Debunking Extremist Claims: The True Meaning of Hijrah and the Reality of Jihad Mobilization: Part - 5

By Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti Translated from Arabic to English by Ghulam Ghaus Siddiqi, New Age Islam 24 September 2025 A detailed response clarifying misconceptions about “Muhajirun,” the misuse of Islamic texts by extremist groups, and the correct rulings on jihad and migration in Islamic law. ----- (Translator’s Note: “Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti’s article “Debunking Extremist Claims: The True Meaning of Hijrah and the Reality of Jihad Mobilization: Part 5” critically addresses widespread misconceptions promoted by extremist groups such as ISIS regarding hijrah (emigration) and jihad. The article demonstrates how these groups distort Islamic texts to legitimize their violent agendas, while providing a clear and authentic explanation of hijrah in classical Islamic law, the rulings on jihad, and the social dynamics related to foreign fighters. It further emphasizes humility and sincerity in religious practice, countering the self-righteousness often displayed by extremists. Translating this work into English is essential to extend its reach beyond Arabic-speaking audiences, equipping Muslims and non-Muslims alike with a reliable refutation of extremist narratives. It serves as a valuable resource for educators, scholars, and community leaders, supporting informed dialogue about Islam and helping safeguard vulnerable audiences from radicalization through accessible counter-narratives grounded in Islamic teachings. In translating this article, every effort has been made to accurately convey the author’s intent in English. References and explanations of key terms have been provided in the endnotes for clarity. Of particular interest is endnote number four, which highlights one of the main reasons extremist organizations rely so heavily on so-called “muhājirīn” and assign them leadership positions. These groups deeply distrust local populations, who generally reject their extremist ideologies and foreign-imposed agendas, whereas recruits arriving from abroad have already embraced the ideology, severed ties with their past lives, and left themselves with no alternative but full commitment. As a result, foreign fighters disproportionately carry out suicide bombings (al-ʿamaliyāt al-istishhādiyyah), lead the early formation of extremist cells, and their elimination often precipitates group collapse. Moreover, the bulk of extremist propaganda is produced in foreign languages for international audiences, as seen in ISIS’s magazine Dābiq, which contained overtly extremist rhetoric, takfīr discourse, and deceptive portrayals of life under the so-called caliphate—content rarely published in Arabic. “As noted in endnote number four, when this propaganda was translated into Arabic it provoked significant backlash, leading to the removal of most issues, with only a few carefully selected articles retained for specific propaganda purposes.” This highlights how extremist groups exploit the ignorance of foreign audiences in order to deceive, recruit, and mobilize global supporters.”) …. Debunking Extremist Claims: The True Meaning of Hijrah and the Reality of Jihad Mobilization: Part – 5 By Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti The extremists infer the validity of their methodology by pointing to the presence among them of emigrants who left their homes and families, emigrating for the sake of Allah and striving in His cause. They claim this indicates that they are upon the truth and the correct path! In response to this misconception: • A clarification of the true meaning of hijrah (emigration) and the correct interpretation of the related texts. • A clarification of the error in declaring the people of al-Sham (Greater Syria) who came to support them as disbelievers. • A detailed ruling on mobilizing for jihad. The misconception: The "muhajirun" (emigrants) left their homes and families in emigration and jihad for the sake of Allah, and this indicates that they are upon the truth and the correct methodology. Most of them are found in the ranks of the [Islamic] State organization (Tanzim al-Dawlah), which further proves the correctness of the group’s methodology. Response to this misconception: First: Labelling those who came to Syria—or to other lands of jihad and resistance—as muhajirun is not necessarily valid or accepted. Linguistically, hijrah (emigration) refers to several meanings, the most important of which are: separation, abandonment, distancing, and relocation to another land.[i] In Islamic law (Sharī‘ah), hijrah is defined as leaving the land of disbelief (dār al-kufr) and migrating to the land of Islam (dār al-Islām).[ii] Hijrah is only considered legitimate (shar‘i) if it is done to preserve one’s religion or to escape persecution. Al-Qurṭubī (may Allah have mercy on him) said regarding the verse: “And fear a trial (fitnah) which will not strike those who have wronged among you exclusively...” [al-Anfāl: 25]: “Our scholars said: When a tribulation becomes widespread, it destroys everyone. This occurs when sins appear openly, evil becomes widespread, and no one tries to stop it. If the people do not act to change it, then the believing individuals who reject it in their hearts are obligated to abandon that land and flee from it. This was the ruling for the nations before us... and this is what the Salaf (early righteous predecessors) said as well.”[iii] However, the majority of those individuals came from Muslim lands that are not considered lands of disbelief (dār kufr). And those who came from non-Muslim countries did not leave due to fear for their religion, nor were they fleeing persecution or oppression. In fact, many of them lived securely and peacefully before making the move. Therefore, it is incorrect to label such individuals as muhajirun, even if one intends the linguistic meaning. This is because hijrah has become a well-established legal term (istilāh shar‘ī) with specific meanings and rulings in Islamic law—especially since they base legal judgments and stances on this label. And even if they were genuine muhajirun, merely making hijrah does not in itself prove the correctness of one’s methodology, nor does it serve as a criterion to distinguish truth from falsehood. Secondly: There has appeared in the discourse of the [Islamic] State organization (Tanzim al-Dawlah) a clear extremism in the understanding and application of the texts regarding hijrah (emigration). Among the examples of this: They apply the legal texts revealed about the Emigrant Companions (al-Muhajirun) to those who have joined their organization. For instance, al-‘Adnani said in his speech titled “Then Let Us Invoke the Curse of Allah Upon the Liars”—in a lengthy statement about the "muhajirun": “O seeker of guidance, your Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: ‘Stick to al-Sham (Greater Syria), for it is the best of Allah’s lands; He chooses for it the best of His creation.’ So look: On which side are the muhajirun in the land of al-Sham today? O Ansar (supporters), reflect on the words of your Lord, the Almighty: ‘Indeed, those who believed and those who emigrated and strove in the cause of Allah—it is they who hope for Allah’s mercy’ [al-Baqarah: 218] ...Take refuge with the muhajirun, O Ansar, for Allah, Blessed and Exalted, said: ‘And those who emigrated for the sake of Allah after being wronged—We will surely settle them in this world in a good place; but the reward of the Hereafter is greater, if only they knew’ [al-Nahl: 41] ...Take refuge with the muhajirun, for Allah is their guarantor. Take refuge with the muhajirun, support them, and aid them, for Allah will not misguide them. Take refuge with the muhajirun, for jihad cannot be established without the muhajirun and the Ansar.” (end quote) This speech contains several serious misinterpretations of the religious texts, for the following reasons: 1. These texts were revealed about the Emigrant Companions (al-Muhajirun) — may Allah be pleased with them. These were individuals whom the religious texts explicitly affirm were granted Allah’s pleasure, the approval of His Messenger (peace be upon him), Paradise, and forgiveness. So how can these descriptions possibly apply to others? 2. Applying the texts revealed about the Emigrant Companions to those whom they (the group) label as “muhajirun”—and then applying the rulings and virtues associated with the Companions to their own recruits—and using these virtues as evidence of the correctness of their own methodology, just as the Companions' methodology was correct, is clearly corrupt and invalid reasoning. 3. There is nothing in these texts that indicates that merely performing hijrah guarantees protection from misguidance, or the correctness of one’s actions and beliefs. 4. The claim that jihad cannot be established except through the muhajirun and Ansar is false and has no basis in Islamic law. In fact, defensive jihad (jihad al-daf ‘)—that is, repelling disbelieving invaders from Muslim lands—is an obligation upon the people of that land specifically. It is not required of others from different lands unless they are needed, as will be explained in later sections. Thirdly: Those who came to Iraq and Syria with the intention of offering support (nusrah) were met with a warm welcome by the local population. The people of these lands opened their hearts before their homes and dwellings, they sheltered them, helped them, provided for their needs, and rejoiced at their presence. However, when such a newcomer transforms into someone who: • Declares the local people to be disbelievers (takfīr), • Sheds their blood and seizes their wealth unlawfully, • Accuses them of treason and collaboration, • Attempts to divert their revolution toward goals and agendas that are harmful to the land and its people, • And ultimately aids the tyrannical oppressor or lurking occupier—whether directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally—then there is no choice but to resist his aggression and oppression, in order to restore rights and protect the revolution and the cause of jihad. This rule applies equally to locals and outsiders. And even if such a person’s intentions were good, that does not exempt him from responsibility or accountability for his mistakes.[iv] Fourthly: The repeated claim that “we only emigrated seeking Allah’s pleasure, in support of the truth, and in defence of the oppressed” falls under what Allah has prohibited regarding self-righteousness, as in His saying: “So do not claim purity for yourselves; He is most knowing of who fears Him.” [Surat al-Najm: 32] Moreover, such self-praise often leads to blameworthy behaviours, such as: • Boasting of one’s deeds, • Reminding others of favours done to them, • Causing harm, • And arrogance and pride in both speech and action. What was required of them was to: • Acknowledge Allah’s favour upon them for making this great opportunity (to emigrate and support the cause) easy, • Thank Him for it, • And display humility toward others. This is a sign of sincere and accepted deeds. Ibn Kathīr said regarding the verse: “They consider it a favour to you that they have accepted Islam.” [al-Ḥujurāt: 17] Meaning: The Bedouins who regarded their acceptance of Islam, following the Prophet (peace be upon him), and their support for him, as a favour upon him—Allah responds to them: “Say: Do not regard your Islam as a favour to me. Rather, Allah has conferred favour upon you that He guided you to faith—if you are indeed truthful.” That is, if you are sincere in your claim. As the Prophet (peace be upon him) said to the Ansar on the Day of Ḥunayn: “O assembly of the Ansar! Did I not find you astray, and Allah guided you through me? You were divided, and Allah united you through me. You were poor, and Allah enriched you through me.” Whenever he said something, they replied: “Allah and His Messenger have bestowed the favour.”[v] It is also reported that the reason for the revelation of this verse is: “A group from the Arabs said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, we accepted Islam and did not fight against you, while such-and-such tribe did fight you!’” Another narration states they said: “O Messenger of Allah, we have testified that there is no god but Allah alone with no partner, and that you are His servant and Messenger. We came to you without you sending for us, and we are at peace with those behind us.” So Allah revealed this verse.[vi] It is also important to note that many non-Syrian fighters are present in other jihadi factions in Syria, and they continue to be treated well, with no harm or injustice inflicted upon them. This clearly indicates the true origin and cause of the conflict. Fifthly: The Ruling on Mobilizing for Jihad (al-Nafīr ilā al-Jihād) Jihadi organizations deliberately seek to mobilize followers to come from outside the countries where fighting is taking place, claiming that jihad becomes a personal obligation (farḍ ‘ayn) on every Muslim man and woman across the globe whenever any Muslim land is attacked or occupied. Some of them have labelled it "the neglected obligation" (al-farīḍah al-ghā’ibah), and others have called it “the greatest obligation” of our time. They support their view by citing selected statements from scholars. However, upon proper examination, it becomes clear that these statements are often misunderstood, misapplied, or taken out of their proper context. In fact, the consistent position of classical and contemporary scholars is that jihad with one's own person (physical participation) is not an individual obligation (farḍ ‘ayn) except in specific cases: 1. If the imam (legitimate leader) calls upon a group of people to mobilize, then it becomes obligatory upon them. 2. When two opposing armies meet in battle.[vii] 3. If the enemy attacks a Muslim land, then fighting becomes a personal obligation on every able person within that land. If the local population is unable to repel the enemy, then the obligation extends to those in the neighbouring areas, and then to others further away, in order of proximity, until the need is fulfilled and sufficiency is achieved. Ibn ‘Ābidīn (may Allah have mercy on him) said in his marginal notes (Ḥāshiyah): "When mobilization (al-nafīr) is declared, jihad becomes an individual obligation (farḍ ‘ayn) only upon those closest to the enemy. As for those who are farther away from the enemy, it remains a collective obligation (farḍ kifāyah) upon them. They may omit it without sin so long as they are not needed. But if they are needed—either because those closer to the enemy are incapable of resistance, or because they are lazy and do not engage in jihad—then it becomes an individual obligation upon those who are next in line, and so on..."[viii] Al-Qurṭubī (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "There are situations in which everyone must mobilize—this is the fourth case—that is, when jihad becomes obligatory due to the enemy overpowering a region, or reaching the heartland. In such a case, it becomes obligatory upon all the people of that land to go out for jihad, whether young or old, light or heavy, each according to their ability, even if they must go without their father's permission, or in the case of one without a father. No one who is capable of going out—whether a combatant or one who can support—may stay behind. If the people of that town are unable to repel the enemy, then it becomes obligatory upon those in nearby regions, as it was on the locals, until it becomes clear that they are capable of resisting and supporting them. Likewise, anyone who is aware of their weakness and is able to reach and help them, is also required to go. For all Muslims are united as one hand against those who oppose them. Once the people of the attacked region have repelled the enemy, the obligation is lifted from others."[ix] Al-Dardīr said: "Jihad becomes individually obligatory (farḍ ‘ayn) when the enemy attacks suddenly, even upon groups such as women and slaves, and it also becomes obligatory upon those near them if the locals are unable to repel the enemy on their own."[x] Imam al-Nawawī said: "Jihad today is a collective obligation (farḍ kifāyah), unless the disbelievers invade a Muslim land—then it becomes individually obligatory (farḍ ‘ayn) upon them. If the people of that land are not sufficient to repel the invasion, then those in neighbouring areas must complete the obligation."[xi] Ibn Qudāmah said: "Jihad becomes an individual obligation (farḍ ‘ayn) in three situations: • The first: When the two armies meet and the battle lines are drawn—it becomes forbidden for those present to retreat, and obligatory for them to remain. • The second: When the disbelievers invade a Muslim land—it becomes obligatory upon its people to fight and repel them. • The third: When the imam calls upon a group of people to mobilize—it becomes obligatory for them to go with him..."[xii] Ibn Taymiyyah said: "When the enemy enters the lands of Islam, there is no doubt that repelling him becomes obligatory on those who are closest, and then on those further away—since all Muslim lands are like a single city. As for defensive fighting (jihād al-daf‘), for example, if the enemy is numerous and the Muslims are unable to defeat them, but there is fear that if they withdraw, the enemy will attack the Muslims they leave behind—then, in this case, our scholars clearly stated that the Muslims must sacrifice their own lives and even the lives of those they fear may be harmed, in order to repel the enemy and ensure the safety of the others."[xiii] The statements of the scholars on this topic are extensive. However, some of these statements include general terms or broad language which, upon closer inspection, apply specifically to the people of the land under attack, and not to all Muslims universally. Therefore, the blanket claim that it is obligatory upon all Muslims in every region to mobilize for jihad, regardless of proximity or necessity, is not supported by the statements or fatwas of the scholars. It is one of the errors and exaggerations committed by many of the groups that call to jihad. Moreover, in many of the regions where jihad has taken place against occupiers or aggressors, the issue is not a lack of fighters, but rather a critical need for material support—such as weapons, food, aid for the families, and logistical needs. Also, those who come from abroad are often unfamiliar with the country, its people, and the nature of the groups they are joining. Many of these groups intentionally recruit foreigners because they are easier to manipulate and deceive, as revealed in numerous reports and confessions broadcast by various entities in Syria. Some of these accounts report that individuals were pushed into suicide operations or other acts of violence under the false belief that they were fighting the regime or apostates, while in reality, the situation was entirely different. These foreign fighters often suffer from isolation, being cut off from society and kept in segregated compounds, with restricted access to the outside world, making it easier for leaders to manipulate and mislead them however they wish. As for when jihad truly becomes an individual obligation (farḍ ‘ayn), then the usual conditions—such as the permission of the ghārim (the creditor/person to whom one owes a duty), the consent of one’s parents, or authorization from the political leader are no longer required, as explained in the legal rulings of the scholars.[xiv] Conclusion: Whoever joined the so-called “Islamic State” organization (ISIS) or any other faction with the intention of performing jihad in the path of Allah, should not be referred to as a “muhājir” (emigrant). Even if this label were somehow correct, the mere act of “migration” carries no weight in validating the methodology of ISIS or justifying its behaviour. ------- Source: Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti, “Shubuhāt Tanẓīm al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah wa Anṣārih wa al-Radd ʿalayhā, Arabic” ["Doubts and Misconceptions Spread by the Islamic State (ISIS) and its Supporters, and Responses to Them"] ------ Dr. Imad al-Din Khayti is a researcher and expert in Islamic studies. He serves as the Deputy Head of the Fatwa Council at the Syrian Islamic Council, where he contributes to issuing fatwas on contemporary issues (as reported in Roaa Islamic Magazine, Arabic). He has authored several works, but is best known for his book “The Doubts Raised by the Islamic State Organization and Its Supporters—and Responses to Them”, which addresses topics related to ISIS's ideology and the doubts surrounding it, drawing on the insights of various scholars and theologians. Endnotes [i] See: Tāj al-ʿArūs min Jawāhir al-Qāmūs (14/397), and Lisān al-ʿArab (5/250) [ii] See: Jāmiʿ al-ʿUlūm wa al-Ḥikam by Ibn Rajab (1/72), and Al-Taʿrīfāt by al-Jurjānī, p. 256 [iii] Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī (7/932) [iv] One of the main reasons these organizations rely on so-called “muhājirīn” and eagerly assign them leadership roles is their deep distrust of the local populations in the areas where they operate, knowing that these societies generally reject the group’s extremist ideologies and foreign-imposed agendas, which often ignore local social, religious, and political realities. In contrast, those who arrive from abroad do so only after being fully convinced of the group’s ideology, often having severed all ties with their past lives and burned any bridges of return—leaving them with no alternative but full, zealous commitment to the group’s project. Consequently, most individuals who carry out suicide bombings (al-ʿamaliyāt al-istishhādiyyah) are foreigners, the early formation of extremist cells is typically led by these non-locals, and the collapse of such groups often begins when these individuals are neutralized. Furthermore, the bulk of the group’s ideological media—both written and visual—is produced in foreign languages and aimed at non-Arab audiences, as seen in ISIS’s magazine Dābiq, which contains overtly extremist content, takfīr rhetoric, violent ideological messaging, material not found in their Arabic publications, and highly misleading portrayals of life under the so-called caliphate and its conflicts—all designed to exploit the ignorance of foreign audiences about the actual situation in Syria and elsewhere. These tactics serve to deceive, recruit, and mobilize international supporters. When some of this content was translated into Arabic, it triggered widespread backlash, leading to the deletion of most issues—only a few carefully curated articles were retained to serve specific propaganda goals. [v] Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (7/390). The ḥadīth about the Anṣār is narrated by al-Bukhārī (5/157, ḥadīth no. 4330) and Muslim (2/738, ḥadīth no. 1061) from the narration of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Zayd (may Allah be pleased with him). [vi] Lubāb al-Nuqūl fī Asbāb al-Nuzūl, p. 182. [vii] There are specific conditions and rulings for retreat when the two armies face one another, which are not detailed here. However, it is important to note that the rulings for withdrawal in offensive jihad (jihād al-ṭalab) differ from those in defensive jihad (jihād al-dafʿ). See the fatwa: “The Ruling on Withdrawing from Cities and Battlefronts” – http://islamicsham.org/nashrah/1129. [viii] Radd al-Muḥtār ʿalā al-Durr al-Mukhtār ("Ḥāshiyat Ibn ʿĀbidīn") (4/124). [ix] Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī (8/151). [x] Al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr (2/174). [xi] Sharḥ al-Nawawī (13/9). [xii] Al-Mughnī (9/197). [xiii] Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā (5/539). [xiv] Some scholars state that defensive jihad (jihād al-dafʿ) does not always require the permission of a ruler; this is not an absolute rule but depends on the circumstances. If aggression (Ṣiyāl) occurs in a land with a governing authority, the ruler’s permission is necessary, as he may have insight or a specific strategy. This also applies when there is no single ruler but influential leaders or faction heads whose authority is recognized. However, the requirement for permission is waived in cases of direct self-defence or sudden enemy assault. Ibn Qudāmah (may Allah have mercy on him) in al-Mughnī (9/213) explains that when the enemy attacks, jihad becomes an individual obligation (farḍʿayn) on all, and no one may abstain; yet, they should not go out except with the commander’s permission because military affairs are entrusted to him, and he understands the enemy better. His judgment is safer for Muslims, but if permission cannot be obtained due to a surprise attack, then immediate engagement without permission is required to prevent harm. Furthermore, if jihād al-dafʿ means defending against an attacker (Ṣāʾil) who assaults one’s life or property, it is permissible to fight back without a ruler’s permission, as narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim from Abū Hurayrah (may Allah be pleased with him), where the Prophet ﷺ said: “if a man tries to take your wealth, do not give it to him; if he fights you, fight him; if he kills you, you are a martyr; and if you kill him, he is in the Fire.” Earlier Parts of the Article: Part 1: Introduction: Refuting ISIS and the Ideology of Terror in the Name of Islam: Part—1 Part 2: Refuting the Doubts Raised by ISIS and Its Supporters: Part-2 Part 3: Exposing the False Claim of ISIS: Why They Fit the Description of the Khawarij Part 4: Martyrs or Murderers? Debunking the Illusion of ISIS's Righteousness ….. 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