Refuting the Doubts Raised by ISIS and Its Supporters: Part-2

By Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti Translated from Arabic to English by Ghulam Ghaus Siddiqi, New Age Islam Refuting the Misconception that the “Islamic State” derives its legitimacy from the legacy of Jihad and its scholars Summary of the Refutation of the ‘State’ Organization (ISIS) This summary is drawn from a key refutation in the book شبهات تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وأنصاره والرد عليها (The Doubts Raised by the Islamic State Organization and Its Supporters—and Responses to Them) by Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti, published by the Research Office of the Islamic Syrian Authority. The work thoroughly challenges the legitimacy and ideology of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). Drawing from the consensus of scholars, and Islamic principles, the refutation highlights how ISIS falsely claims religious authority based on the legacy of jihad and early support from Salafi-jihadi figures, many of whom later renounced the group. ISIS’s refusal to follow recognized leadership, along with its extreme interpretations of Takfir (declaring others as disbelievers), sets it apart from mainstream Islamic movements. Its harsh and violent methods, lack of consultation, and attempts to impose leadership by force contradict both Islamic teachings and historical precedent. Moreover, leading scholars and religious bodies across the Muslim world have publicly rejected ISIS, calling it a misguided and illegitimate faction. The group’s version of jihad focuses more on gaining power than defending Muslim communities, often targeting other Muslims and distorting Islamic ethics. In Syria, ISIS falsely claimed to be the original force behind the jihad, while in reality, local revolutionary groups led the resistance independently. Ultimately, the overwhelming view among scholars is that ISIS has deviated from authentic Islamic creed and practice, and its claims to leadership and legitimacy are invalid and widely rejected. (Translator) ------ Refuting the Misconception that the “Islamic State” derives its legitimacy from the legacy of jihad and its scholars By Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti ISIS’s Misconception: The so-called "Islamic State" claims that its existence and legitimacy are rooted in the historical legacy of jihad within the Muslim Ummah. It asserts that its scholars are the very scholars of the Jihadi Salafi movement—those who once supported and endorsed the formation of this "State." Additionally, it argues that the group was among the first to raise the banner of jihad in Syria during its early association with Jabhat al-Nusra, and therefore, it considers itself most entitled to lead the jihad and carry its banner. Response to This Misconception: First, the "State" organization limits its claim of legitimacy to the endorsement of a select group of Jihadi Salafi leaders, disregarding the broader scholarly and Mujahideen consensus across the Muslim Ummah. However, even many of those very leaders have since disassociated themselves from the organization. They have publicly declared their opposition, withdrawn their recognition, and rejected the group once it deviated from their principles and broke away from their authority. Al-Zawahiri, in his statement “A Testimony to Spare the Blood of the Mujahideen in al-Sham,” mentioned aspects of the relationship between al-Qaeda and the “State” organization—the very relationship upon which the organization bases its claim to legitimacy. The details of that relationship had been concealed throughout the period of conflict with other Iraqi factions. He outlined it through the following points: 1. Al-Qaeda was neither consulted nor asked for permission prior to the announcement of the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq. 2. The "State" organization was not obedient to al-Qaeda or responsive to its directives: a. It did not seek permission from al-Qaeda to establish the “State” in Iraq, nor did it consult them before announcing its expansion into the Levant (Syria). Furthermore, it refused al-Qaeda’s repeated requests to return to Iraq. b. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was an unknown figure to al-Qaeda leadership; they had no prior knowledge of him. Al-Qaeda repeatedly requested the “State” organization to provide information about him in the past. c. The “State” organization disagreed with al-Qaeda on certain political and military matters, despite repeated communications on these issues. d. The “State” organization refused to establish independent courts during recent events in Syria, despite multiple requests from al-Qaeda to do so. This was also the stance of all the prominent figures of the [Jihadi] Salafi current, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, and others.[i] Moreover, the majority of the Jihadi Salafi movement and its affiliated groups did not agree with the organization’s recent policies and actions—beginning with the declaration of the caliphate, and the subsequent positions and decisions that followed. The same applies to the statements and positions the “State” organization attributes to bin Laden and others: Old disputes between al-Qaeda and the “State” had already surfaced publicly regarding several issues going back to the Iraq days, along with the letters exchanged over these matters. Al-Qaeda justified its previous silence about these disagreements as an effort to protect the cause of jihad and avoid giving the enemies an opportunity to exploit internal conflicts—as stated by Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, the former mufti of al-Qaeda. So not a single leader from the Jihadi Salafi current—whose history the “State” organization tries to invoke—remains in agreement with them on their recent positions. How then can the “State” organization use the endorsement of the Jihadi Salafi current as evidence for the correctness of its methodology only at certain times and not others? This clearly proves the falsehood of this claim and the invalidity of using it as evidence.[ii] In fact, the “State” organization has attacked and discredited the historical leaders of this current, labelling several of them with Irjā’ and misguidance.[iii] So how can they then claim to be their successors, or that those scholars testify in their favour?![iv] Second: The people of knowledge, fatwa (legal rulings), jihad, opinion, and consultation are not limited to any specific organization or affiliation. Rather, they come from the broader Muslim community and its majority over many decades. They are the ones through whom jihad, knowledge, and Dawah (Islamic call) have been carried out by their hands and efforts. The scholars and Mujahideen of the Ummah have rejected this organization (ISIS) and have ruled that it deviates from the religion. Many fatwas and statements have been issued by scholarly bodies consisting of scholars from various Islamic countries, rejecting the organization’s ideas and clarifying its creed. These fatwas are numerous, and below are some examples: 1. The fatwa issued by the Syrian Sharia Associations and Bodies states that the ongoing fighting between the Mujahideen brigades and the “State” organization is not a Fitna (civil strife), but rather a fight against a faction that is outside the fold of Islam and aggressive toward Muslims.[v] 2. Fatwa of the Islamic Sham Authority on exposing the external creed of the organization.[vi] 3. Statement by the major Mujahideen factions in Syria with their Sharia bodies (represented by the Islamic Front) regarding the claim of the caliphate, in which they decided that the “State” organization is an external group and that its caliphate is illegitimate.[vii] 4. Several Fatwas And Statements From The Syrian Islamic Council.[viii] 5. Statement by the Muslim Scholars Authority in Iraq, which rejected the declaration of the caliphate and considered it not in the interest of Muslims.[ix] 6. General positions of the Mujahideen factions in Iraq since the emergence of the “Islamic State of Iraq” organization, including recent publications such as the Army of the Mujahideen’s “The Islamic State Between Reality and Illusion” by its Emir Abu Abdullah al-Mansur.[x] 7. Statement by the International Union of Muslim Scholars, which determined that the declaration of al-Baghdadi’s caliphate by the “State” organization in Iraq lacks any legitimate or realistic standards, and warned against opening the door to chaos in independent legal reasoning (Ijtihād), far from the qualified authorities of the Muslim Ummah—its scholars, jurists, and specialists. 8. Statement by the Association of Muslim Scholars in Sudan, which rejected the declaration of the caliphate and clarified that the organization is an external group. 9. The masses of scholars and learned individuals of the Ummah—Syrians and others—who rejected the organization’s ideas, actions, and declaration of the caliphate. Many described it as breaking away from the Muslim community. Due to their large numbers, it is difficult to list their names, and it is rare to find anyone among them who supports the organization. Third: The claim by the “State” organization that it was the one who initiated jihad in Syria is not true. The people of the country were the ones who began this blessed jihadist revolution—first through strikes, then through peaceful protests[xi]—and only turned to armed resistance when the regime’s response forced them to do so. Most of the jihadist groups present today had already emerged and begun their activities before the “State” organization or Jabhat al-Nusra even had a presence in Syria. In fact, the leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra—which initially included leaders and figures who would later become part of the “State” organization—stated that their reason for coming to Syria and founding their movement was to support the Syrian people and help them confront the regime. They also acknowledged that none of this would have happened without the Syrian revolution. Al-Jawlani said in his interview on Al Jazeera on December 19, 2013: “Circumstances in Iraq came one after another, and while our bodies were there, our hearts were attached to the land of al-Sham [Greater Syria], until the Syrian revolution began... Al-Sham would not have been ready for our entry were it not for the Syrian revolution... This revolution removed many of the obstacles and paved the way for us to enter and reach this blessed land.” (End of quote.) All jihadist groups in Syria owe their existence and initial spark to the Syrian revolution. It was the revolution that allowed them to emerge, join the fight, support it, embrace it, provide the right environment for its continuation, and enable them to operate. Fourth: What matters is not who first declared jihad or who initiated it earliest. Being first does not necessarily mean being right—in fact, it could reflect haste and recklessness. This has been evident in deviant movements such as the Kharijites, heretics, and esoteric sects, who declared “jihad” against the Rightly Guided Caliphate, the Umayyad State, and the Abbasid State. What truly matters for jihad to be valid is its alignment with Islamic law (Sharī‘ah) and its realization of genuine benefit. If the methodology of the group declaring jihad is correct, then its actions and jihad are valid and accepted, even if it appeared later. But if the group’s methodology is corrupt, then its actions and jihad are invalid and rejected, even if it came first. The Prophet (peace be upon him) once sent a caller during one of the military expeditions to announce to the people: “Whoever constricts a dwelling or blocks a road—he has no [valid] jihad.” (Narrated by Abu Dawud (4/268, Hadith No. 2629). So if this is the consequence for someone who merely constricts a dwelling or blocks a road for a Muslim, what then remains of the claim to jihad for those who kill Mujahideen and preachers, adopt the extremist beliefs of the Kharijites, and harm the cause of jihad, the country, and the people? Fifth: Even if we assume that the “State” organization was the first to declare jihad, this does not entitle it to take control of jihad and the state unilaterally, without consultation with the Muslims, nor to monopolize leadership, or to appoint over them someone they neither accept nor want—especially if that person is from outside the country. This has never been the way of the scholars of jihad and the leaders of the Mujahideen in any of the lands they entered—from Afghanistan, to Chechnya, Bosnia, and others. This is the true history of jihad; from which they claim to derive their legitimacy![xii] If it is said: These early Muslims came out of the Arabian Peninsula, conquered lands, and ruled them—and continued to do so until recently. Those conquering rulers were known individuals, with known circumstances. People accepted them as their leaders, and they operated under the authority of a single, established ruler, whose governance was stable and whose obedience was religiously mandated. That ruler had the legitimate right to appoint or remove leaders based on the best interest of the state. Moreover, those cities and regions were all part of one unified state, no matter how distant its territories were. So how do they compare to the unknown leaders of this organization—unidentified in person or character—who embrace deviant ideologies and beliefs, seize power through deceitful and criminal means, and impose themselves on the people without consultation or consent, only to be met with opposition and resistance as a result? This analogy is therefore invalid. – Moreover, consideration for the people of the land, its notables, and leaders in their public affairs, and those who govern them, has a basis in Islamic law, including the following: 1. When the Prophet (peace be upon him) intended to migrate to Medina, he did not migrate until a number of its people embraced Islam and pledged to protect him and be his supporters. 2. If the matter concerned the people of a particular land, he would consult them and no one else—such as when he consulted the Ansar rather than the Muhajirun regarding fighting the Quraysh in the Battle of Badr. 3. When sending teachers to instruct people in matters of their religion, he often sent someone from their own people, as this increased the likelihood of accepting the message. For example, he sent Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari as a judge to Yemen. 4. Likewise, judges were often appointed from among the locals. Moreover, the Muslims were not eager for ruling, control, or suppressing their Muslim opponents as is the case with the “State” organization, which has made establishing the emirate, allegiance, and founding the state its foremost goal. It prioritized this over defending against the invading occupier, and then it allied with and fought against the occupier to the extent that it declared Takfir (excommunication) on anyone who opposed it, as will be noted later. Rather, the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) would send to kings and rulers saying to them: “Submit (to Islam) and you will be safe, and I will grant you what your hands can reach.”[xiii] And people from tribes and peoples would come to him (peace be upon him) to learn the matters of religion, then return to their people to teach them and manage their affairs. How different are the two matters![xiv] In summary: The majority of the scholars and Mujahideen of the Ummah have ruled that the “State” organization is deviant and misguided, having strayed from the creed of the Ummah and its community. Therefore, the organization’s claim that it follows the methodology of the Mujahideen or their sheikhs is a false and rejected claim, even by those close to its methodology, such as the Jihadi Salafi current. ----- Endnotes: [1] See, for example, ‘al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah fī al- ‘Irāq wa al-Shām' wa al-mawqif al-wājib tijāhahā, lil-Maqdisī, (The Reality of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham and the Required Stance Toward It" by al-Maqdisi) wa Thiyāb al-Khalīfah, lil-Filasṭīnī, and "The Caliph’s Garments" by al-Filistini. [1] These very positions taken by the Jihadi Salafi current are what led the “State” organization to launch a coordinated religious media campaign against the current’s leadership, aiming to discredit them and strip them of their legitimacy in favour of the organization. This was done by accusing the current of deviating from the correct methodology, betraying the trust, and thus presenting the “State” organization as the sole heir and rightful guardian of the ideology of the Jihadi Salafi current. One example of this is what al-Adnani said in his final statement, “Say to Those Who Disbelieve: You Will Be Defeated,” addressing America: “We dragged you into two wars—in Khorasan and Iraq,” even though the “State” organization had no presence in Afghanistan and did not participate in its wars! [1] Issue 6 of Dabiq magazine, which is published in English, contained several articles that described al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Qatada as being misguided. It also accused al-Qaeda and its leadership — including bin Laden — of irjā’ (a theological deviation involving delaying judgment on sinners. [1] Many analyses have focused on uncovering the true nature of the conflict between the so-called "Islamic State" organization (ISIS) and the broader Jihadi Salafi movement, with its various groups. This summary highlights the two main points of disagreement: (1) Organizational Conflict: The first and most prominent issue lies in ISIS’s refusal to submit to the leadership and directives of the broader Jihadi Salafi current. This refusal led to differing views on strategic priorities—particularly in Syria—and eventually escalated into disagreements over the structure and leadership of the organization itself. Unvetted and unknown individuals were introduced into ISIS’s ranks, especially those not accepted by al-Qaeda, leading to disobedience and the breakdown of discipline. This divergence eventually gave rise to harsh rulings of Takfir (declaring others to be disbelievers) and infighting. (2) Ideological Conflict: The second area of disagreement is ideological. ISIS developed a set of unique and controversial religious interpretations—especially regarding takfir and its expanded application, as well as in its approach to military operations, both in scale and method. It’s worth noting that signs of tension between ISIS and the broader movement existed as early as the days when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. However, these differences were deliberately concealed at the time in the name of “preserving the interests of jihad,” until they surfaced publicly and ultimately led to direct conflict between the two wings of the movement. Despite this divide, the foundational ideological and theological framework of the Jihadi Salafi movement as a whole remains grounded in the idea that armed struggle is the legitimate method for change in the Muslim world. This includes fighting against governments and regimes they label as “apostate,” “agents of the West,” or as having replaced the rule of Allah. Their reasoning is based on doctrines of Hakimiyyah (sovereignty belongs to God) and al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal), as interpreted by the movement. Notably, they limit their religious references to a narrow set of ideologues, excluding the broader body of Muslim scholars. A review of the writings of key ideologues—such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al-Filastini—reveals a high degree of alignment in core beliefs and doctrines. In fact, despite the prolonged dispute, al-Maqdisi once tweeted about his relationship with ISIS members, saying: “I am their sheikh who taught them Tawheed (monotheism).” It is important to recognize that the Jihadi Salafi current itself contains a range of tendencies—from more extreme to more moderate—yet its foundational principles are still built on the frameworks established by its ideologues. It’s also worth noting that many of the historical figures often associated with these movements—such as Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, and Khattab—did not hold many of the ideas promoted by the current iteration of the Jihadi Salafi movement. For example: They did not endorse the blanket takfir of governments. In fact, they expelled individuals from their camps for expressing such views. Nor did they refer to foreign fighters joining them as “muhajirun” (emigrants), but rather called them “Ansar” (supporters), and they discouraged them from asserting control in the lands they entered. These and many other examples highlight the need to re-examine the historical evolution of these movements, the factors behind their transformation, and the individuals responsible for this shift. It also calls into question whether these movements truly represent the legacy of the figures they claim as their foundation—figures whose names they use to gain legitimacy. [1] See the fatwa: Hal al-qitāl al-qā’im bayna al-katā’ib al-mujāhidah wa tanẓīm (al-Dawlah) qitāl fitnah? “Is the fighting between the Mujahideen brigades and the ‘State’ organization a fitna?” http://islamicsham.org/fatawa/1549 [1] See the fatwa: Yunẓar fatwā: Hal tanẓīm (al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah) min al-Khawārij? (Is the “Islamic State” organization among the Kharijites?) http://islamicsham.org/fatawa/1945 [1] These include: Fatwa regarding the Islamic State organization in Iraq and al-Sham: http://sy-sic.com/?p=263. Statement by the Syrian Islamic Council regarding the war on terrorism: http://sy-sic.com/?p=182. Clarifying statement about the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham organization: http://sy-sic.com/?p=244 [1] These include: A fatwa concerning the Islamic State organization in Iraq and al-Sham: http://sy-sic.com/?p=263. A statement by the Syrian Islamic Council regarding the war on terrorism: http://sy-sic.com/?p=182. A clarifying statement about the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham organization: http://sy-sic.com/?p=244. [1] See Statement No. 1003, al-muta‘alliq bi-i‘lān tanẓīm al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah al-khilāfah fī al-‘Irāq wa Sūriyā (Regarding the declaration of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State organization. http://www.iraq-amsi.net/ar/news_view_75741.html [1] Many statements, fatwas, and positions were issued by the military factions in Iraq and their various Sharia bodies to clarify the reality of the Islamic State of Iraq organization during the time of the war in Iraq. [1] Since the beginning of the blessed Syrian revolution, scholars and fatwa councils have actively accompanied it by issuing religious rulings related to the uprising. They were at the forefront of this effort, preceding any extremist groups. One notable example is the work of the Islamic Sham Organization, which issued some of the earliest fatwas, including: Is it permissible to give zakat in advance to aid the Syrian people? Should a person obey orders to kill protesters to save himself? Is someone killed by the Syrian regime considered a martyr? These rulings can be found at: http://islamicsham.org/fatawa. Later, when the revolution turned into an armed struggle, the Syrian Resistance Charter was issued, followed by an explanation titled Explanation of the Syrian Resistance Charter. These works focus on clarifying the rulings related to jihad in the Syrian context. You can view it here: http://islamicsham.org/versions/715. [1] Shaykh Abdullah Azzam said in his book “Bushā’ir al-Naṣr” (Glad Tidings of Victory), p. 14: “Do not forget that you are a guest of the Afghans, and that these people paved the way for you to fulfil the obligation of jihad. So the credit belongs to Allah first and last, and then to them. So preserve this favour they have granted you.” He—and many other leaders of jihad—rejected taking any official positions in the countries where they were engaged in jihad. They spoke extensively on this matter and issued strong warnings against doing so. [1] As mentioned in the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) letter to Hawdhah ibn Ali al-Hanafi, the ruler of Yamamah. See: ‘Uyoon al-Athar fi Funoon al-Maghazi wal-Shama’il wal-Siyar by Ibn Sayyid al-Nas (Vol. 2, p. 338). [1] Abu Basir al-Tartousi said in his article “A Man Should Not Lead in Another’s Domain”: The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “When someone visits a people, he should not lead them in prayer. Let one of them lead the prayer.” He also said: “A man should not lead another in his own home or in his domain, nor should he sit in a place of honour in someone’s home except with their permission.” The early scholars said: The host has more right to lead the prayer than the guest. Based on this principle, just as a guest should not lead the prayer in someone else’s home out of respect for the host’s rights, dignity, and feelings, and just as he is not allowed to sit on the host’s couch or special seat without permission, it follows even more strongly that he should not assume leadership in matters of governance, politics, or managing the affairs of a land without the host’s consent and approval. In fact, this analogy is even more applicable, more sensitive, and a clearer violation of the host’s rights, dignity, and authority. Any guest who fails to observe this etiquette and this profound Prophetic teaching will inevitably end up in conflict with the rightful host. And when that happens, he will have no one to blame but himself. Endnotes: [i] See, for example, ‘al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah fī al- ‘Irāq wa al-Shām' wa al-mawqif al-wājib tijāhahā, lil-Maqdisī, (The Reality of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham and the Required Stance Toward It" by al-Maqdisi) wa Thiyāb al-Khalīfah, lil-Filasṭīnī, and "The Caliph’s Garments" by al-Filistini. [ii] These very positions taken by the Jihadi Salafi current are what led the “State” organization to launch a coordinated religious media campaign against the current’s leadership, aiming to discredit them and strip them of their legitimacy in favour of the organization. This was done by accusing the current of deviating from the correct methodology, betraying the trust, and thus presenting the “State” organization as the sole heir and rightful guardian of the ideology of the Jihadi Salafi current. One example of this is what al-Adnani said in his final statement, “Say to Those Who Disbelieve: You Will Be Defeated,” addressing America: “We dragged you into two wars—in Khorasan and Iraq,” even though the “State” organization had no presence in Afghanistan and did not participate in its wars! [iii] Issue 6 of Dabiq magazine, which is published in English, contained several articles that described al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Qatada as being misguided. It also accused al-Qaeda and its leadership — including bin Laden — of irjā’ (a theological deviation involving delaying judgment on sinners. [iv] Many analyses have focused on uncovering the true nature of the conflict between the so-called "Islamic State" organization (ISIS) and the broader Jihadi Salafi movement, with its various groups. This summary highlights the two main points of disagreement: (1) Organizational Conflict: The first and most prominent issue lies in ISIS’s refusal to submit to the leadership and directives of the broader Jihadi Salafi current. This refusal led to differing views on strategic priorities—particularly in Syria—and eventually escalated into disagreements over the structure and leadership of the organization itself. Unvetted and unknown individuals were introduced into ISIS’s ranks, especially those not accepted by al-Qaeda, leading to disobedience and the breakdown of discipline. This divergence eventually gave rise to harsh rulings of Takfir (declaring others to be disbelievers) and infighting. (2) Ideological Conflict: The second area of disagreement is ideological. ISIS developed a set of unique and controversial religious interpretations—especially regarding takfir and its expanded application, as well as in its approach to military operations, both in scale and method. It’s worth noting that signs of tension between ISIS and the broader movement existed as early as the days when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. However, these differences were deliberately concealed at the time in the name of “preserving the interests of jihad,” until they surfaced publicly and ultimately led to direct conflict between the two wings of the movement. Despite this divide, the foundational ideological and theological framework of the Jihadi Salafi movement as a whole remains grounded in the idea that armed struggle is the legitimate method for change in the Muslim world. This includes fighting against governments and regimes they label as “apostate,” “agents of the West,” or as having replaced the rule of Allah. Their reasoning is based on doctrines of Hakimiyyah (sovereignty belongs to God) and al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal), as interpreted by the movement. Notably, they limit their religious references to a narrow set of ideologues, excluding the broader body of Muslim scholars. A review of the writings of key ideologues—such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al-Filastini—reveals a high degree of alignment in core beliefs and doctrines. In fact, despite the prolonged dispute, al-Maqdisi once tweeted about his relationship with ISIS members, saying: “I am their sheikh who taught them Tawheed (monotheism).” It is important to recognize that the Jihadi Salafi current itself contains a range of tendencies—from more extreme to more moderate—yet its foundational principles are still built on the frameworks established by its ideologues. It’s also worth noting that many of the historical figures often associated with these movements—such as Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, and Khattab—did not hold many of the ideas promoted by the current iteration of the Jihadi Salafi movement. For example: They did not endorse the blanket takfir of governments. In fact, they expelled individuals from their camps for expressing such views. Nor did they refer to foreign fighters joining them as “muhajirun” (emigrants), but rather called them “Ansar” (supporters), and they discouraged them from asserting control in the lands they entered. These and many other examples highlight the need to re-examine the historical evolution of these movements, the factors behind their transformation, and the individuals responsible for this shift. It also calls into question whether these movements truly represent the legacy of the figures they claim as their foundation—figures whose names they use to gain legitimacy. [v] See the fatwa: Hal al-qitāl al-qā’im bayna al-katā’ib al-mujāhidah wa tanẓīm (al-Dawlah) qitāl fitnah? “Is the fighting between the Mujahideen brigades and the ‘State’ organization a fitna?” http://islamicsham.org/fatawa/1549 [vi] See the fatwa: Yunẓar fatwā: Hal tanẓīm (al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah) min al-Khawārij? (Is the “Islamic State” organization among the Kharijites?) http://islamicsham.org/fatawa/1945 [vii] These include: Fatwa regarding the Islamic State organization in Iraq and al-Sham: http://sy-sic.com/?p=263. Statement by the Syrian Islamic Council regarding the war on terrorism: http://sy-sic.com/?p=182. Clarifying statement about the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham organization: http://sy-sic.com/?p=244 [viii] These include: A fatwa concerning the Islamic State organization in Iraq and al-Sham: http://sy-sic.com/?p=263. A statement by the Syrian Islamic Council regarding the war on terrorism: http://sy-sic.com/?p=182. A clarifying statement about the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham organization: http://sy-sic.com/?p=244. [ix] See Statement No. 1003, al-muta‘alliq bi-i‘lān tanẓīm al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah al-khilāfah fī al-‘Irāq wa Sūriyā (Regarding the declaration of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State organization. http://www.iraq-amsi.net/ar/news_view_75741.html [x] Many statements, fatwas, and positions were issued by the military factions in Iraq and their various Sharia bodies to clarify the reality of the Islamic State of Iraq organization during the time of the war in Iraq. [xi] Since the beginning of the blessed Syrian revolution, scholars and fatwa councils have actively accompanied it by issuing religious rulings related to the uprising. They were at the forefront of this effort, preceding any extremist groups. One notable example is the work of the Islamic Sham Organization, which issued some of the earliest fatwas, including: Is it permissible to give zakat in advance to aid the Syrian people? Should a person obey orders to kill protesters to save himself? Is someone killed by the Syrian regime considered a martyr? These rulings can be found at: http://islamicsham.org/fatawa. Later, when the revolution turned into an armed struggle, the Syrian Resistance Charter was issued, followed by an explanation titled Explanation of the Syrian Resistance Charter. These works focus on clarifying the rulings related to jihad in the Syrian context. You can view it here: http://islamicsham.org/versions/715. [xii] Shaykh Abdullah Azzam said in his book “Bushā’ir al-Naṣr” (Glad Tidings of Victory), p. 14: “Do not forget that you are a guest of the Afghans, and that these people paved the way for you to fulfil the obligation of jihad. So the credit belongs to Allah first and last, and then to them. So preserve this favour they have granted you.” He—and many other leaders of jihad—rejected taking any official positions in the countries where they were engaged in jihad. They spoke extensively on this matter and issued strong warnings against doing so. [xiii] As mentioned in the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) letter to Hawdhah ibn Ali al-Hanafi, the ruler of Yamamah. See: ‘Uyoon al-Athar fi Funoon al-Maghazi wal-Shama’il wal-Siyar by Ibn Sayyid al-Nas (Vol. 2, p. 338). [xiv] Abu Basir al-Tartousi said in his article “A Man Should Not Lead in Another’s Domain”: The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “When someone visits a people, he should not lead them in prayer. Let one of them lead the prayer.” He also said: “A man should not lead another in his own home or in his domain, nor should he sit in a place of honour in someone’s home except with their permission.” The early scholars said: The host has more right to lead the prayer than the guest. Based on this principle, just as a guest should not lead the prayer in someone else’s home out of respect for the host’s rights, dignity, and feelings, and just as he is not allowed to sit on the host’s couch or special seat without permission, it follows even more strongly that he should not assume leadership in matters of governance, politics, or managing the affairs of a land without the host’s consent and approval. In fact, this analogy is even more applicable, more sensitive, and a clearer violation of the host’s rights, dignity, and authority. Any guest who fails to observe this etiquette and this profound Prophetic teaching will inevitably end up in conflict with the rightful host. And when that happens, he will have no one to blame but himself. ------ Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti is a researcher and expert in Islamic studies. He serves as the Deputy Head of the Fatwa Council at the Syrian Islamic Council, where he contributes to issuing fatwas on contemporary issues (as reported in Roaa Islamic Magazine, Arabic). He has authored several works, but is best known for his book “The Doubts Raised by the Islamic State Organization and Its Supporters—and Responses to Them”, which addresses topics related to ISIS's ideology and the doubts surrounding it, drawing on the insights of various scholars and theologians. URL for part 1: Introduction: Refuting ISIS and the Ideology of Terror in the Name of Islam: Part—1 URL: https://www.newageislam.com/islam-terrorism-jihad/refuting-doubts-isis-supporters-part-2/d/136651 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism