Are Rules Moral Because God Ordained Them, or Did God Ordain Rules Because They Are Moral?

By Naseer Ahmed, New Age Islam 9 October 2025 Ashrof says, “The Qur’an transcends mere human psychology and engages with divine wisdom that may not always align with empirical findings.” Does it? Verse 3:30 says: Allah has created mankind upon a Fitrah (natural constitution); His revealed Deen is in perfect alignment with that Fitrah. If divine law corresponds to human nature, then Qur’anic morality must reflect—not oppose—what leads to genuine human flourishing. God does not ordain what contradicts reason, reality, or human well-being. The Theologians’ Error Theologians defined morality as “what God commands,” severing it from the pursuit of the greatest good or happiness for all. This view is mistaken. Moral rules revealed through religion were not arbitrary commands but divinely guided principles aimed at human flourishing—though their wisdom often became evident only through long practice and observation. Because religion did not always rationally justify each moral law, theologians took them as unexplainable decrees to be obeyed without inquiry. The result was the erroneous assumption that divine morality was divorced from human well-being. Yet every moral rule finds its ultimate justification in empirical reality—because God ordains only what is most moral, most right, and most conducive to the good of self, family, and society. Hence, seeking empirical data to test the effectiveness of “wa-iḍ'ribūhunna = strike” in verse 4:34 in resolving marital conflict is legitimate and even encouraged. Allah’s repeated appeal—“Do they not see?”—is an open invitation to seek validation through observation and reason, thereby deepening our understanding of His Deen. Empirical Context: The Missing Literature on Common Couple Violence (CCV) Rasheed’s reference to empirical psychology was never an attempt to determine the semantic meaning of Qur’anic words. It was a rebuttal to the charge of cruelty against the verse 4:34 command “Wa-Iḍribūhunna” (“strike them”). The issue is not linguistic but ethical: does the verse’s guidance produce justice and compassion in practice? To answer that, Rasheed cited sociological research by Michael P. Johnson, whose now-suppressed paper distinguished between Common Couple Violence (CCV) and Patriarchal Terrorism (PT). The findings, drawn from the National Family Violence Surveys (Feld & Straus, 1990), were revealing: 94% of perpetrators of minor violence did not escalate to severe violence; In 70% of cases involving severe conflict, violence de-escalated over time; Ordinary marital disputes often involved CCV—temporary boundary-setting episodes that led to stronger relationships after reconciliation. By contrast, Patriarchal Terrorism, found in shelter populations (Dobash & Dobash, 1979), stemmed from domination and control—escalating abuse divorced from any moral or marital logic. This was clearly condemned both by social science and by Qur’anic ethics. Rasheed’s point was that Qur’an 4:34 aligns with conflict regulation, not patriarchal control. The verse prescribes a bounded, escalating framework: verbal counsel → emotional distance → symbolic corrective act—culminating, if unresolved, in arbitration (4:35). Its goal is to preserve the marriage, not enable cruelty. As Rasheed summarised: “By ruling out ‘strike’ and replacing it with nothing beyond the first two steps—which have already failed—you are effectively pushing the marriage towards divorce, which the Qur’an was trying to prevent. Most women would call that outcome more cruel than striking.” Agency, Restraint, and the Woman’s Right to Refuse Crucially, the Qur’anic process is not unilateral. At every stage, the woman retains agency: she may insist on being accepted as she is, or she may seek divorce. Thus, the verse preserves her autonomy while protecting the possibility of reconciliation. Rasheed notes that Qur’an 4:34 rests on two explicit premises: The husband functions as Qawwam—the protector and provider; If this premise collapses, the rest of the verse ceases to apply. The verse is therefore conditional, addressing a specific moral structure—not a timeless license. Its purpose is restorative, not punitive. Verse 4:34 Is a Non-Binding Advisory Moreover, since the Qur’an does not restrict a man from divorcing his wife without assigning any reason, this verse must be read as advisory and not binding on either party. It provides helpful guidance to resolve serious marital conflict that often results in divorce in a fit of peeve. The advisory nature is also apparent in that there is no warning for non-compliance, except that it warns the husband that he has no way against her if she is responding and cooperating: “If they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance): for Allah is Most High, Great (above you all).” Thus, the verse is moral counsel, not compulsion—a structured recommendation for reconciliation, not a legal command. Against Euphemism and Posturing Those who euphemise “strike” as “separate” or “withdraw” achieve little beyond self-congratulation. Men inclined to abuse will not be restrained by semantics; they will interpret the verse to suit their temperament. Such euphemism, Rasheed contends, does not protect women—it merely allows commentators to appear “modern” or “male feminist” while avoiding the real moral question. True reform lies in clarity, not concealment. By sanitising the text, reformists project their anxieties, not their empathy. Their concern is less for women than for public image. On the Meaning of Qurūʾ in 2:228 In the context of determining the absence of pregnancy, three menstrual cycles are both necessary and sufficient. The observance of Iddah is a reasonable restriction whose moral justification ceases the moment its purpose is fulfilled. To extend it beyond that point would be contrary to Qur’anic justice and therefore immoral. The term Qurūʾ—which can mean either “menstrual periods” or “periods of purity”—must be understood contextually. In matters of divorce (2:228), the concern is the confirmation of non-pregnancy; hence Qurūʾ refers to menstruation. Conversely, in contexts such as fixing the marriage date for girls, Qurūʾ naturally refers to the period of purity. The Qur’an employs the same term with flexible precision—its meaning determined not by linguistic rigidity but by moral and biological logic. This is the difference between logical inference and hermeneutics. Ashrof fails to pick the right meaning because he confuses polysemy with pluralism, arguing instead for “the divinely-sanctioned scope for human reason (Ijtihad) to operate within the text’s linguistic capacity, leading to equally valid material legal outcomes.” But such an approach, Rasheed points out, abandons reason and logic in favour of interpretive relativism. It treats all meanings as equally valid, even when context and purpose clearly privilege one. Reason discerns the moral logic that the text itself presupposes; hermeneutics without logic dissolves that moral clarity into indeterminacy. A Morality Both Divine and Empirical Rasheed’s approach brings back the Qur’an’s moral realism. By analysing every element of the verse from the woman’s point of view—her safety, her options, her moral dignity—he reveals that the Qur’an already embeds within its structure the very safeguards modern interpreters try to invent. Where theologians once divorced divine law from human good, Rasheed re-integrates them. If God’s Deen is aligned with Fitrah, then divine ethics must stand the test of lived truth. Empirical coherence is not an intrusion into revelation—it is its vindication. The Qur’an commands only what is most moral, most beneficial, and most true. And every rule of God, when rightly understood, survives the scrutiny of reason, experience, and compassion alike. Conclusion: The Measure of Divine Clarity The question that lingers beyond verse 4:34 is larger than marriage and divorce; it concerns revelation itself. Can a Muḥkam (clear and decisive) verse sustain two materially different interpretations and still remain self-consistent? The Qur’an says no: “These are the clear verses of the Book — the foundation of the Scripture” (3:7). Their clarity lies not in linguistic simplicity alone but in moral and logical coherence. Ashrof’s interpretive pluralism, though well-intentioned, risks confusing the multiplicity of human opinion with divinely sanctioned ambiguity. Rasheed’s approach restores the Qur’an’s claim to be both intelligible and internally self-verifying. If God’s laws flow from Fitrah, then they are not arbitrary decrees to be reinterpreted endlessly, but moral constants that can withstand both reason and reality. Thus, the debate returns to its philosophical heart: rules are not moral because God ordains them; God ordains them because they are moral — eternally aligned with human nature, rational insight, and the balance He built into creation. ------ A frequent contributor to NewAgeIslam.com, Naseer Ahmed is an independent researcher and Quran-centric thinker whose work bridges faith, reason, and contemporary knowledge systems. Through a method rooted in intra-Quranic analysis and scientific coherence, the author has offered ground-breaking interpretations that challenge traditional dogma while staying firmly within the Quran’s framework. His work represents a bold, reasoned, and deeply reverent attempt to revive the Quran’s message in a language the modern world can test and trust. URL: https://www.newageislam.com/islam-spiritualism/rules-moral-god-ordained/d/137161 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism