The Lashkar and other so-called “Kashmiri” groups are not just India’s problem; rather, they are the problem of the entire international community.
India and the United States have more or less agreed on a desired end-state for Pakistan: a stable, democratic, civilian-controlled state at peace with itself and with its neighbours and with a commitment to preventing further nuclear proliferation.
However, Washington and New Delhi have seldom agreed on the best means of encouraging this end-state. Since the 1950s, Indian leadership has been discomfited by Washington’s practice of cajoling Pakistani cooperation for a variety of initiatives with pecuniary appeasements and conventional military assistance, training and sales.
For many years after 9/11, New Delhi rightly chided Washington for its singular focus upon Pakistan’s cooperation in fighting the Al-Qaeda and, after 2007, the Afghan Taliban while doing very little to persuade Pakistan to cease and desist from employing militants to prosecute Pakistan’s foreign policies throughout India. India (likely correctly) believed that Washington tended to view the so-called “Kashmiri groups” as India’s problem. At times those groups also threatened key U.S. security interests. The Jaish attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 precipitated a year-long Indo-Pakistan military crisis, which adversely affected U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan and engagement of Pakistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. Throughout the standoff, U.S. officials worried about the outbreak of war and the possibility of inadvertent or deliberate nuclear use. In other words, Washington cared about the so-called “Kashmiri groups” only if they directly threatened U.S. interests whereas India’s primary security threat centred upon those groups.
http://newageislam.com/the-mumbai-attacks-and-indo-u.s.-relations-/war-on-terror/d/2132
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