufti issues a fatwa against ISIS or any of its Mujahids, his fatwa will be considered null and void, according to ISIS. Employing this rule, they also preach that only they have the authority to talk about Jihad, Mujahid, and the future of Ummah. This norm has been so ingrained in the minds of ISIS and other Jihadist outfits that they are not willing to listen to the counter-arguments offered by Muslim academics around the world, consequently abstaining from acts of violence. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Also Read: Declare The ISIS As The Kharijites (Those Who Seceded From Islam) As This Article Demonstrates And Declares: Global SOS To The Ulama, Muftis, Intellectuals And Scholars Of Islam ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This false rule is now used by almost every jihadist organization, and it has been countered by a number of well-known clerics and intellectuals in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt for a variety of reasons. In this episode, we'll discuss some key reasons, reminding our listeners that ISIS is an anti-Islamic organization whose goal is to tarnish the Islamic image, massacre Muslims, destroy Muslim countries, and force Muslims to flee their homes and migrate toward starvation and destruction. It is these individuals who, as part of the difficulty for Muslims living in non-Muslim majority nations, are sowing doubt among non-Muslims. This rule, 'The one who remains [at home] has no legitimacy to give Fatwas on a Mujahid,' is not from the Islamic legal maxims [Fiqhi Qawaid], or the jurisprudential principles by which the truth is known, and it has no legal basis in the Qur'an or the Sunnah, and jurists have never used it as a criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Also Read: Investigating and Refuting the Black Flag and Khorasan Narrative Propagated by IS and Al-Qaeda Jihadists ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Knowing the difference between truth and untruth, as well as being correct in a fatwa, is based on inference and its procedures rather than participation in ‘Jihad’ or worship. Knowledgeable people have explained the conditions of a mufti, based on credible facts, and some of those conditions are as follows: • Knowledge of the Quran, the Sunnah and the associated Sciences [Ulum] and Principles [Usul] • Knowledge of all areas of the Consensus [Ijma'], doctrines, jurisprudential schools, and jurists’ viewpoints and disagreements • Full understanding of the principles of jurisprudence [Usul al-Fiqh], Islamic legal maxims and norms, the purposes of Sharia, and the sciences that aid in understanding the Quran and the Sunnah, such as grammar, morphology, rhetoric, language, and so on. • Knowledge of people's conditions, customs, the circumstances of the era, and its advancements, as well as their shift in what is based on a recognized custom [urf-e-aam] that does not contradict the text • Possessing Jurisprudential qualification required for extracting legal decisions from texts. • Consulting the experts and well-experienced scholars in many specialties in order to visualize the related issue, such as medical and economic issues ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Also Read: ISIS/Takfiris Are Friends of Satan, the Enemies of Allah and His Messenger, Foremost In Shirk, Hypocrisy and Apostasy and No Muslim Must Support Them in Any Form or Fashion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The criteria of the mufti, that he be a fighter, a mujahid, or a resident of the frontier territories, were never specified by Muslim legal theorists and jurists. Instead, the main rule declared that the words of an expert scholar were acceptable, while the statements of an ignorant scholar were not. It no longer matters whether a scholar or an ignorant person is from a certain region, location, or organization. Many imams and jurists, including the four great Imams, were not among the conquerors. Despite this, the chapter on jihad, which they composed and issued Fatwas on, was and continues to be a cornerstone in Islamic jurisprudence and a reference for scholars of all ages. Rather, the jurist or Mufti must have a thorough understanding of the issue on which he is giving fatwas and use that expertise to base the legal judgment. He also needs to be aware of the rules and judgments based on customs and culture that can change with time and place, as addressed by notable scholars of Shari'ah and Principles of Jurisprudence from various Schools, with multiple sections, rules, and situations, dealing with contemporary concerns in various branches and areas. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Also Read: The Concept of God’s Sovereignty (Hakimiyyah): Extremist Islamists Vs Mainstream Muslims ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ There is no evidence in the Quran, Sunnah, or classical jurisprudential books of the entire fourteen hundred years of history that it is essential to fight in jihad in order to give a fatwa on jihad. As a result, it is completely correct to declare that jihadist rule is utterly ludicrous and without foundation, as it is not based on the Quran, Sunnah, or the fatwa-principles of any Imams. In terms of the Jihadists' claim to Jihad, they are committing a transgression, not Jihad. If you examine all of the heinous terror assaults carried out by terror groups around the world and consider all of Allah Almighty’s obvious boundaries, you will come to the strong conclusion that terror groups that perpetrate atrocities in the name of Jihad and Islam are transgressors. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Also Read: Did War-related Madani Verses Abrogate Makki Verses in the Sense of Not Allowing Peaceful Coexistence between Muslims and Non-Muslims? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jihad is divided into two categories in Islam: Jihad by fighting [Jihad bil Qital] and Jihad by Nafs (inner spiritual struggle). Jihad by Nafs is a distinguishing element of Taqwa that can be done anywhere. Jihad by fighting, on the other hand, is the obligation of Islamic governments, as you are aware. Only an Islamic government can declare Jihad in this circumstance by fighting to defend its territory and inhabitants, including Muslims and non-Muslims, and to combat terrorism, violence, oppression, and other forms of persecution. We live in modern democratic countries where religious freedom and security are guaranteed by the constitution and must be practically ensured. Fighting-based jihad should not be practiced in such democratic countries. What we can do here is wage Jihad by Nafs (Jihad al-Nafs), which is an inner spiritual battle against personal evil impulses, thoughts, lust, wrath, falsehoods, cunning, deception, fraudulent behaviour, prejudice, developing extremism, and retribution wants. Indeed, the practice of Jihad al-Nafs gives us spiritual strength to keep our minds at ease and allows us to have patience and endurance when confronted with the unintended repercussions of political, religious, or worldly conflicts. Another idea of Islamic Jihad is fighting for religious rights and the safety of life under the banner of Islamic rule on the declaration of an Islamic government. This sort of Jihad cannot be undertaken with transgression. The Quran and Sunnah have made it clear to their followers that they must refrain from transgression in a variety of areas, including war. Let us take a serious look at some of the key sections. Allah Almighty says, “Do not exceed the limits, and Allah does not like the transgressors” (2:190). According to the majority of classical Islamic scholars, God Almighty's command is Muhkam and not abrogated (Mansukh). They examine the typical norms of war, such as the prohibition on killing women, children, the elderly, monks, hermits, the chronically ill, and peasants, among other things, using this Divine decree. Hazrat Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with him) said, “The phrase “do not exceed the limits” renders “do not kill women, children, old men, or those who offer peace and restrain their hand. If you do that, you will have transgressed against them”. (Jamiul Bayan, vol. 2, p. 110-111, printed at Beirut Darul Ma’rifa) Whenever the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) dispatched a commander of an army, he would exhort him personally to fear Allah and prohibit transgression, killing of children, mutilation, and treachery. (Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah, Abu Dawud etc) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Also Read: Refutation of ISIS That Justifies Terrorism in 21st Century: Did the ‘Sword Verse’ 9:5 Really Abrogate Verses of Peace and Forbearance? Part -5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Hazrat Abu Bakar al-Siddiq used to instruct the army soldiers, “kill neither a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy’s flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone” (Muwatta Imam Malik p. 466) Let us look at some more Quranic verses where Allah Almighty commands Muslims to avoid transgression. “Do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors” (5:87) “Pray to your Lord crying humbly, and softly; indeed He does not love the transgressors.” (7:55) “We seal over the hearts of the transgressors” (10:74) “...they returned towards Allah’s wrath; that was because they disbelieved in Allah’s signs and wrongfully martyred the Prophets; that was for their disobedience and transgression” (2:61) “And you had already known about those who transgressed among you concerning the sabbath, and We said to them, "Be apes, despised” (2:65) “O you who have believed, prescribed for you is legal retribution for those murdered - the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female. But whoever overlooks from his brother anything; then there should be a suitable follow-up and payment to him with good conduct. This is alleviation from your Lord and a mercy. But whoever transgresses after that will have a painful punishment.” (2:178) “.... These are the limits of Allah, so do not transgress them. And whoever transgresses the limits of Allah - it is those who are the wrongdoers” (2:229). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Also Read: Refuting the Claim of ISIS ‘Islam Was Never for A day the Religion of Peace’ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The whole verse deals directly with the problem of divorce (talaq), but like other verses, it also has wider applicability, implying that one should not go beyond Allah's limitations in any matter. “...And when you divorce women and they have [nearly] fulfilled their term, either retain them according to acceptable terms or release them according to acceptable terms, and do not keep them, intending harm, to transgress [against them]. And whoever does that has certainly wronged himself” (2:231) “And whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger and transgresses His limits - He will put him into the Fire to abide eternally therein, and he will have a humiliating punishment” (4:14) “...And do not let the hatred of a people for having obstructed you from al-Masjid al-Haram lead you to transgress. And cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is severe in penalty” (5:2) Let us pause here and reflect more deeply on this text, which urges us to cooperate in justice while avoiding cooperation in transgression and hostility. The believers are commanded not to transgress even against the people who have hatred against them. “And you see many of them hastening into sin and aggression and the devouring of [what is] unlawful. How wretched is what they have been doing.” (5:62) “O People who Believe! Do not forbid the pure things, which Allah has made lawful for you, and do not cross the limits; indeed Allah dislikes the transgressors.” (5:87) “And indeed do many lead [others] astray through their [own] inclinations without knowledge. Indeed, your Lord - He is most knowing of the transgressors.” (6:119) “In respect of the believers, they do not keep regard for any relations nor any pacts; it is they who are the rebels.” (9:10) “..Whoever crosses Allah’s limits has indeed wronged himself” (65:1) We have seen massive destruction and enormous casualties as a result of several awful wars and attacks perpetrated by ISIS and other terror outfits. These are not the acts of Jihad mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah, but rather transgressions that can’t be justified by ‘Jihadists’. First Part of the Article: Refuting ISIS Concept of Caliph and Caliphate [Khalifa and Khilafah] – Part 1 URL: https://www.newageislam.com/radical-islamism-jihad/jihad-isis-jihadist-fatwa-mujahid/d/125827 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism

The Quran Does Not Declare the Dog Totally Unclean and Permits Its Domestication for Restricted Purposes

Dogs Can Be Used For Herding Goats and Hunting Animals Main Points: 1. The Quran permits domestication of hunting animals including dogs. 2. Dogs are not totally unclean according to the Quran. 3. Hadiths permit domesticating dogs for herding and hunting. ----- By New Age Islam Staff Writer 22 November 2021 (Photo courtesy/ history583380908.blog) ------ The Quran gives details of what is halal (permissible) and what is haram (non-permissible) for Muslims. It mentions the names of animals that can be used for consumption and that cannot be consumed. The dog is considered Najas (unclean) by the Muslims. It is not domesticated for that reason. But the Quran does not restrict the domestication of dogs totally by the Muslims. It permits domesticating dogs for some purposes. There are hadiths that permit domesticating dogs for two purposes: Herding goats and hunting animals. There is a verse in the Quran that permits the domestication of ‘hunting animals’ for hunting. “They ask you, ‘O Prophet, what is permissible for them to eat, Say, ‘What is good and lawful. Also what is caught by your hunting animals and birds of prey which you have trained as instructed by Allah. So eat what they catch for you but mention the name of Allah over it first. And be mindful of Allah. Surely Allah is swift in reckoning. (Al Madinah: 4) There are some hadiths that also permit domesticating of dogs for herding goats and hunting animals. Adi bin Hatim narrated, “I said to the holy prophet pbuh, “We hunt animals with the help of dogs. Are such hunted animals (hunted by domesticated dogs) permissible for us?” The holy prophet pbuh replied, “When you set your trained dogs upon animals uttering Allah’s name (on them) then you can eat from the animal caught or hunted by the dog, even if they kill the animal. However, when the dog eats a portion of the hunted animal (then do not eat) because it is then supposed that the dog caught the animal for itself. Similarly, if other dogs joined your dog in hunting then also do not eat the hunted animal. (Hadith 446, Vol 3, Kitabuz Zahayeb, Sahih Bukhari). The rule for using dogs for hunting is that the owner of the dog should utter Allah’s name on his dog before setting it upon an animal. The owner cannot eat the meat of the hunted animal which is caught by a dog on which Allah’s name is not uttered. Adi bin Hatim narrated that the holy prophet pbuh said, “When you set upon your dog on the animal after uttering Allah’s name and if the dog catches and kills the animal, then you can eat from the animal, but if the dog eats from the animal, then do not eat it because it caught the animal for itself not for you. Similarly, if your dog catches and kills an animal together with other dogs on which Allah’s name was not uttered, then also do not eat it because you never know which animal killed the hunted animal. (Hadith 447; Kitabuz Zabayeh, Sahih Bukhari) Moreover, the Quran keeps the need of the hunting animal (dog) in consideration and so forbids the owner of the dog from eating from the hunted animal if his dog eats from the animal after catching and killing it as it will be considered then that the animal was hungry and it killed the animal for itself and not for its owner. However, the Quran does not permit domesticating the dog for any other purpose that herding goats and hunting animals. There are a couple of hadiths on that issue. Abdullah bin Umar narrated that the holy prophet pbuh said that if a person does not domesticate a dog which is for herding the goats nor for hunting, his rewards for deeds would be reduced by two carats daily. Hadith 443, Kitabuz Zabayeh, Vol 3 Sahih Bukhari) Ibn Umar narrated that the holy prophet pbuh said whoever domesticates a dog for other purpose then herding (goats) or hunting his rewards for good deeds will be reduced by two carats every day. (Hadith 445, Kitabuz Zabayeh Vol 3 Sahih Bukhari). URL: https://www.newageislam.com/islamic-culture/quran-unlean-dog-domestication/d/125814 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism

AIMPLB’S Demand for the Enactment of an Anti-Blasphemy Law Will Only Prove Counterproductive for the Muslim Community of India

The Demand for Anti-Blasphemy Law Is Unconstitutional and Will Give Rise to Islamophobia Main Points: 1. India already has a law preventing Hate Speech. 2. Muslims should only demand a strict enforcement of existing laws on Hate Speech. 3. Anti-Blasphemy Law will also give rise to sectarian violence among Muslims. 4. Anti-Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan and Bangladesh are mostly used against Muslims. ----- By New Age Islam Staff Writer 22 November 2021 After losing the Babri Mosque and Triple Talaq cases, the AIMPLB is trying to reclaim its credibility among the Muslims. A recently held survey showed that more than 64 per cent Muslim women favoured the bill against Triple Talaq and more than 50% Muslim men also favoured the bill against the Instant Talaq. But ignoring the larger writ of the Muslims, it stuck to the stand of the ulema who insist that Triple Talaq is valid and could not be invalidated. Now, the Board has found a new issue to garner Muslim support and find its lost support among the Muslims. In its two day convention held in Kanpur on Sunday, It has demanded that the government should enact an Anti-Blasphemy Law to prevent snide remarks against the holy prophet of Islam by the Islamophobes. The resolution of the Board has also demanded punishment for those making indecent remarks against the holy figures of Islam. While it is a fact that Islamophobia is on the rise in India and there have been a few incidents of hate speech against Islam and Islamic holy figures. But it is also a fact that India is not a theogratic state but a secular country and that India does not have a state religion. On the other hand, India’s Constitution grants equal rights to the followers of all the religious communities and also prevents hate speech or blasphemous statements in any form against any religion. Therefore, India already has laws against hate speech that makes it a punishable crime. Section 295(A) of the Indian Penal Code of 1927 says: Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of (citizens of India),(by words, either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise) insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to (three years) or fine or with both. Since India is a secular country, this law applies to all. At the most the Muslims can demand strict application of the law on those who commit blasphemy against Islamic figures. But when Muslims demand an Anti-Blasphemy Law specifically for punishing those who iinsult the holy figures of Islam, they will also demand death sentence for the blasphemer as a section of the Islamic scholars have the opinion that those insulting the prophet pbuh should be summarily killed. On the contrary, the Quran, the basic source of Islamic shariah does not prescribe any physical punishment for blasphemy. It advises Muslims to observe patience and restraint and only stage peaceful protest condemning the act. However, a majority of Islamic scholars believe that the blasphemer should be punished with death. And a section of Islamic scholars including Dr Tahirul Qadri is of the opinion that even a Muslim should be killed for showing insult to the prophet pbuh. Therefore, if such an Anti-Blasphemy Law is enacted in India, it will have a wider ramification among the Muslim and sectarian violence among different sects of Muslims will rise. Muslims of opposing sects will declare members of the rival sect Kafir or Gustakh-e-Rasul (blasphemer) and register cases under the Anti-Blasphemy Law. This already happens in Pakistan and Bangladesh. When the accused will be absolved by the court, he will be killed extrajudicially by any member of a sect and the killer will be honoured by the Muslims. If the killer is sentenced to death by the court of law, he will be turned into a martyr and a Peer. Mumtaz Qadri’s case is a living example of this phenomenon. He killed the governor of Punjab because he demanded a repeal of the Blasphemy Laws which was being used to frame Christians and other members of religious minorities in Pakistan. When the court of law sentenced him to death, Muslims declared him a martyr and build a mazar on his grave. Therefore, such a law will only prove counter-productive for Muslims as it will be used more by Muslims to frame Muslims of rival sects for blasphemy. Currently, Muslims of India only accuse Muslims of other groups of blasphemy or of becoming Kafir on various pretexts and it does not turn into religious violence but once such a law is enacted, sectarian differences will reach courts and will lead to violence. The Muslim Personal Law Board does not demand enforcement of the existing laws and punishment for the guilty but it wants a separate Anti-Blasphemy Law which will be based on the interpretation of Sharia which is not permissible under the Indian Constitution. By demanding such a law they have showed their ignorance of the secular nature of the country or they want to impose Islamic sharia. Such a demand will only cause a rise in Islamophobia as communal forces will use this resolution to convince the non-Muslims of India that the Muslims want to impose Shariah rule and thus cause the widening of the communal gap between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Board has ignored the flagrant truth that the majority of India’s Hindus is secular and condemns such vicious attacks on religious figures of Islam and has always demanded punishment for them. Making such an unconstitutional demand will only make Muslims lose the support and sympathy of a large section of Hindus of India. So, an Anti-Blasphemy Law in India will not only cause a rise in Islamophobia in India but also, if enacted, will prove counterproductive for the Muslim society of India as a new phenomenon of sectarian violence in India will rear its ugly head. Therefore, this resolution of the AIMPLB is not in the best interests of the Muslims community and the country. URL: https://www.newageislam.com/islam-politics/aimplb-blasphemy-muslims-india/d/125811 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism

Why Salman Khurshid is Wrong in Equating Hindutva with Islamist Terror

By Arshad Alam, New Age Islam 20 November 2021 There Are Fundamental Differences Between Islamist Terror And Right-Wing Hindu Groups Main Points: 1. Islamist violence primarily draws its inspiration from religious scriptures. 2. Hindutva is confined to national boundaries which is an anathema to Islamist terror groups. 3. Islamist violence is primarily directed at Muslims while the victims of Hindu right-wing violence are religious minorities. 4. Are Muslims supposed to forget the pre-2014 violence against them because it was committed by the Congress party? ---- Salman Khurshid, Congress leader ---- Salman Khurshid, the Congress leader landed himself in controversy after the publication of his book ‘Sunrise over Ayodhya: Nationhood in our Times’. In a small portion of the book, he compares a ‘robust version of Hindutva’ with Islamist terror groups like ISIS and Boko Haram. While some in his own party have supported him, many inside and outside have opposed him for this comparison. The Hindu right-wing groups have demanded banning of the book and have indulged in arson; targeting one of his houses in the hills. If someone else had made this comparison, one would not have seen this level of consternation. But Salman Khurshid is a Muslim, and hence this comparison was bound to stoke a controversy. May be, he should have been more measured but what if he himself wanted to generate such a controversy? But despite the brouhaha that has been generated, it is fair to ask if Salman Khurshid was right in his comparison. Even if he did not take the name of the RSS, he certainly meant that certain strains of Hindutva are similar in their violent proclivities as some of the heinous Islamist terror groups. Certainly, we have seen in multiple riots and state-controlled pogroms that the Hindu right-wing has committed revolting violence, particularly on Muslim women. From being stripped and paraded to their wombs slit, cases of deranged yet premeditated violence are all part of documentation. Men have similarly been killed in extremely heinous fashion. On the other hand, Islamist groups like the ISIS and Boko Haram have indulged in kidnapping, rape, torture, sex slavery and many other atrocities, especially on the women of religious minorities or those who they have declared beyond the pale of Islam. One can keep arguing that one kind of violence is different from the other. That the brutality of Boko Haram is more pugnacious than that committed by the Hindu right wing. But for the Yazidis and Muslims and especially their women, who have suffered at the hands of such brutes, these differences simply do not have any value. Any violence leaves a permanent scar on the psyche and any attempt to get into the semantics of ‘type of violence’ is not just pointless but also bereft of any empathy for the victims of such violence. But beyond the effects of the violence, it needs to said that there are fundamental differences between Islamism and Hindutva of whatever variety. First of all, Islamist violence primarily draws its inspiration from religious scriptures. Whether it is ISIS, Boko Haram or the Taliban, they all derive their legitimacy from within the Islamic tradition, relying primarily on religious teachings. Hindutva, on the other hand, is primarily political in its orientation. Hindu right-wing groups treat other communities as insufficiently socialized in the national culture and therefore perceives them as a threat. No doubt this understanding is faulty as there is no singular way to belong to the national culture but it is important to distinguish that the motivations of Islamist and Hindu right-wing violence comes from very different sources. Secondly, Hindutva is confined to national boundary but Islamist terrorism does not recognize any such boundaries. Rather, Islamist terror groups understand these boundaries against the teachings of the Quran and hence makes all possible efforts to obliterate them. More importantly, Islamist violence is primarily directed at those Muslims who do not subscribe to their ideology. Thus, Sunni militancy in Pakistan and other places primarily targets the Shia who are deemed as heretic in their eyes. Despite the numerous terror incidents which have targeted and killed non-Muslims, the data is clear that most victims of Islamist violence have been Muslims themselves. The same cannot be said with regard to the violence enacted by the Hindu right wing groups which are primarily and solely directed towards religious minorities. In perhaps deliberately conflating the two, Salman Khurshid might have ensured higher sales for his book. With his party in the wilderness and without a clue as to how to negotiate its way back to power, Salman Khurshid might have thought that a little controversy might help him. And it certainly did with no less that Rahul Gandhi coming out with a video distinguishing between Hinduism and Hindutva. Essentially, he gave the same formulation as that of Khurshid: arguing that Hinduism is a lofty religious philosophy while Hindutva is a pernicious political ideology of hate, otherness and violence. Even this formulation is problematic to say the least. Granted that Hinduism is one of the most sophisticated religious philosophies but as some Dalit intellectuals have pointed out, the whole edifice of this religion was based on the suppression of oppression of multitudes of lower caste people. How does one convince an Ambedkar about the greatness of Hinduism when he states that this religion has been responsible for the undignified existence of lower castes and women? It is not just that Salman Khurshid is wrong in equating Hindutva with Islamist terror, he might be equally mistaken about the fundamental difference between Hinduism and Hindutva. It is also very important to ask some hard questions to Salman Khurshid. History is amply clear that anti-minority violence in this country hasn’t been inaugurated with the coming to power of the BJP. The whole effort of Khurshid and his ilk is to whitewash the crimes of Congress regimes before 2014 which saw the brutalization of Muslims in many parts of the country. The important question to ask Khurshid is whether all that pre-2014 was also done by Hindutva forces? Or is it that Muslims and other minorities are supposed to forget such crimes because they were committed by a so- called secular party? ---- Arshad Alam is a columnist with NewAgeIslam.com URL: https://www.newageislam.com/islam-politics/salman-khurshid-hindutva-islamist-terror/d/125806 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism

Neither Hindus nor Muslims Are Accountable For the Misdeeds of Others

The Quranic Verse “No Bearer of Burdens Will Bear the Burden of Another” Is Based On Justice Main Points: 1. Justice demands that nobody should be accountable for the misdeeds of others. 2. Blaming the entire community for the crime of one of its individuals has become a widespread worry for causing societal harm. 3. Historical accounts of Muslim kings and rulers contain inconsistencies. 4. If a Hindu kills a Muslim, whether by lynching or otherwise, or if a Muslim kills a Hindu somewhere, it does not entail that all Muslims and all Hindus are to blame. 5. Whoever commits a crime must be punished or condemned, according to justice and regardless of faith, caste and colour. ……. By Kaniz Fatma, New Age Islam 18 November 2021 Justice demands that nobody should be accountable for the misdeeds of others. If someone in the past has done wrong, the people of today are not accountable for their misdeeds. There were some Muslim kings in India, who might or might not have done wrong, in either case; the Muslims are not accountable for their deeds or misdeeds. This is the beauty of justice as enshrined in the word of the Quran, “Whoever is guided is only guided for [the benefit of] his soul. And whoever errs only errs against it. And no bearer of burdens will bear the burden of another.” (17:15) This verse means that no person will be accountable for the misdeeds of others. Every person is responsible for his deeds or misdeeds. This also means that the guidance or misguidance of each individual only affects him, and no one can bear the burden of another person’s sins or ward off from him even an atom’s weight of harm. Allah is the most just of those who show justice; He does not punish anyone until the proof has been established against him by sending the message, then he stubbornly rejects it. At various points in the Quran, the notion of personal responsibility is emphasised, because one cannot follow the straight path diligently without fully comprehending its implications. It means that everyone is totally responsible for his moral behaviour and is answerable to God as an individual in his own right, with no one else sharing the burden of duty. Take, for example, a specific action or a specific manner of behaving in which a generation or a community of a significant number of individuals contributed. When the people gather before Allah on the Day of Judgment, their collective behaviour will be examined in order to place the burden of accountability on each and every person who contributed to it, and they will be rewarded or punished accordingly. A person will not be punished for the role that another person played in his performance, nor will a load of a single person's guilt be placed on the shoulders of another. This notion has been underlined numerous times in order for a wise man to avoid acting in imitation of others or justifying his actions based on the actions of others. If a person understands his own duty, he will act in such a way that he will emerge victorious on the Day of Judgment, regardless of what others do. When we evaluate our society with this notion in mind, we can observe that injustice and abuse are on the rise. The practice of highlighting the crime of someone who is not of your religion, colour, nationality, or caste in order to blame his entire group has become a widespread worry for causing societal harm. On the contrary, if the criminal is a member of your group, caste, or religion, you will make every attempt to defend him. Historical accounts of Muslim kings and rulers contain inconsistencies. According to some sources, Muslim monarchs were brutal, while others claim they were not. Some of them may be beneficial or harmful. But why are these historically contradicting accounts being referenced today to sow discord among members of two faiths? What is the advantage? Do we want to perpetuate the idea that since Muslim monarchs were brutal, today's Muslims must be held accountable? People may have differing viewpoints on this issue, and if the answer is yes, I will never agree because this is not a matter of justice. Similarly, if a Hindu kills a Muslim, whether by lynching or otherwise, or if a Muslim kills a Hindu somewhere, it does not entail that all Muslims and all Hindus are to blame. The killer, whether a Muslim or a Hindu is a criminal, and other Hindus and Muslims should not be held responsible. Because I have not read the Gita, Ramayana, or Vedas, I am unable to provide any quotations. However, I examined a Quranic passage (17:15) that states that no one would be held responsible for the wrongdoings of others. This scripture teaches us that no one should be held responsible for the wrongdoings of others; hence any attempt to sow discord between India's two largest populations based on the crime of either Muslim or Hindu is an act of injustice. Muslims in the north-eastern Indian state of Tripura, for example, have been subjected to obvious barbarism in the aftermath of recent bloodshed in Bangladesh during Durga Puja. Looking at this episode, it is apparent that the attitude of our society has degraded to the point where criminals in one country are being avenged on innocent people in another. This is something that both Hindus and Muslims are equally responsible for. However, even under natural law, it is not right to punish a weak and innocent person for the crimes of criminals in another country. Whoever commits a crime must be punished or condemned, according to justice and regardless of faith, caste and colour. If a Hindu commits a crime, this does not mean that all Hindus are to blame. Similarly, if a Muslim commits a crime, it will not be considered that all Muslims are equally condemnable and punishable. I believe that if we can successfully instil this simple concept in the brains of every person in our society, many riots will be avoided. URL: https://www.newageislam.com/interfaith-dialogue/hindus-muslims-misdeeds/d/125791 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism