New Age Islam

Sunday, August 2, 2015

Present Day Islam Is a Travesty of Islam

By Naseer Ahmed, New Age Islam

31 July, 2015

Some of the worst Muslims were in the first few generations and also some of the best.

That the best were among the earliest Muslims who migrated to Medina with the Prophet and the Ansars who welcomed them, gave them shelter and support is attested by the Quran itself in several verses. The expression خَيْرُالْبَرِيَّةِ (the best of creatures) in verse 98:7 is reserved for them and they were promised heaven in their life time itself.

The Best

(9:100) The vanguard (of Islam) - the first of those who forsook (their homes) and of those who gave them aid, and (also) those who follow them in (all) good deeds, - well-pleased is Allah with them, as are they with Him: for them hath He prepared gardens under which rivers flow, to dwell therein for ever: that is the supreme felicity.

and of these people it is said that God will not allow them to go astray. Some did but quickly realize their mistake and corrected themselves.

(115) And Allah will not mislead a people after He hath guided them, in order that He may make clear to them what to fear (and avoid)- for Allah hath knowledge of all things.

(117) Allah turned with favour to the Prophet, the Muhajirs, and the Ansar,- who followed him in a time of distress, after that the hearts of a part of them had nearly swerved (from duty); but He turned to them (also): for He is unto them Most Kind, Most Merciful.

(118) (He turned in mercy also) to the three who were left behind; (they felt guilty) to such a degree that the earth seemed constrained to them, for all its spaciousness, and their (very) souls seemed straitened to them,- and they perceived that there is no fleeing from Allah (and no refuge) but to Himself. Then He turned to them, that they might repent: for Allah is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful.

Please make a note that they were not infallible nor was Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) infallible, and the Quran itself mildly reproaches some of his “errors” and ascribes no divinity to him and makes clear that he was human.

The Worst

(9:101) Certain of the desert Arabs round about you are hypocrites, as well as (desert Arabs) among the Medina folk: they are obstinate in hypocrisy: thou knowest them not: We know them: twice shall We punish them: and in addition shall they be sent to a grievous penalty.

Others

(102) Others (there are who) have acknowledged their wrong-doings: they have mixed an act that was good with another that was evil. Perhaps Allah will turn unto them (in Mercy): for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.

The expression “Al-Salaf Al-Sāliḥ” refers to the best among the early Muslims. Conceptually there can be no argument against following the “Al-Salaf Al-Sāliḥ”in all their good deeds but not as perfect human beings since only Allah is perfect. All Sunnis claim to be both Ahle-Sunnat-wal-Jam’at as well as followers of the “Al-Salaf Al-Sāliḥ” including the Barelvis/Sufis as is evident from the following:

“The Ahl as-SunnatWalJama’at is the largest group of Muslims and the only group whose beliefs and teachings are truly in accordance with the Noble Qur’an and Sunnah of the Most Beloved Prophet (SallaAllahualaihiwaSallam). The beliefs of this group are the same as the beliefs of the Sahaba or Noble Companions of the Beloved Prophet (SallaAllahualaihiwaSallam) and the Salf-e-Saliheen (our great pious predecessors). In many Ahadith, the Beloved Prophet (SallaAllahualaihiwaSallam) strongly advised the Muslims to follow his Sunnah and to remain steadfast upon the path of his Sahaba, the Salf-e-Saliheen.”

Source: http:/ahlus-sunna.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=18

In practical terms however, since Islamic scholarship and writings beyond the text of the Quran did not begin until 200 years later, the Muslims are followers of what later date scholars made of what the Salaf practiced. What we know about the “Al-Salaf Al-Sāliḥ” is therefore from scholars who came two to three centuries later and therefore in practical terms, the Muslims follow one or several of the scholars of later times. The most important among them are the compilers of the Ahadith and the four imams of Islamic jurisprudence.

All major Sunni sects follow the Quran and the Ahadith and none of the sects has a methodology by which they have declared some of the contradictory Ahadith (plural of Hadith) or those Ahadith that are antithetical to the message of the Quran as doubtful and put them aside as apocryphal. The fact is that all major sects of Islam interpret the Quran through the Ahadith which means that the Hadith prevails over the Quran!

The primary difference between the various sects of Sunni Islam is on the definition of what constitutes “innovation in the religion” or “Bid’at”. Puritanism is thus related to the degree to which innovation in religious practices that are not supported by the Quran and the Ahadith is shunned. But for this, there is very little difference of an ideological nature. Takfir is practiced to the same degree and in the same manner by all sects. Contrary to what is propagated by the sectarians, Abdul Wahhab's teachings as far as Takfir of other sects is concerned, are no different from that of any other sect and none of his writings go against the Ahadith accepted by all sects of Sunni Islam. For example,

Natana J. DeLong-Bas says in her book “Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad” :

“despite his at times vehement denunciations of other religious groups for their supposedly heretical beliefs, Ibn Abd al Wahhab never called for their destruction or death. … he assumed that these people would be punished in the Afterlife …”

“Although a person will be considered as Mushrik until he has fulfilled Aslu-Dīn al-Islām, Abdul Wahhab was opposed to declaring Takfir upon any individual person if the argument has not yet been established upon him so that he has an excuse with Allāh on the Day of Judgment.”

Source: http://al-aqeedah.com/images/books/asludeen.pdf

Apostasy is punishable by death for all major sects and while other sects are declared as heretic, heretics are not punishable by death. A person changing his sect is considered an apostate by the sect the person has left which then considers such a person as punishable by death. As long as a person remains in the sect in which he was born, he is safe from all sects that follow their creed strictly.

Radical Islam is a result of the inability of all major sects of Islam to deal appropriately with the Ahadith which have corrupted the Islam of the Quran. The unreliable and mostly concocted Ahadith, are the cancer of Islam. Reform, to my mind, is possible only through a call to a return to the Islam of the Quran which undoubtedly was the Islam of the “Al-Salaf Al-Sāliḥ” and not what passes today as Islam which is a travesty of Islam based on Ahadith concocted two centuries later. All major sects of Islam follow the Ahadith and are suspect and those who lay the greatest emphasis on the Ahadith are the most vulnerable to a xenophobic form of Islam. The Muslims will have to accept that the Quran is the best source for the Sunna of the Prophet and not the Ahadith. The Ahadith must be accorded a secondary position and greater emphasis laid on a study of the Quran for any reform to be possible.

Naseer Ahmed is an Engineering graduate from IIT Kanpur and is an independent IT consultant after having served in both the Public and Private sector in responsible positions for over three decades. He is a frequent contributor to NewAgeIslam.com.

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islamic-society/naseer-ahmed,-new-age-islam/present-day-islam-is-a-travesty-of-islam/d/104108

Saudi Arabia's New Sunni Alliance

By Hussein Ibish

July 31, 2015

If the Iran nuclear deal was an earthquake shaking the Middle East’s strategic landscape, one of the most dramatic aftershocks was the surprising arrival last month in Saudi Arabia of a high-level delegation from Hamas. The visit by the Islamist organization that rules Gaza is the latest sign of an about-face in Saudi policy, which is now seeking a rapprochement with the regional Muslim Brotherhood movement, to which Hamas belongs.

Saudi Arabia has long been mistrustful of the Brotherhood. Traditionally, the kingdom has regarded the Islamists as a political threat and a rival source of Islamic authority in the Middle East. This suspicion deteriorated into open hostility as Brotherhood parties threatened to take over key Arab states following the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in 2011.

The Saudis therefore welcomed the ouster of the Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, a Brotherhood leader, in 2013. That was the first of a series of major setbacks for the Brotherhood throughout the region. The low point came last year when the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a terrorist group. (Hamas is the only Brotherhood party that is openly armed and advocates the use of violence, specifically against Israel.)

The Saudi foreign minister, Adel Al-Jubeir, insisted that the recent Hamas visit was for religious, not political, reasons and that “the position of the kingdom with regards to Hamas has not changed.” But pilgrimages to Mecca don’t usually involve extensive meetings with the entire leadership, including King Salman bin Abdulaziz and his principal deputies, Crown Prince Muhammed bin Nayef and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman.

The Hamas delegation included its chief representatives in Egypt and Turkey, which means that its leading factions were all represented: This was not a power play by one element. As a courtesy, during the visit the Saudis released eight Hamas members jailed for illegal political activities in Saudi Arabia.

In another sign of a Saudi opening to Brotherhood groups, Saudi-backed forces in Yemen last month installed Nayef al-Bakri of the Brotherhood-oriented Al-Islah party (also designated a terrorist group by Riyadh) as governor of the key southern city of Aden, which Saudi-backed forces had just recaptured.

Three other leading Brotherhood figures — Rachid al-Ghannouchi of Tunisia’s Ennahda Party, Abdul Majeed al-Zindani of Al-Islah and Hammam Saeed of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood — have all visited Saudi Arabia in recent weeks. There was even a rumour, as yet neither confirmed nor denied, that the Brotherhood has been quietly removed from the kingdom’s terrorism list.

A critical mass of circumstances accounts for this shift in Saudi attitudes. King Salman is more sympathetic to religious conservatives than his predecessor was. The weakened Brotherhood is now perceived as less of a threat, while the extremists of the Islamic State are viewed as far more dangerous. Above all, the new Saudi approach is shaped by the regional confrontation with Tehran in the wake of the nuclear agreement.

Riyadh has been strengthening relations with its fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member Qatar, which reportedly brokered the Hamas visit. It has also stepped up outreach efforts to Turkey and Sudan. This appears to be a broad-based Saudi attempt to recruit as many Sunni political actors across the Middle East as possible to confront Iran and its Shiite allies.

The Saudis and the Brotherhood can find common cause in several regional conflicts. As a leading Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi told me, “Saudi Arabia is interested in working with the Brotherhood because it is politically effective in places like Syria and Yemen.”

The Saudi calculation is that it cannot simultaneously take on Iran and its Shiite Islamist allies, like Hezbollah, as well as jihadist movements, like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and more mainstream Islamists. Hence the Saudi outreach to the more moderate Brotherhood.

For the Saudis, wooing Hamas will ensure that Iran loses influence in Gaza, leaving only Islamic Jihad as a wayward ally. Iran has reportedly responded by stopping its funding of Hamas.

Hamas itself has competing factions, however, and its military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, has deep ties to Iran. The Brigades leadership may fear that the Gulf is a good source of cash but not of arms.

With Hamas’s control of Gaza facing new challenges from Islamic State-inspired jihadists, it’s possible the militarist perspective could prevail. But the Saudi détente with the Brotherhood is not limited to Hamas, and more is at stake for the region’s Islamists. The entire Brotherhood movement faced an existential crisis with the ouster of Mr. Morsi and Egypt’s crackdown; now Riyadh is offering it a lifeline.

A closer Saudi relationship with Hamas will require skilful diplomacy. Riyadh must avoid making relations worse with Egypt, which remains as hostile as ever to the Brotherhood, or undermining the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which is controlled by Fatah, the majority movement of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Saudis must move carefully to ensure that they are seen in Cairo and Ramallah as playing a constructive role, promoting both the reconstruction of Gaza and reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.

The nuclear agreement with Iran has propelled Saudi Arabia to make rolling back Iran’s regional influence a priority. Its strategy is to unite as much as possible of the Sunni Middle East (excepting extremists like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda). Riyadh may be right that this is the best way to strengthen its hand against Tehran’s cohesive Shiite bloc. But it also means consolidating already sharp sectarian divisions in the Middle East.

That will make matters more difficult for outside powers like the United States that do not have a natural affinity with either camp. As for the peoples of the region, a new regional order based on sectarian identity is dangerous indeed.

Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, is a writer and a broadcaster.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/opinion/hussein-ibish-saudi-arabias-new-sunni-alliance.html?emc=edit_ty_20150731&nl=opinion&nlid=71783194&_r=0

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islam-and-politics/hussein-ibish/saudi-arabia-s-new-sunni-alliance/d/104121

Saudi Arabia's New Sunni Alliance

By Hussein Ibish

July 31, 2015

For the Saudis, wooing Hamas will ensure that Iran loses influence in Gaza, leaving only Islamic Jihad as a wayward ally. Iran has reportedly responded by stopping its funding of Hamas.

Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, is a writer and a broadcaster.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/opinion/hussein-ibish-saudi-arabias-new-sunni-alliance.html?emc=edit_ty_20150731&nl=opinion&nlid=71783194&_r=0

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islam-and-politics/hussein-ibish/saudi-arabia-s-new-sunni-alliance/d/104121

Contradictions of Post-Islamism: Evidence from Turkey

By Toygar Sinan Baykan

30 Jul 2015

In the mid-1990s, Asaf Bayat published one of the earliest comments on the change in the nature of Islamism and later wrote a book length account on the transformation of Muslim societies in which he clarified his ideas on post-Islamism. According to Bayat, the social transformation of Muslim societies under the effect of market mechanisms, consumerism, and authoritarian political structures had weakened the appeal of Islamism. Gradually, the top-down project lost ground and Islamist elites and intellectuals began to perceive the use of Islamist discourse and symbols in politics as corrosive of the sincere religious beliefs of the masses. Instead, at least some of the Islamist political elites and intellectuals across the Middle East started to embrace a much more conciliatory attitude towards pluralist and democratic values.

In recent years we have witnessed the gradual decline of the once post-Islamist actors with regards to their attitudes towards pluralism, democracy and the rule of law in Turkey. This demonstrated a fundamental contradiction which lies at the hearth of the post-Islamist experience. The essential contradiction of post-Islamism was two-fold. First of all, organisational and political culture of post-Islamist actors was inevitably a product of a restrictive and flawed political cultural and institutional framework. In the second place, as post-Islamist actors entrenched their position in power they started to benefit from the very same flawed and restrictive framework which gave rise to them. After prolonged exercise of power, post-Islamist actors lost their democratising appetite and started to play by the rules of the power game.

From the perspective of the debates initiated by Bayat, even up until a couple of years ago, Turkey was seen as a bright example of the post-Islamist experience. When the Justice and Development Party (JDP) was founded in 2001 and was elected to power in 2002, the party’s prominent intellectuals wrote openly of the corrosive effect of the use of Islam or religion in general in politics in their reflections on the notion of “conservative democracy” (Muhafazakar Demokrasi). Likewise, the activities of the Gülenists across the world and their grassroots’ work have always been seen as compatible with liberal democratic values and the Gülen Community’s (GC) conciliatory political style was often praised by liberal democratic circles in Turkey as well.

After the struggle between JDP and GC became a public issue due to the corruption probes initiated by allegedly Gülenist prosecutors, Fethullah Gülen himself argued in one of his public comments that it is against to the spirit of Islam to pursue political power for religious aims and to see religion as a political ideology. According to Gülen, the intermingling of religion and politics is corrosive for both and particularly for religion. This statement clearly signalled that the GC is still claiming ownership of a post-Islamist stance and is trying to consolidate its legitimacy. As a response, government circles harshly criticised the GC’s intervention in politics and argued that its use of Gülenist cadres implanted in the security bureaucracy and judiciary is fundamentally anti-democratic. According to the pro-JDP narrative in the media, such involvement in politics by a religious community can only be explained as a coup against civilian authority using the religious beliefs of the community’s followers within the state apparatuses. Thus, the main argument of the supporters of the government also had a post-Islamist flavour. It therefore seems that the JDP government and the GC are both attempting to hold on to the same post-Islamist position. However, when well-known Machiavellian methods used by the JDP and the GC in their political struggles taken into account their post-Islamist stance started to appear less convincing.

Any explanation of the divergence of once post-Islamist actors from a genuinely pluralist-democratic trajectory in Turkey must take into consideration the political circumstances and legal frameworks within which these actors emerged. Since the early 1970s, the natural democratic development of the political organisations of the Islamist movement has been frequently interrupted by state actors such as the military and high judiciary. From a much wider historical perspective the impact of unexpected opportunities created by the military coup in 1980 and the crushing of organised leftist forces in the rise and current decline of the post-Islamist actors in Turkey should also be taken into account.

The vigilance of the elites of the Islamist movement during the turbulent years of Turkish democracy in the second half of 1970s protected Islamist organisations from using violent means. The reward for the Islamist political entrepreneurs was a less heavy-handed intervention in the Islamist movement and relatively undamaged political and social networks throughout 1980s and 1990s. One can also argue that there was a tacit approval of the Islamist politics by the new establishment of Turkey at the beginning of 1980s as a panacea to leftist movements. This, so to say, “selective pluralism” in Turkey created a virtual consensus between systemic actors and the Islamist movement at the expense of the destruction of the organised leftist forces in particular and a genuinely pluralist political space in general. This consensus itself was founded on a majoritarian understanding of democracy which envisaged a narrow and limited political space populated only by forcefully modified political actors.

This understanding was further consolidated by the narrow political framework of the constitution of Turkey and the ten percent threshold for parties seeking to enter parliament. One must also mention the effect of the current Law on Political Parties (Law no 2820), which contributes significantly to leadership domination and undemocratic tendencies within parties by granting extensive flexibility to the party leadership and headquarters in enrolling members, changing provincial administrations, and defining candidates. Finally, this legal and political institutional framework must be seen against the background of a political culture within which dissent and opposition is considered treacherous in itself. This attitude was highlighted by Şerif Mardin decades ago and, sadly, little has changed since then.

In addition, religious and conservative social actors such as Islamic communities and brotherhoods have had to find non-transparent ways to protect themselves from the state repression stemming from a very particular understanding of secularism since the foundation of the Republic. The major method was infiltration of the state, with appointments of sympathisers of the various religious communities to high bureaucratic positions. Such secrecy necessitated the formation of hierarchical and non-transparent organisations. Thus, post-Islamist actors in Turkey have, on the one hand, created very centralised and hierarchical political organisations and, on the other, very hierarchical and non-transparent religious communities.

The major lesson stemming from the current state of post-Islamism in Turkey is the importance of political institutions and legal frameworks to support pluralism within parties, in party systems and in the sphere of civil society. Post-Islamist forces have overcome the pressures of systemic actors and have emerged from within a narrow political space. Throughout their struggle with systemic pressures, while renouncing violent means, they developed highly disciplined and hierarchical organisational and political cultures whose strategic leverage helped them to achieve political influence and electoral success. They have struggled with anti-democratic interventions of systemic actors and then benefited from the very same narrow political framework created by their opponents. Hence, the struggle between GC and JDP over the ownership of a legitimate post-Islamist ground is, to say the least, deeply ironic. Turkey has already reached the limits of the democratising potential of post-Islamist experience.

Toygar BaykanToygar Sinan Baykan is a PhD researcher in politics at the University of Sussex. He studied political science in the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University. He also attended the Middle East Technical University and Leiden University for his graduate studies and has a master’s degree in comparative politics from LSE. His current research focuses on Islamist and post-Islamist politics and political organisations, in particular the organisation and strategies of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. His research interests include party politics, comparative politics and political culture.

Source: flickr.com

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islam-and-politics/toygar-sinan-baykan/contradictions-of-post-islamism--evidence-from-turkey/d/104122

The Good and Bad Taliban

By Abbas Nasir

30 Jul 2015

Even by Pakistan's standards, Wednesday was an explosive news day.

What started as mere murmurings a few days ago about Taliban leader Mullah Omar's death, was confirmed on Wednesday when the Afghan government went on record to say the reports were true.

Throughout the day a steady stream of unnamed Afghan, Pakistan, and even some Taliban officials suggested Mullah Omar was no more.

With the confirmation, the obvious question that popped up into many minds was what impact this development will have on the recently initiated peace talks between the Ashraf Ghani government and Taliban representatives in Pakistan, backed by the country's powerful military.

There were fears of Mullah Omar's death leading to a power struggle within the Afghan militant movement and even leading to fragmentation.

Until the new hierarchy is not demonstrably in place, the situation would cast a shadow over any talks.

However, all major players, particularly Pakistan's all-pervasive security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), reputed to enjoy huge influence with the Afghan Taliban, would have known of this development and prepared for it.

Fostering Negotiations or Thwarting Talks

Admittedly, it is too early to say if making Mullah Omar's death public at this stage, when it supposedly happened in April 2013, was aimed at making the militant movement more amenable to negotiations or to thwart the talks.

For example, if it is the latter, and there are influential sections within Afghanistan's delicate power structure who are hostile to these talks - in fact, they are hostile towards having much to do with Pakistan - then the news will bring into question the efficacy of any talks where the representative status of Taliban interlocutors is questionable itself.

If the whole idea was to make the announcement so the new leadership is quickly in place and so an embarrassing situation - like the one when the Taliban Qatar office representatives decried the talks while those still claiming to hold a brief for Mullah Omar were engaging in these - would not happen again.

Nonetheless, the international media had its top story.

Mullah Omar, whose rule in Afghanistan triggered a chain-reaction of events that would change the world beyond anybody's recognition, was dead.

He may not have been hunted with the same fervour as Osama bin Laden, a guest of the Taliban emirate when he owned up to directing the 9/11 attacks on the United States, was but the Taliban "emir" hosted the man and refused to hand him over to the US and its allies.

The military action that followed the 9/11 attacks saw him dislodged from power in Kabul.

But because he had evaded capture or death, he acquired a mythical status and was seen as the inspiration behind all militant activity directed against the foreign troops present in Afghanistan, for a very long period.

Another Shocking Death

The news will have a telling effect on the region, including Pakistan, even though the country had woken up to equally dramatic but different news - the killing of Malik Ishaq.

Following Ishaq's death, a photograph, released to the media, of his bullet-riddled, bloodied corpse with one glazed eye seemingly staring at nothingness in disbelief on the cold, tiled floor of a mortuary in southern Punjab may have represented the adage live by the sword, die by the sword.

But it was wholly inadequate to tell the story of the terror perpetrated by the man who was lying dead there in the company of his two sons and about a dozen other comrades.

Malik Ishaq, who by his own admission, was responsible for the murder of more than 100 Shia Muslims in Pakistan, was the head of the outlawed Lashkar-e-Jhangvi - a terrorist organisation committed to the "extermination" of Shia Muslims whom it considers to be heretics.

Despite spending a decade and a half in prison on charges relating to the murder of 70 Shia Muslims, he was never convicted.

Witnesses were intimidated. Those who refused to withdraw were killed. Prosecutors were reminded of the fate of the others who did not oblige.

Nurturing Terrorists

A judge trying him was said to have buried his face in his hands before leaving the court in a rush when Malik Ishaq got up and started to rattle off the names of his children. Ishaq had been freed by the Lahore High Court in 2014, but was recently rearrested.

He is quoted to have told the former chief of army staff retired General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani: "General, Sir, we are like your children but we can't do as you say."

In a meeting, Kayani had reportedly asked him to stop the murder of Shia Muslims.

This incident was never denied by the military, which has been blamed in the past for nurturing such terrorists and their groups for use in Indian-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Such was the villainous record of the man that even the usually vocal human rights activists did not question whether the "shoot-out" between his comrades and the police escorting him to a weapons cache was actually what happened: Was it an attempt to spring him from custody, or a staged extrajudicial killing as had become the wont of the security forces when they can't secure court convictions?

Most also wanted to know if his death finally meant an end to the military's use of proxies and if it was now committed to crushing all terror groups as the army chief has publicly pledged. Perhaps the distinction between the so-called good and bad Taliban has now been abandoned.

Abbas Nasir is a former editor of Pakistan's English language newspaper Dawn and former executive editor at BBC Asia Pacific region.

Source: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/good-bad-taliban-mullah-omar-malik-ishaq-150730070225207.html

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islam,terrorism-and-jihad/abbas-nasir/the-good-and-bad-taliban/d/104119

Empowering Saudi Women for Public Office

By Samar Fatany

01 August 2015

THE participation of women in the forthcoming Municipal elections is creating a local and international buzz. It is still very unclear whether the women running for elections will succeed or not.

Unfortunately there are still many social barriers that are challenging. There are also many who still oppose the participation of women in decision-making positions.

This rigid attitude has kept our country behind and continues to block our way to progress. We need to work harder to create a consensus to support women in leadership positions.

The more we see women in power the more people will get used to the fact that women are capable leaders. However, recruiting women to run for a local office is still a real challenge for our region.

Saudi women could play a pivotal role in building their community. Studies have shown that women tend to identify more with the social needs of the community and they bond together for the common good.

The concerns of healthcare, education, and the economy are some of the modern day issues that affect all women and they should have a say on the way government addresses these concerns.

To do so we need to eliminate the barriers that have marginalized women for a very long time. The distorted Islamic interpretations that depicted women as less intelligent and questioned their morality should be buried and eliminated once and for all.

Today Saudi women have joined the ranks of other Muslim women who are highly intelligent and qualified as scientists, doctors, bankers, economists, architects, academics and researchers.

They do not lack the intelligence or the moral attitude to command respect and recognition. There are many professional and capable women, who if given the chance, can become successful candidates for political office.

In fact, there are many who are more eligible and better qualified than men who occupy positions but lack professionalism and are less qualified.

It is time we look into the experience of others and learn some of the strategies that have supported women to reach leadership positions and provided them the opportunity to play a bigger role in public office.

In more advanced societies there is a long history of many organizations that worked towards supporting women to reach decision-making positions.

Establishing a formal professional political action committee could be one way of recognizing potential women leaders.

Its role would be to identify a diverse group of women who are not well represented in the country. It would study the demographic and geographic situation of citizens and accordingly provide the necessary training and support for potential women leaders to qualify for government positions.

Instituting professional networks with campaign managers and media training services to enhance the political qualifications of potential women leaders could be another way of boosting their prospects to be nominated for public office.

They would be trained to develop a campaign on how to deal with the media and how to shape a message. They would be educated on issues that are of great concern to the society.

They would learn the art of how to deal with the difficulties of addressing public needs and increasing their understanding of Shariah laws and policy issues.

Their goal would be to create informed and active women leaders, who could serve the nation politically, socially and shaping its economy.

The country is in dire need of all its qualified citizens, men and women. Women who are 50 percent of the population and are 57 percent of the university graduates could include potential politicians who could be brilliant negotiators and serve the nation in the international arena, negotiating policies on arms control and military advocacy.

Or legislators who could introduce a new perspective on social policy issues like healthcare education, family, the environment and fiscal issues, which could create a great difference on the domestic front.

Indeed qualified Saudi women if given the opportunity and the proper training could play an important role in shaping public policy and in providing a more moderate environment to fight extremism and sectarianism that continue to threaten the surety and stability of this country.

Policymakers are called upon to focus on researching and identifying women with potential. A network of support to allow women reach decision-making positions is the need of the hour.

There should be concerted efforts to bring women into full participation in policymaking; they should not be denied the opportunity to serve as chief executives, legislators, ministers and ambassadors.

For how long will Saudi women continue to remain bystanders in the progress of their region? It is time they are recognized as equal members of the international community who are eager to serve humanity and build a better future for their children.

The future of our nation depends on the way we conduct our lives and embrace modernity.

Samar Fatany is a radio broadcaster and writer.

Source: http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20150801252026

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islam,-women-and-feminism/samar-fatany/empowering-saudi-women-for-public-office/d/104117

Young Generation to Lead Redefinition of Indonesian Islam

By Zacky Umam

July 31 2015

The founders of Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulema (NU) were the product of late 19th century Islamic encounters with modernity and colonialism.

Both the founder of Muhammadiyah, Kyai (revered cleric) Ahmad Dahlan (as Muhammad Darwish is better known) and NU founder Hashim Asyari were well trained under many renowned teachers in Mecca, including those from Jawi or Java.

The August congresses of Muhammadiyah in Makassar, South Sulawesi, and NU in Jombang, East Java, will be an historical moment for both organizations to stimulate efforts to articulate the magnitude of Indonesian Islam.

With the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Mecca and Medina were vital centers for Sunni learning for scholars from Java. In this milieu, in the 17th century, some Jawi scholars became commentators of the Shafi‘i school of law, knowledgeable Sufis and harsh critics of Dutch colonialism.

Their oeuvres were even published not only in Istanbul and Hyderabad, but also, mostly, in Cairo printing houses.

Circulation of ideas, furthermore, took place in the interaction between Sunni traditionalism, the reformism proposed by Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida and the need to articulate “imaginary independence” for Muslim liberation.

This milieu nurtured the young Darwish and Asyari to hone their struggle to improve Muslim society.

While Darwish proposed building modern schools and hospitals and promoting economic improvement and the radical criticism of traditionalism, Asyari attempted to preserve Sunni traditionalism by continuing the role of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) as prestigious seminaries for the Sunni school in the archipelago.

One century after the birth of Muhammadiyah and NU, much has been said about their respective transformation.

In the early 21st century, their members have been educated in Western academies.

NU has many members studying at Al-Azhar University and others in Arab countries, in addition to a recent increased interest in Turkey.

The leading students from an NU background have delved into critical scholarship of non-traditional intellectuals such as those found in Egypt, Morocco and Syria, making them the transmitters of Middle Eastern encounters with European philosophy.

Their contemporaries read Western philosophy and social sciences with enormous curiosity, as a result of persistent efforts by former chairman and Indonesian president Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid and his compatriots from the 1980s onwards to advocate a democratic culture and literacy.

In some leading NU pesantren, students discuss the works of Jacques Derrida, Karl Marx and others, in addition to their engagement with world literature.

If this trend continues, it could be comparable to the long development of religious seminaries in Iran, “the land of ideas”, in the Muslim world.

Similarly, the youth of the two largest Muslim organizations have traveled to many Western countries in pursuit of knowledge, not only to deepen their understanding of the pure sciences and technology, but also humanities and social sciences.

Many have been engaged in Islamic studies. Muhammadiyah, unlike NU, treats its youth based on merit. NU, by contrast, holds traditional reverence to the senior cleric, or the rule of kyai.

NU youth thus need to learn to use accepted parlance and approaches to effectively transform the organization where necessary.

Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, has no hierarchical problem.

In 20 to 30 years, both organizations will be led by the current generation, the product of intimate encounters between classical Islamic discourse and critical thinking, along with an engagement in efforts to improve the social and economic conditions of their communities.

The current generation has also had to deal with various influences, including that of the capital-rich Wahhabism.

The religious leaning of Islamists and their destruction of Islamic heritage in the name of puritanism is a crucial issue for NU.

An historical precedence of safeguarding Islamic traditions against claims of puritanism lies within NU’s origin.

It was the initiative of their founding fathers to form the “Komite Hijaz 1926.” In 1926, the committee sent a few scholars to the ruler of the Hijaz, later Saudi Arabia, and successfully negotiated freedoms for Islamic followers in the holy land other than those of the Wahhabi.

Both organizations, furthermore, must continue to respond intensively to the call for jihad promoted by the barbarism of the Islamic State (IS) movement.

It is an exaggeration to differentiate Muhammadiyah from NU along black and white lines.

Both can be avant-garde institutions for progressive Muslims seeking a new movement that is plural in nature, without succumbing to the temptation to ruin the gift of an Islamic tradition of scholarly debate.

