Logical Inference vs. Interpretation: A Critical Evaluation of Naseer Ahmed's Thesis

By V.A. Mohamad Ashrof, New Age Islam 30 September 2025 Naseer Ahmed's thesis, I would say at the outset, " Logical Inference Is Not Interpretation," emerges as a significant, indeed audacious, intervention. This evaluation aims to dissect Ahmed's thesis with the academic rigour and critical engagement it demands. While acknowledging the profound strengths and transformative potential of Ahmed's framework, this evaluation will also meticulously explore its philosophical underpinnings, potential vulnerabilities, and the broader implications for Quranic studies, Islamic theology (Kalam), and jurisprudence (Fiqh). His framework is indeed commendable as it not only encourages rigorous debate but also safeguards against the pitfalls of subjective interpretation that can dilute the Quran's message. It forces interlocutors to move beyond mere assertion and engage with the underlying structure of the argument, demanding accountability and intellectual precision. This shift is a significant advance over approaches that privilege lexicography or tradition over the text’s self-referential coherence. While Ahmed's definitions are clear and his call for logical consistency laudable, one might critique the rigidity with which he applies them. The Quran, as a sacred text, often invites multiple layers of meaning. Its language is rich in metaphor, rhetorical flourish, and contextual elasticity. To reduce its multifaceted discourse to a series of propositions from which singular, logically necessary conclusions can be drawn risks oversimplifying the interpretive process. Religious texts, unlike mathematical theorems, are not typically "closed axiomatic systems." They operate on different registers: propositional, poetic, ethical, and narrative. As some scholars remind us, "text does not exist in a vacuum; meaning emerges in the dialogical relationship between text, context, and reader." The very act of discerning which verse provides a "definitive premise" is already an "act of interpretation." The challenge lies in reconciling the demands of formal logic with the inherent multivalence of natural language, especially within a text that self-identifies as containing both "clear (Muhkamat) and ambiguous/allegorical (Mutashabihat)" verses (Q.3:7). The process of discerning which verse belongs to which category, and how clear verses should be used as premises to clarify ambiguous ones, is precisely "where interpretation enters the system." Ahmed’s framework may inadvertently create a different problem: anachronistic harmonization that flattens genuine development or contextual variation within the text. Ahmed argues that his logical inferences are derived from "explicit premises" and that the "plain meaning" is "the meaning the Quran itself supplies through definitions, context, and cross-verbal qualifiers." However, the identification of these "explicit premises" and the determination of the "plain meaning" are themselves interpretive acts. For instance, if Q.2:6 is chosen as a "universal definition" for kafir, this is an interpretive choice to elevate a specific descriptive property to a universal, necessary definition. A traditionalist might argue that Q.2:6 describes only the final state of those who meet an ontological definition of kafir (one who conceals/denies God's truth), rather than being the definition itself. The selection of the defining verse is, arguably, the "Achilles' heel" of the logical framework; "the premises are chosen, not merely found, which means the initial choice is an interpretative risk." The Role of Context and Internal Consistency in Ahmed's Hermeneutic Ahmed's application of Q.4:82 is a powerful corrective against what he terms "free-floating lexicalism"—the practice of defining Quranic terms in isolation or relying solely on external dictionary meanings without checking for consistency across the entire text. By demanding that definitions and conclusions be tested for Cross-Quranic consistency, he ensures a systematic and rigorous analysis, aligning with the principle of tafsir al-Quran bi-al-Quran (interpreting the Quran by the Quran). This approach safeguards against the pitfalls of subjective interpretation that can dilute the Quran's message. He effectively illustrates this through various examples, particularly his rigorous analysis of the term kafir. His argument that early Meccan revelations targeted specific individuals as "kafirun" while not condemning all disbelievers "underscores the need for contextual understanding." This commitment "to textual integrity, it raises several critical questions." The Quran itself acknowledges that some verses are clear (muḥkamat) and others are ambiguous/allegorical (Mutashabihat) (Q.3:7). The very process of discerning which verse belongs to which category, and how a muḥkam verse should be used as a premise to clarify a mutashabih one, is where interpretation enters the system. In essence, while Ahmed’s "methodological discipline is a significant advance over approaches that privilege lexicography or tradition," his reliance on a particular reading of context and consistency might overlook the inherent "linguistic and thematic complexity" of the Quran, which often requires a broader hermeneutical lens. The challenge remains: how to balance the demands of logical consistency with the interpretive depth and multivalence that sacred texts inherently possess? The Case Study of Kafir: A Critical Redefinition Naseer Ahmed's application of his rigorous methodology to the term Kafir (often translated as "disbeliever") stands as the central demonstration of his thesis. This case study is crucial, for it is here that Ahmed attempts to move from abstract methodological claims to concrete, textually derived logical inferences with profound theological and practical consequences. Ahmed's analysis of Kafir begins with Q.2:6: "As to those who disbelieve, it is the same to them whether you warn them or do not warn them, they will not believe." From this verse, he logically derives a crucial premise: that Kafir denotes individuals characterized by "permanent, settled rejection" – those for whom divine warnings are inherently "ineffective." This establishes a fundamental distinction between mere "temporary disbelief" (a state from which one can return to faith) and "settled rejection" (a hardened state of imperviousness to guidance). This derivation is compelling. If we accept Q.2:6 as a functional definition, then the inference that "not every disbeliever is a kafir" follows necessarily. Many individuals may disbelieve temporarily but remain open to conviction. Only those who have reached the state described in Q.2:6 are truly Kafirun. This analysis "successfully separates the term from the generic, temporary state of disbelief and powerfully undermines its deployment as a blanket legal or theological category." Ahmed does not rest his case on a single verse. He builds a robust argument by drawing on a wide array of corroborating textual evidence, which lends substantial historical and chronological weight to his definition: • Chronological Analysis of Meccan Revelations: He highlights that early Meccan revelations often distinguished between Kafirun (persistent, entrenched opponents like Abu Jahl and Abu Lahab, who embody the Q.2:6 definition) and Mushrikun (polytheists, who were still often approached as potential converts). This suggests a nuanced taxonomy within the Quran itself. • Surah 109 (Al-Kafirun): The direct address "Say: O disbelievers!" (Q.109:1) is understood by Ahmed as addressing these specific, hardened rejecters, signalling an absolute break, consistent with their imperviousness to warning. • The Case of Noah (Q.11:36): The divine declaration to Noah that "no more of your people will believe than those who have already believed" is presented as an example of God sealing the fate of a group of Kafirun, aligning with the Q.2:6 premise of a permanent, settled rejection. • Q.8:33 and Q.9:6: These verses, which speak of divine forbearance and the possibility of offering protection to polytheists, further support the idea that not all disbelievers are Kafirun in the hardened sense. God's mercy and the opportunity for reflection extend even to those who are currently in a state of disbelief, suggesting they are not yet irrevocably sealed as Kafirun. This cumulative evidence "adds substantial historical and chronological weight" to Ahmed's redefinition, making it "difficult to refute without contradicting the Quran's internal definitions or contextual qualifiers." While Ahmed's redefinition of Kafir is powerful and ethically profound, it also invites scholarly scrutiny: • The Problem of Exclusivity: While Q.2:6 clearly describes a type of person called Kafaru, the logical inference takes this specific descriptive property (imperviousness to warning) and elevates it to the universal, necessary definition of the term kafir across the entire text. Is this step, that a description of a subset is the definition of the whole category—an interpretive choice, albeit a highly plausible one? Could Q.2:6 be making a general characterization rather than a defining criterion? Natural language often employs characteristic descriptions that admit exceptions without logical contradiction. • Broader Quranic Usage and Polemical Contexts: Critics might argue that while Ahmed's definition is robust for specific contexts, the Quran often uses Kafir in sweeping polemical address, functioning rhetorically rather than taxonomically (e.g., Q.109:1). To restrict Kafir to a single definitional property risks ignoring these polyvalent usages. Moreover, traditional exegesis frequently points to verses like Q.3:90-91 or Q.98:6, which seem to use kafir in a broader, more categorical sense related to disbelief after guidance, as foundational definitions. • The Historical-Critical Gap: Ahmed's method is admirably text-internal, but it assumes that purely synchronic (within-text) analysis can resolve questions that may have diachronic (across-time) dimensions. If Kafir terminology evolved in meaning across the Meccan-Medinan periods, or if it functioned differently in legal versus homiletical contexts, then the "Quran's own definitions" might not be singular or stable. The tradition of Asbab Al-Nuzul (occasions of revelation) exists precisely because early communities recognized that context—including historical context—matters for meaning. In sum, Ahmed's "rigorous redefinition of Kafir" is a powerful, necessary intervention that challenges reductionist readings. It liberates a key term from centuries of expansive, often politically charged, traditional usage by anchoring it to a specific, textual condition (Q.2:6). However, the argument for its exclusive logical necessity and its universal applicability across all Quranic usages may overstate the degree to which his conclusions are necessary rather than highly probable. It remains a profoundly insightful interpretation, but perhaps not entirely free from the hermeneutical choices inherent in defining "explicit premises" within a sacred text. Theological and Legal Consequences: A Liberatory Vision Ahmed's critique of translations that conflate 'kafir' with 'disbeliever' highlights a significant issue in Quranic hermeneutics. This conflation has often led to erroneous moral and legal conclusions, particularly in historical contexts where the term Kafir has been used to justify hostility, discrimination, or even violence against non-Muslims. By differentiating between kafir (defined as settled, permanent rejecters, impervious to warning) and generic "disbelievers" (who may still be open to faith), Ahmed’s work establishes crucial distinctions: • Legal Categorization: If Kafir is treated as a generic term for all non-Muslims, it risks conflating different categories of disbelievers, which could lead to misapplications in legal contexts. Ahmed's method ensures a more precise application of Quranic injunctions, reserving specific condemnations or legal statuses only for those who truly fit the narrow, textually derived definition of Kafir. • Moral Distinctions: The indiscriminate labelling of all non-Muslims as kafir often carries a moral stigma, implying a state of inherent sinfulness or enmity towards God. Ahmed's redefinition encourages a more nuanced and merciful understanding, differentiating between individuals based on their genuine spiritual state and openness to truth, rather than blanket communal identity. This has profound implications for "social justice and community relations." Salvific Inclusion: Expanding the Horizon of Divine Mercy Perhaps the most audacious and impactful theological consequence of Ahmed's thesis is its implication for "salvific inclusion." By taking verses like Q.2:62 and Q.2:112 as foundational premises, he logically concludes that salvation is not exclusively confined to Muslims or even the "People of the Book" in a narrow sense. Ahmed's vision of salvific inclusivity directly confronts the commonly held theological barrier that shirk (polytheism, associating partners with God) is the one unforgivable sin, citing verses like Q.4:48 and Q.4:116. Ahmed's brilliant rebuttal and ingenious but questionable logical counter-argument is that these verses, in their specific contexts, are addressed to particular audiences: • Q.4:48 and Q.4:116: These verses, which state that "God forgives not that partners should be set up with Him; but He forgives anything else, to whom He pleases," are argued by Ahmed to be addressed to Muslims or People of the Book who already accept tawhid (monotheism) but might be tempted by idolatry or hypocrisy. Therefore, they do not universally apply to all polytheists, particularly those who have never been addressed by the prophetic message in its fullness or who genuinely hold a belief in a Supreme Deity alongside other spiritual practices. This deconstruction is a critical deconstruction of a commonly held theological barrier. The absence of a verse equating all Mushrikin with the condemned categories is a powerful argument from silence, especially when contrasted with the explicit criteria for salvation in 2:62 and 2:112. This inference is profoundly liberating and opens avenues for a more inclusive Islamic theology. While Ahmed's conclusions are theologically enlightened and ethically profound, they also provoke significant scholarly and ethical questions: • Contested Definition of "Belief in God": The phrase "belief in God" in Q.2:62 and Q.2:112 is contested. Must it align with the strict Tawhid of Islam, or does any form of belief in a Supreme Deity suffice? Traditional exegesis often interprets "belief in God" through an Islamic lens, which would inherently exclude polytheists. This semantic nuance is itself interpretive. • Universal Applicability of Shirk Condemnation: Critics might argue that while Q.4:48 and Q.4:116 might have specific immediate audiences, their language implies a universal principle about the gravity of shirk. If a verse declares shirk unforgivable, the claim seems to concern the act itself, not merely its prohibition for certain communities. The logical form appears to be "shirk is unforgivable" rather than "shirk is unforgivable for you." • Reconciling Tensions: The Quran undeniably portrays shirk as a grave offense and a significant barrier to divine favour, with verses like Q.9:28 stating the polytheists are Najas (impure) and Q.9:5, 9:29 containing harsh prescriptions regarding them. While Ahmed might argue these refer to specific hostile polytheists, this requires precisely the kind of interpretive work he elsewhere rejects as insufficient. How does one weigh a cluster of texts that overwhelmingly warn against shirk against isolated passages that appear more inclusive? To resolve this tension requires judgment, ethical orientation, and theological vision—hallmarks of interpretation rather than deduction. Logical Consistency vs. Hermeneutical Flexibility: A Productive Tension Ahmed directly challenges critics to produce alternative conclusions or demonstrate ambiguities in his premises. Despite the virtues of Ahmed's methodological discipline, the application of strict logical determinacy to sacred texts like the Quran presents inherent challenges. The Quran is not a closed axiomatic system like mathematics, where propositions follow deductively from premises under formal rules of logic. Rather, it is a polysemic, rhetorical, and dialogical text that deliberately employs layers of meaning, figurative devices, and contextual indirections. • Polyvalence of Language: Natural language, especially ancient and sacred discourse, often resists reduction to singular, unambiguous propositions. As one critique notes, semantic ambiguity is ubiquitous in natural language, especially in texts spanning 23 years addressing varied audiences and contexts. The Arabic root k-f-r, for instance, demonstrably carries multiple senses, and determining which sense is "operative" in any given verse requires interpretive judgment that cannot be fully reduced to logical derivation. • The Muhkamat and Mutashabihat (Q.3:7): The Quran itself acknowledges "that some verses are clear (Muhkamat) and others are ambiguous/allegorical (Mutashabihat)." This verse suggests that not every Quranic claim can be reduced to logical inference. The text "itself institutionalizes interpretation as an inevitable, ongoing, and plural practice." Ahmed's framework, while seeking to clarify ambiguity, might inadvertently constrain the interpretive richness that is characteristic of religious texts. • Beyond Propositional Truth: Religious texts often convey truth through narrative, poetry, parable, and ethical exhortation, not just through logical propositions. To insist that all valid meaning must be reducible to a logically necessary inference risks flattening revelation’s layered discourse and collapsing the poem of revelation into the code of a legal brief. Hermeneutical Flexibility: A Necessary Complement While Ahmed's method champions logical consistency, a balanced hermeneutic often embraces a degree of flexibility. This flexibility allows for: • Dynamic Meaning: Meanings can evolve based on new contexts and understandings. While Ahmed insists on internal Quranic consistency, acknowledging the possibility of "dynamic interpretations" can enrich understanding rather than diminish it. • Addressing Tensions and Apparent Contradictions: Traditional hermeneutics has historically employed tools like Naskh (abrogation) or Takhṣiṣ(specification) to reconcile apparent contradictions or tensions within the text. While these tools are debated, they reflect an engagement with the text that acknowledges its complexity and resists simplistic harmonization. Ahmed's method implicitly rejects Naskh and relies heavily on Takhṣiṣ, which is "logically sound but assumes the Quran intends every verse to operate simultaneously and universally across all time and context." • The Role of Critique as a Tool for Growth: While the burden of proof is crucial, critique can serve as a tool for growth. Engaging with alternative interpretations, even if they don't immediately fit a rigid logical framework, can enrich understanding rather than diminish it. The pursuit of knowledge in the Quranic context is a collective endeavour, enriched by diverse perspectives and interpretations. Reconciling Logic and Interpretation: The tension between logical consistency and hermeneutical flexibility need not be a zero-sum game. Ahmed's work serves as a powerful, necessary intervention that demands discipline in interpretation. It rightly exposes the flimsiness of appeals to 'just interpretation' when clear Quranic signposts exist. However, to absolutize logical inference in the realm of sacred text is to risk collapsing the poem of revelation into the code of a legal brief. A more fruitful approach might synthesize Ahmed’s rigorous methodology with an acknowledgment of the Quran’s inherent polyvalence: • Logical Coherence as a Baseline: Ahmed is right that careless appeals to just interpretation' can deflect substantive argument. Logical consistency should be the minimum standard for any valid reading. Interpretations must be coherent and non-contradictory within a given textual framework. • Interpretation in Premise Selection: Recognize that all inference is mediated by interpretation when dealing with polyvalent religious language. The selection of explicit premises is itself an interpretive act, even if a highly disciplined one. Ahmed's contribution is to make these interpretive choices explicit and build a coherent system from them. • Humility Before Divine Speech: Even when conclusions seem logically airtight on given premises, the premises are still hermeneutically mediated, embedded in fallible human understanding." The Quran itself warns against absolutizing our parsing (Q.3:7). Thus, to claim an exegetical conclusion as a necessary inference may blur the humility required in Tafsir, where Zann (informed conjecture) is acknowledged and certitude (Yaqin) belongs ultimately to God. In essence, Ahmed has not eliminated interpretation but has refined it. His work demonstrates that the highest form of interpretation is one that is self-aware about its premises, rigorous in its deductions, and humble in its submission to the test of internal consistency. The value of his contribution lies in pushing us towards a more scholarly and intellectually honest form of it, where logical rigor sharpens Tafsir, but hermeneutics—humble, plural, and dialogical—remains indispensable. A Critical Review of Ahmed’s Methodological Assumptions Naseer Ahmed's thesis, “Logical Inference Is Not Interpretation,” is built upon a foundation of specific methodological assumptions that grant his arguments their distinctive rigour and challenging force. While these assumptions are integral to his framework, a thorough scholarly evaluation requires us to critically scrutinize them. The complexity of the Quran's language and historical context may necessitate a more nuanced understanding of authorial intent. Literary theorists and hermeneutic philosophers often caution against a simplistic equation of authorial intent with textual meaning, especially in complex, multi-layered texts like scripture. The Quran, as a text revealed over 23 years in diverse contexts, might not always possess a singular, rigidly formalized "authorial intent" accessible through purely deductive means. The very act of identifying what constitutes an "explicit premise" as opposed to a descriptive statement or a rhetorical flourish, "is already an act of interpretation." Ahmed asserts that his logical inferences follow from "explicit premises" that the Quran itself supplies. He places the burden on the critic to demonstrate genuine ambiguity in these premises. The claim that the Quran’s premises are absolutely, logically explicit can be contested. The problem is that the act of identifying which verse supplies the definitive premise (P1) is already an act of interpretation. For example, while Q.2:6 is a compelling description of a Kafir, the choice to elevate this specific description to the universal, necessary definition of the term across the entire text is an interpretive choice, albeit a highly plausible one. Other verses (e.g., Q.3:85, Q.5:72) might be chosen as alternative foundational premises by different interpretive schools, leading to different, yet internally consistent, logical systems. The "selection of the defining verse is the 'Achilles' heel' of the logical framework. The premises are chosen, not merely found, which means the initial choice is an interpretive risk." Ahmed grounds his logical inferences in "accepted rules of reasoning (modus ponens, reductio, the law of non-contradiction, etc.)." He implies that these rules are universally applicable and sufficient for deriving necessary conclusions from the Quran. While fundamental logical principles are indeed universal, their application to ancient, often elliptical, and contextually rich religious discourse is complex. The Quran often employs rhetorical devices, metaphors, and narrative structures that defy straightforward propositional logic. Assuming a direct, unmediated application of formal Western logic to a text with a distinct literary and cultural genesis might oversimplify its communicative strategies. Moreover, while classical Islamic scholarship developed sophisticated logical systems (Ilm Al-Kalam, Usul Al-Fiqh), these were often integrated with linguistic nuances (Balagha) and contextual understanding in ways that acknowledged the unique challenges of divine speech. Ahmed's method could benefit from explicitly situating its "rules of reasoning" within these broader Islamic intellectual traditions to enhance its persuasive power and contextual relevance. Ahmed's article primarily focuses on the term kafir and its implications for salvation. While this focus allows for a deep dive into a critical concept, it also raises questions about the generalizability of his method. Furthermore, his methodology, while rigorous, faces the potential charge of circular reasoning. A more comprehensive analysis of other key terms and concepts in the Quran could further strengthen his argument and demonstrate the broader applicability of his method. More critically, Ahmed's methodology relies on the Quran's internal definitions and contextual qualifiers to derive conclusions. However, if these definitions and qualifiers are themselves subject to interpretation, the argument may be vulnerable to circular reasoning. Traditional hermeneutics often employs principles like abrogation (Naskh) or specification (Takhṣiṣ) to resolve apparent contradictions. By not explicitly addressing Naskh, the argument bypasses a major traditional mechanism for resolving textual tension, which a scholarly critique must acknowledge. While Ahmed's method implicitly offers an alternative to Naskh by seeking harmonization through redefinition and contextual delimitation, a direct engagement with these traditional tools would clarify the points of departure and intellectual lineage. Similarly, his insistence on absolute, all-encompassing consistency might overlook scholarly debates on whether the Quran intends every verse to operate simultaneously and universally across all time and context. Ahmed's method is "admirably text-internal," rigorously seeking meaning solely within the Quranic discourse. While this guards against external biases, it risks creating a form of "hyper-immanentism" that might overlook crucial diachronic and extra-textual factors. If Kafir terminology evolved in meaning across the Meccan-Medinan periods, or if it functioned differently in legal versus homiletical contexts, then the 'Quran's own definitions' might not be singular or stable. The tradition of Asbab Al-Nuzul (occasions of revelation) exists precisely because early communities recognized that historical context matters for meaning. Ahmed’s rejection of "free-floating lexicalism" is commendable, but his internal-consistency method might inadvertently create a different problem: anachronistic harmonization that flattens genuine development or contextual variation within the text. While the Quran is divinely preserved, its revelation unfolded in a specific historical milieu, and linguistic meanings are shaped by broader cultural and historical environments. To hermetically seal off Quranic Arabic from its pre-Islamic linguistic context and evolving usage might be an overcorrection. In conclusion, Ahmed's methodological assumptions are the engines of his thesis, granting it both its power and its provocative nature. A critical review reveals that while these assumptions enable rigorous logical derivation, they are themselves often products of interpretive choices regarding the nature of the Quranic text, authorial intent, and the appropriate scope of hermeneutic inquiry. Recognizing these underlying assumptions allows for a deeper and more nuanced engagement with Ahmed's work, moving beyond simple acceptance or rejection to a rich, ongoing scholarly dialogue. A Paradigm Shift in Quranic Hermeneutics Naseer Ahmed's "Logical Inference Is Not Interpretation" stands as a monumental and necessary intervention in contemporary Quranic studies. His thesis presents a rigorous framework for analysing Quranic text through the lens of logical inference, challenging centuries of interpretive traditions and offering a pathway to a more intellectually coherent, ethically expansive, and internally consistent understanding of the divine message. His meticulous re-evaluation of Kafir, defining it as an individual in a state of "permanent, settled rejection" impervious to warning (Q.2:6), is perhaps his most impactful contribution. This "rigorous redefinition" profoundly challenges the widespread, often indiscriminatory, application of the term, which has historically led to theological misunderstandings, legal misapplications, and severe social consequences. It liberates a key term from centuries of expansive, often politically charged, traditional usage. The logical inferences drawn from his redefinition, particularly regarding "salvific inclusion" for individuals (including polytheists) who genuinely "believe in God and the Last Day and do good deeds" (Q.2:62, Q.2:112, Q.5:69), are theologically enlightened and ethically profound." This opens a path to a more merciful, inclusive, and justice-centred understanding of God's universal message, directly challenging exclusivist doctrines and fostering interfaith harmony. His brilliant rebuttal of Q.4:48 and Q.4:116 for universal application to polytheists is a powerful deconstruction of a major theological barrier. While Ahmed's framework offers a powerful new lens, the critical evaluation also highlights areas where his claims invite further scholarly dialogue and refinement: The Nature of "Explicit Premises": The core challenge lies in the assumption that Quranic statements yield purely "explicit premises" that are beyond interpretive choice. Critics argue that the act of identifying which verse supplies the definitive premise... is already an act of interpretation. The selection of Q.2:6 as the universal definition of Kafir, while compelling, is a hermeneutical decision, not a purely logical inevitability. This suggests that while his inferences are rigorous, they derive from interpretively chosen axioms. The Quran, as a multi-layered, poetic, and rhetorical text, often embraces polyvalence and ambiguity (Q.3:7) that resists absolute reduction to singular, logically necessary conclusions. Natural language, especially in complex literary-religious texts, resists full reduction to logical calculus. Overemphasizing logical necessity might inadvertently flatten genuine development or contextual variation within the text. Ahmed's rigorous application of Q.4:82 to eliminate contradictions is powerful. However, some traditional hermeneutics might view certain textual tensions as deliberate, requiring "interpretive flexibility" or tools like Naskh (abrogation) and Takhṣiṣ(specification) rather than strict logical elimination. His method effectively resolves what he identifies as contradictions, but "what constitutes a 'contradiction'" is itself subject to interpretive frameworks. Ahmed's method, while highly disciplined, still operates within the hermeneutic circle. His "logical inferences" are the deductive conclusions that flow from a specific set of interpretively chosen axioms. The "consistency" he achieves is the consistency of his own system, whose foundational premises are established through a rigorous, yet ultimately interpretive, process. In sum, Naseer Ahmed’s thesis is a bold attempt to ground Quranic hermeneutics in the rigour of logic. He is fundamentally right to demand that interpretive positions account for their premises and consequences, and that they not hide behind the vague shield of 'mere interpretation' when clear Quranic signposts exist. His work is not merely a critique of traditional Tafsir but a proposal for a reformed, critical methodology that elevates logical rigor and internal textual coherence above external authority (lexicons, tradition) and subjective preference. It forces a deeper engagement with the Quran's text itself, compelling scholars to examine the internal logic and semantic fields of its language. The "paradigm shift" lies in his forceful argument that the highest form of interpretation is one that is self-aware about its premises, rigorous in its deductions, and humble in its submission to the test of internal consistency. Ahmed has not abolished interpretation, but he has fundamentally refined it, demonstrating that while we may never fully escape the hermeneutic circle, we can navigate it with far greater intellectual discipline, accountability, and clarity. This is a critical, bold, and ultimately enlightened contribution to Quranic scholarship. It challenges us to read the Quran with both profound faith and uncompromising reason, allowing the Book to speak for itself with a clarity that fosters greater justice, mercy, and universal understanding. ------ V.A. Mohamad Ashrof is an independent Indian scholar specializing in Islamic humanism. With a deep commitment to advancing Quranic hermeneutics that prioritize human well-being, peace, and progress, his work aims to foster a just society, encourage critical thinking, and promote inclusive discourse and peaceful coexistence. He is dedicated to creating pathways for meaningful social change and intellectual growth through his scholarship. URL: https://www.newageislam.com/debating-islam/logical-inference-interpretation-evaluation-naseer-thesis/d/137045 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism