By S Mubashir Noor
July 06, 2015
The Taliban spring offensive in Afghanistan has been especially fierce this year. On June 22, they attacked the Afghan parliament in a supposedly secure part of Kabul. A week later, the Taliban ambushed and killed 11 Afghan soldiers in Herat. Critics of the war on terror again mocked the US’s victory claims since, on the surface, it seems the Taliban have never been stronger. This is an illusion: they are starting to feel like headless chickens. Islamic State (IS) has made more gains in Afghanistan than expected while Mullah Omar’s status remains unknown.
Behind the go-for-broke Taliban are their nail-biting leaders, whose nerves are starting to show. On June 27, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had a sudden bout of conscience. Muhammad Khurasani, its spokesperson, blamed Karachi’s heat wave deaths on the city’s sole power supplier, K-Electric. He said K-Electric was “completely responsible due to its unnecessary power outages and profiteering practices,” and warned the TTP could take action. Of course, Khurasani offered no explanation for the thousands killed by the TTP itself.
An even more astounding event took place a little earlier in May. The Afghan Taliban spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, confirmed a Taliban delegation’s visit to Iran. On this “ordinary” visit, Mujahid said, “Iran assured us of their full cooperation in resolving the issues in the region.” Why the change of heart? In 1998, when the Taliban felled Mazar-e-Sharif, they slaughtered several Iranian diplomats and angry Iran almost declared war. The Persian-speaking Afghans of the Northern Alliance have been Iran’s natural allies, not the Pashtuns. It was with their help that the US toppled the Taliban regime in 2001.
All the actors in Afghanistan have, at one time or another, dismissed IS’s chances in the country. Their logic was simple: a foreign cult could not drop anchor among the tight-knit Pashtuns. They, however, underestimated both human nature and history. Al-Baghdadi’s propaganda machine is matchless and IS keeps winning. Everybody loves a winner. Second, the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s had around 20,000 foreign fighters who did just fine in Pashtun society. As long as an Afghan war is led by local warlords, like Hekmatyar and Massoud earlier, everything is socially kosher. The Taliban’s problem in Afghanistan is people defecting from their ranks, not Arabs parachuting into the country.
In January, Al-Baghdadi called Mullah Omar “a fool and an illiterate warlord”, and kicked off a mini-jihad. By April, however, IS’s top brass in Afghanistan was dead, killed either by army operations or an errant bomb. For the Taliban, this joy was short-lived. A month later, on May 24, they clashed with IS in the khaki safe area of Farah province. A local commander claimed: “This was the biggest fight between the Afghan Taliban and IS followers so far.” Mullah Khan Noorzai, an IS convert, warned: “Our jihad against the ignorant so-called Taliban will go on forever.”
The eastern Nangarhar province became the next flashpoint. IS-allied Afghans attacked Taliban formations in June and began pushing them back. IS reportedly took over six of Nangarhar’s 21 districts after this duel. To further Taliban woes, a new renegade faction called Fidayee Mahaz decided to ally with Al-Baghdadi. By sending a delegation to meet him, the group hoped to “categorically tell the IS leader that there will be no misunderstanding if the group continues its operations in Afghanistan,” said spokesperson Qari Hamza.
Since Shahidullah Shahid and the first batch of Taliban commanders defected in October 2014, the group has buckled under image problems. Money no longer comes in like it used to. The Gulf monarchies sympathetic to their cause have moved on to shinier new toys like IS and al Nusra. Though Mullah Omar forbade it, the Taliban were forced to get back into the drug trade full-time to raise funds. It does not help that they are seen as leeches in comparison to rich IS allies either. Malek Jan, a Nangarhar tribal elder, told Reuters, “Unlike the Taliban, they have cash and spend it on food and luring young villagers to join them.”
When Mullah Omar’s biography dropped out of the blue in April, the purpose of this Taliban-published piece was clear. Ahmed Sayedi, a regional expert, felt it was to “counter Daesh influence in their ranks”. Al-Baghdadi is the new face of global jihad while the Taliban are faceless. Most crucially, it is the speed of IS’s advance in Afghanistan that worries the Taliban. With its vast coffers and amped-up recruits, how much will IS have gained in another year? Till now, the group has represented all militias in any Afghan peace talks, but IS pushes to diminish their importance. The Taliban, meanwhile, are trying to stay relevant the best way they know how: by killing more people.
S Mubashir Noor is a freelance columnist and audio engineer based in Islamabad
Source: http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/06-Jul-2015/the-black-flag-worries-the-taliban
No comments:
Post a Comment