Many, because of their ignorance to this long Islamic tradition, fail to value its nature.

Muhammadiyah and NU should be endlessly proud of their culture of scholarly debate.

If both can cooperate in the future, we would see a better affirmation of Indonesian Islam.

With the increase of Indonesia’s economic and political profile in international relations, both organizations could contribute much to the nation in this century.

Their slogans, such as “constitutional jihad”, as declared by Muhammadiyah leaders, and the “Fiqh [seeking jurisprudence in Islamic teachings] of eradicating corruption”, as cited by NU leaders, must be further detailed according to interpretations of Islamic law.

Nowadays the enthusiasm of the youth of Muhammadiyah and NU, strengthened by the emergence of their overseas offshoots, should not be neglected, because they will become the leaders who will determine the future of Indonesian Islam in accordance with the global call for just societies.

This challenge is much more complex than the challenge posed during the late Dutch colonial period when both Ahmad Dahlan and Hasyim Asyari made their mark in history.

Zacky Umam chairs Germany’s chapter of the Nahdlatul Ulema, and is a PhD fellow at the Berlin Graduate School for Muslim Cultures and Societies.

Source: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/07/31/young-generation-lead-redefinition-indonesian-islam.html

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islamic-society/zacky-umam/young-generation-to-lead-redefinition-of-indonesian-islam/d/104120

Saturday, August 1, 2015

Present Day Islam Is a Travesty of Islam

By Naseer Ahmed, New Age Islam

31 July, 2015

Some of the worst Muslims were in the first few generations and also some of the best.

The Best

and of these people it is said that God will not allow them to go astray. Some did but quickly realize their mistake and corrected themselves.

(115) And Allah will not mislead a people after He hath guided them, in order that He may make clear to them what to fear (and avoid)- for Allah hath knowledge of all things.

The Worst

Others

Source: http:/ahlus-sunna.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=18

Natana J. DeLong-Bas says in her book “Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad” :

Source: http://al-aqeedah.com/images/books/asludeen.pdf

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islamic-society/naseer-ahmed,-new-age-islam/present-day-islam-is-a-travesty-of-islam/d/104108

The Meaning of ‘Fiqh’ in the Qur’an and Its Position in Islam

By Louay Fatoohi

31 July, 2015

Article Reproduced on New Age Islam from the Author’s Blog by His Permission

In Islamic sciences, the term “Fiqh” has developed the strictly legal meaning of “studying Shari’a or ‘Islamic law’” [...]. But the Arabic root of this term has a general meaning in the Qur’an. The limited legal meaning this term has developed reflects a narrow reading of one particular Qur’anic verse, which itself is the result of a narrow understanding of Islam.

The term “Fiqh” means “understanding,” “comprehending”…etc. It occurs in six different variations twenty times in as many verses. I have listed these variations with any attached pronouns they may have, their meanings, how many times each occurs, and in what verses:

Variation	Meaning	Count	Verses
Yafqahuna	they understand	13	4.78, 6.65, 6.98, 7.179, 8.65, 9.81, 9.87, 9.127, 18.93, 48.15, 59.13, 63.3, 63.7
Yafqahuhu	they understand it	3	6.25, 17.46, 18.57
Yafqahu	they understand	1	20.28
Nafqahu	we understand	1	11.91
Tafqahuna	you understand	1	17.44
Liyatafaqqahu	to study	1	9.122

In eight (7.179, 5.65, 9.87, 9.127, 48.15, 59.13, 63.3, 63.7) of its thirteen appearances in the masculine plural present tense verb “Yafqahuna,” the term occurs in the expression “la Yafqahuna” or “they do not understand,” referring to the disbelievers’ failure to accept God’s revelation and appreciate His signs. These are three of these verses:

We have assigned to hell many jinn and humans: they have hearts but they do not understand (la Yafqahuna) with them; they have eyes but they do not see with them; and they have ears but they do not hear with them. They are like cattle — rather, they are further astray. Those are the heedless. (7.179)

You (the believers) cause greater fear in their (the disbelievers) hearts than Allah. This is because they are a people who do not understand (la Yafqahuna). (59.13)

That is because they (the hypocrites) believed then disbelieved; therefore a seal has been set on their hearts, so they do not understand (la Yafqahuna). (63.3)

In addition to the eight instances of the expression “la Yafqahuna,” the term “Yafqahuna” appears in another five verses. In one verse, Allah censures the hypocrites for their reluctance to go out for jihad during the hot weather, reminding them the “the fire of hell is hotter,” and commenting that this argument would work with them “if they understand (law Kanu Yafqahuna)” (9.81).

This is a second verse criticizing the reasoning of the disbelievers for raising an illogical argument against the Prophet:

Wherever you [O people!] may be, death will reach you, even if you should be in lofty towers. If a good thing happens to them (the disbelievers) they say “this is from Allah”; but if a bad thing befalls them they say “this is from you (Muhammad).” Say [O Muhammad!]: “Everything is from Allah.” What is it with these people that they can hardly understand (Yafqahuna) a saying? (4.78)

Then there are two verses (6.65, 6.98) stressing that Allah expounds His verses so that people may understand:

Say [O Muhammad!]: “It is He who is able to send on you chastisement from above you or from under your feet, or to confuse you in sects, and to make some of you tastes the violence of others.” See how We handle the signs that they may understand (Yafqahuna). (6.65)

The remaining verse (18.93) in which “Yafqahuna” is used refers to the limited understanding of one the peoples visited by Du al-Qarnain.

Next, there are three verses in which the term “Yafqahuhu (they understand it)” is used. The pronoun “it” refers to the Qur’an. All three verses talk about those who would not understand the Qur’an. This is one verse:

Who is more wrong than he who after being reminded of the signs of his Lord he turns away from them and forgets what his hands have committed? We have laid veils on their hearts lest they understand it (Yafqahuhu), and in their ears heaviness; and though you [O Muhammad!] call them to the guidance they will never be guided. (18.57)

The term “Yafqahu” occurs in a Prophet Moses’ prayer to God to mend a speech impediment he had so that the people he was sent to would understand him: “So that they understand (Yafqahu) my words” (20.28).

“Nafqahu” is found in the false argument that the people of prophet Shu‘aib used against his preaching: “We do not understand (Nafqahu) much of what you say” (11.91).

Then we have the variation “Tafqahuna” in which God tells people that the heaven, the earth, and everything in them glorifies God: “but you do not understand (Tafqahuna) their glorification” (17.44).

The last variation of “Fiqh” is “Liyatafaqqahu.” This variant differs from the other five in that the verb used is not “Yafqah” but “Yatafaqqah.” The difference between the two is that the former is passive while the later is active. So while the former means “understand” the latter means “study.” This is the verse in question:

The believers would not all march forth. A group of each section should march forth to study (Liyatafaqqahu) religion so they may warn their people when they go back to them that they may beware. (9.122)

Exegetes have expressed different opinions about what sections of believers are referred to here and what marching forth means. But there is no disagreement on the clear reference to groups of believers dedicating time to the study of religion. As we saw earlier, the term fiqh means “understanding” or “studying” in general, so the verse is talking about studying all aspects of religion, i.e. Islam, which includes but is not restricted to Islamic law. Fiqh as used in verse 9.122 means studying the creed of the Qur’an, the historical accounts in it, its discussion of various natural phenomenon, the law, the biography of the Prophet, why the Prophet took a particular decision but not another, how God guided the development of the first generation of Muslims to establish the new religion and ensure its eternity, how Islamic teachings relate to time and place, how to present Islam to different people and cultures, and so on.

The late Shaikh Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917-1996) has complained that the term fiqh has been hijacked by the jurists who gave it a limited legal meaning. He has rightly criticized the overemphasis that Muslim scholars have put on the legalistic side of Islam at the expense of its other, broader aspects:

If we look at the fiqh of public relations and worshipping practices, I am not aware of any nation that spent more time on juristic branches than our nation. Take ablution for instance. It can be learned in two minutes, so what makes it the subject of hundreds of pages, books, and even tomes, and doctrinal differences? This is puzzling!1

He goes on to say:

Instead of studying ablution in three months, it would have been better to study: Why did [the people of] ‘Ad expires? Why did [the people of] Thamud perish? Does society today resemble that of ‘Ad or Thamud or not? What corruption took place among the Children of Israel?…. All this is possible to learn by studying the Qur’an’s narratives, but we ignored it completely and distanced ourselves from it as we distanced ourselves from studying the verses that command us to study the universe.2

Of course, the way religious scholars think shapes the average person’s perception of religion. So the Muslim scholars’ seeing of Islam mainly through its legal aspect has had the same impact on the average Muslim.

Here is an experience that every Muslim who takes part in the collective prayer in the mosque would have gone through. As the Muslims line up to start the prayer, it is not uncommon for the person to one’s left or right to advise him that he should widen or reduce the gap between his feet. It is quite amazing how this distance has become such a major issue that makes it the subject of repeated advice. Yet how many times have we been advised by the person standing next to us to make sure that we focus on the prayer and avoid absentmindedness? Almost certainly never. But then which one is more important: measuring the distance between one’s feet, to meet a requirement the origin of which is dubious, or trying to make good contact with God during the prayer by focusing one’s thoughts on the verses he reads, the words he utters, and the supplication he makes?

This common experience summarizes very well the predicament we Muslims have. We have lost touch with the essence of Islam and busied ourselves with superficial issues. We have abandoned the heart for the body, the brain for false teachers, and thinking for lifeless, ancient instructions. Getting one’s body in a particular posture is easy; getting the heart in the right state is extremely difficult. Yet it is having that proper state of mind that really matters. But because it is far more difficult than controlling the body, we have substituted it with that easy alternative.

As Shaikh al-Ghazali says, Muslim scholars have been guilty of over elaborating Islamic law, and this over elaboration reflects a misunderstanding of the purpose of Islamic law and its role in the religion. Islamic law is very important, but Islam is much bigger than its legal system. Similarly, the fiqh of Islam should be about studying all aspects of the religion not only its legal system.

References

Ghazali, M. (2005). Kayfa Nata‘amal ma‘a al-Qur’an (how we should deal with the Qur’an), Nahdat Misr, Cairo, p. 156.

2 Ibid, p. 157.

Source: http://www.quranicstudies.com/quran/the-meaning-of-fiqh-in-the-quran-and-its-position-in-islam/

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islamic-ideology/louay-fatoohi/the-meaning-of-‘fiqh’-in-the-qur’an-and-its-position-in-islam/d/104107